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MILLEMANN, PITTENGER, McMAHAN & PEMBERTON, LLP
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Attorneys/or Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
TIlE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY

ALPINE VILLAGE COMPANY,
an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff,

v.

CASE NO. CV-2010-519C
SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

CITY OF MCCALL,
a municipal corporation,
Defendant.
COMES NOW the above named Plaintiff, Alpine Village Company, an Idaho
Corporation and for its cause of action against the City ofMcCaH (hereinafter "City or
"McCan"), comp1ains and alleges as follows:
PARTIES
1.

Plaintiffis an Idaho corporation which at all times material hereto was the

developer and owner of the Alpine Village Planned Unit Development (hereinafter
"Alpine Village") which is located in McCall, Valley County, Idaho. Plaintiff is also the
owner ofthe Timbers Condorniniwns (the "Timbers") which is located in McCaU, Valley

County, Idaho.
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2.

Defendant City of McCall is a municipal corporation of the State of Idaho.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE
3.

Jurisdiction and venue are proper in this Court as Defendant is situated in

Valley County and P1aintiffis seeking damages in excess ofTen Thousand Dollars
($10,000),

NA TURE OF ACTION
4.

This is a civil action seeking damages for actions ofthe City which

constitute an unlawful taking of Plaintiff's property in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 14

of the Idaho Constitution.

FACTS
5.

Plaintiff acquired property located in downtown McCall for the purpose of

developing a mixed use development. Plaintiff's said property is the site of Alpine

Village.
6.

On February 23,2006, McCan adopted Ordinance No. 819 (hereinafter

"Ordinance 819" or "Inciusionary Housing Ordinance").

7.

Ordinance 819 required that twenty (20) percent of the lots and bouses in

all new residential subdivisions, including condominium projects, be permanently
restricted as community housing units to be affordabIe to City ofMcCal1 households with
incomes in certain defined categories. A true and accurate copy of Ordinance 819 is
attached hereto as "Exhibit AI>.
8.

Ordinance 819 required any applicant seeking the City's approval of a

new residential subdivision or condominium project to submit an IncIusionary Housing
P1an (a.k.a. Community Housing Plan) with the initial subdivision application. The Plan

was required to demonstrate the applicant's proposed method of providing the
community bousing which was required by Ordinance 819.
9.

Ordinance 819 provided four ways by which an applicant could satisfy the

commuoity housing requirements of the Ordinance: 1) construct the community housing
units on the site of the proposed subdivision; 2) construct the community housing units
off-site from the subdivision; 3) convey land to the City equal in value to the total amount
oftbe required number of conununity housing units; or 4) pay a fee to the city in lieu of
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providing either finished units or land. Options 1 and 2 required that the units be

pennanently deed restricted both as to price and the al10wable income levels of buyers

and owners.
10.

On June 20, 2006, Plaintiff submitted the applications to the City which

were required by the McCall City Code for preliminary approval of the Alpine Village
project. These included applications for Preliminary Plat Approval, for Planned Unit
Development Preliminary Plan Approval, for a Conditional Use Pennit, for Scenic Route
Approval and for Amendment of the McCall Zoning Map (hereinafter the "Preliminary
Applications"). The project is a mul1i-phase planned unit development with a mix of
residential, retail and commercial condominium units. As required by Ordinance 819, a
Community Housing Plan was submitted with the Preliminary Applications. The
Preliminary Applications were accepted by the City, which then commenced its review
and public hearing process.

] 1.

On September 22, 2006, a lawsuit was filed by the Mountain Central

Board of Realtors, Inc., against the City of McCall, (Valley County Case No. CV-2006-

490C) seeking to overturn Ordinance 819. The filing of the lawsuit did not interrupt or

impact the City's processing of the Alpine Village Preliminary Applications.
12.

On October 3, 2006, the McCaU Planning and Zoning Commission

recommended approval of all of the Alpine Village Preliminary Applications to the

McCall City Council, conditioned among other things, on Plaintiff reaching agreement
with the City Council on the Plaintiffs method of compliance with Ordinance 819 and
reducing such agreement to a recorded "Development Agreement".
13.

On December 13,2006, the McCall City Council approved all of the

Alpine Village Preliminary Applications, conditioned on Plaintiff's submittal of a
Community Housing Plan, as part of a Development Agreement, demonstrating
compliance with Ordinance 819, prior to final plat approval.

14.

In January, 2007, Plaintiff entered into a purchase agreement to acquire

the Timbers. Plaintiff agreed to purchase the Timbers solely so that Plaintiff could supply
the seventeen (17) off-site community housing units which wouLd be required to satisfY

the Alpine Village community housing requirements which were imposed by Ordinance
819. Plaintiffs agreement to purchase the Timbers was contingent upon Plaintiff
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receiving approval from the McCall City Council for the use of the Timbers units to
satisfy the off-site community housing requirements for Alpine Village under Ordinance
819.

15.

On March 22, 2007, the McCall City Council approved Plaintiffs

Community Housing Plan for Alpine Village, which proposed to use the Timbers units as
the seventeen (17) off-site community housing units for Alpine Village. This approval,
and the Ordinance itself, required that the Timbers units be deed restricted as Community
Housing Units, to be offered at restricted prices to income eligible buyers, all in
accordance with the Ordinance.
16.

Having received the aforesaid City Council approval for the use of the

Timbers units as the off-site community housjng units for Alpine Village, PJruntiff closed
on its purchase of the Timbers on or about April 16, 2007.
17.

Subsequent to its purchase of1he Timbers, plaintiff improved the Timbers

in order to comply with the City's conditions of approval and to make the units
marketable as owned or rented community housing units.
18.

On May 25, 2007, Plaintiff submitted its applications for Final Plat and

Final PUD Plan approval for Phase 1 of Alpine Village (hereinafter the "Final
Applications"). In satisfaction of the aforesaid City Council conditions of approval of the
Preliminary Applications, Plaintiff submitted a proposed Development Agreement which
incorporated thc previously approved Commllllity Housing Plan for Alpine Village,
dedicating the seventeen (17) Timbers units as off-site community housing units for
Alpine Village.
19.

On August 23,2007, the McCall City Council approved Plaintiffs Final

Applications.
20.

On December 13, 2007, Plaintiff and the City executed the Alpine Village

Development Agreement. The Development Agreement confinned Plaintiff s
Community Housing Plan for Alpine Village, which was appended to the Development
Agreement as Exhibit B. The Development Agreement was filed of record with the
Office of Recorder of Valley County on January 28. 2008. A true and accurate copy of
the Alpine Village Development Agreement is attached hereto as "Exhibit B".
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21.

On February 19,2008, the District Court entered its Memorandum

Decision and Order in Mountain Central Board of Realtors, Inc. v. City of McCall. The

court held that Ordinance 819 was void and without force or effect. The City of McCall
did not appeal the decision. A true and accurate copy of the Decision is attached hereto as
"Exhibit e".
22.

On April 24, 2008, by means of the adoption of Ordinance 856, the City

repealed Ordinance 819. A true and accurate copy of Ordinance 856 is attached hereto as

"Exhibit D".
23.

On July 24, 2008, the City and Plaintiff executed the First Amendment to

Development Agreement. Alpine Village Planned Unit Development, which was filed of
record with the Office of Recorder of Valley County, Idaho on August 8, 2008. This
Amendment released Alpine Village from any community housing requirements. A true

and accurate copy of the said First Amendment to Development Agreement is attached
hereto as "Exhibit E".
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
24.

Paragraphs 1 through 23 are reaUeged and hereby incorporated by

reference.
25.

Plaintiff purchased the Timbers Condominiums solely to comply with the

mandatory requirements of Ordinance 819, which required that Plaintiff provide deed

restricted and income restricted community housing units as a condition of proceeding
with the development of Plaintiffs property. But for the Ordinance, Plaintiff would not
have purchased the Timbers or incurred the costs associated with tbe purchase ofthe
Timbers, the remodel and improvement of the Timbers and the continued ownership of
the Timbers.
26.

The City's requirement that Plaintiff comply with Ordinance 819 as a

mandatory precondition to Plaintiff's development ofits property constituted an unlawful
taking of Plaintiff's property in violation ofthe Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.
27.

As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid taking, Plaintiff has been

damaged in an amount in excess of$1O,OOO.OO, the exact amount to be detennined at
trial.
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28.

On November 15, 2010, Plaintiff delivered to the City a written demand

for payment of its damages incurred as a result of the aforesaid taking. The City has
declined to compensate Plaintiff for any of its said damages.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

29.

Paragraphs 1 through 28 are re-alleged and hereby incorporated by

reference.
30.

Plaintiff purchased the Timbers Condominiums solely to comply with the

mandatory requirements of Ordinance 819. which required that Plaintiff provide deed
restricted and income restricted community housing units as a condition of proceeding
with the development of Plaintiffs property. But for the Ordinance, Plaintiff would not
have purchased the Timbers or incurred the costs associated with the purchase of the
Timbers, the remodel and improvement of the Timbers and the continued ownership of

the Timbers.
31.

The City's requirement that Plaintiff comply with Ordinance 819 as a

mandatory precondition to Plaintiff's development of its property constituted an unlawful
taking of Plaintiffs property in violation of Article 1, Section 14 of the Idaho
Consti tution.
32.

As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid taking, Plaintiff has been

damaged in an amount in excess of $1 0,000.00, the exact amount to be determined at
trial.
33.

On November 15,20 I 0, Plaintiff delivered to the City a written demand

for payment of its damages incurred as a result of the aforesaid taking. The City has
declined to compensate Plaintiff for any of its said damages.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
34.

Paragraphs 1 through 33 are re-alleged and hereby incorporated by

reference.
35.

The City's actions, as alleged herein constitute a taking of property, in

violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as
appHed to state action pursuant to 42 U .S.C. § 1983.
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36.

As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid taking, Plaintiff has been

damaged in an amount in excess 0£$10,000.00, the exact amount to be detennined at
trial.

ATTORNEY FEES
37.

Plaintiff is entitled to recover its attorneys fees and costs incurred in

pursuing this action, pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-117, 12-120, 12-121, IRCP
54(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. §1983 and 1988 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests that this Court enter Judgment in favor of
Plaintiff and against the City as follows:
1.

Declaring that the City's application of Ordinance 819 to Plaintiff as

aforesaid constituted a taking of Plaintiff's property in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the
Idaho Constitution;
2.

A warding Plaintiff its damages suffered as a result of the unlawful taking

of its property, in an amount to be proven at trial;

3.

Awarding Plaintiff its costs and attorney fees incurred in this action; and,

4.

For such other relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

DATED this K 't'''day of September, 201 1.

MILLEMMTN, PITIENGER, MCMAHAN
& PEMBERTON, LLP

BY:~~~
GREG Y C. PITI 'GER
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CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 16th day of September, 2011, I caused to be served by
mail a true and correct copy of the foregoing addressed to the foHowing:

Christopher H. Meyer
Martin C. Hendrickson
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701-2720
MILLEMANN, PITTENGER, McMAHAN
& PEMBERTON, LLP

BY:

~rc~GER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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ORDINANCE NO. 819
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EXHIBIT" A"

ORDINANCE NO. 819

AN ORDINANCB OF nIB CITY OF McCALL, IDAHO AMENDING THE CITY OF
McCALL SUBDIVISION AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS CODE, TITLE 9
TO REQUIRE ALL NEW SUBDIVISIONS TO INCLUDE A CERTAlN NUMBER OF
COMMUNITY HOUSING UNITS TO BE AFFORDABLE TO THE CITY'S
WORKFORCE, PROVIDE FOR A SEVERABILITY CLAUSE AND PROVIDE AN
" EFFECTIVE DATB.
WHEREAS, the Housing Component of the McCal\'Area Comprehensive Plan includes
the following objectives:
o Prepare for the housing impact of maj or development proposals and
expansions on the City of McCall, its impact area, and sUlTounding
~~~

.

o Encourage or provide for affordable housing; and
WHEREAS. the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of the City of McCall is
dependent upon a reasonable supply of affordable, deed restricted workforce housing
(community housing) being made available to ensure that critical professional workers,
essential service personnel, and service workers 1.ive within proximity to their work 10
provide municipal and private sector services; and

WHEREAS, the City of McCall has determined through publicinpllt and the
comprehensive planning process that II reasonable supply of community housing is
needed to promote the social and economic diversity of the City; and
WHEREAS, the economic v:itality and wen-being of the citizens oftha City of McCa1l is
dependent upon reasonable supply of community housing, and that persons such as
medical personnel, peace officers, emergency person"lel, fire personnel, and providers of
oilier professional services, which are vital to the community, are dependent upon the
availability of community hOllsing; and

a

. WHEREAS, to advance these objectiveS the City, in partnership with Valley County,
Adams County. and the communities of Cascade, Donnelly, and New Meadows,
commissioned a Housing Market and Needs Assessment for Valley and Adams County
(Housing Needs Assessment) that was completed July, 2005; and

WHEREAS. the Housing Needs Assessment detennined that.21 0 community housin,g
units are currently needed in Valley and Adams Counties, including 145 low to moderate
income homes for families earning 50 to 100% of annual median income and 65
moderate to middle income homes for families earning 100 to 160% of annual median
income; and

20~

"

,-

~-

.
WHEREAS, the Housing Needs Assessment detennined that 200 additional homes are
needed in Vaney and Adams Counties in the next two years, including 138 low to
moderate income homes and 62 moderate to middle income homes; and .
WHEREAS, the Housing Needs Assessment detennined that housing is needed for the
families of a significant number of the 700 to 1,000 construction workers estimated to be

working in Valley and Adams Counties and commuting to their homes elsewhere,
reducing the vitality of the local economy; and
WHEREAS, the Housing Needs Assessment determined that the total number of units
needed to catch up with demand in Valley and Adams Counties is between 550 and 610
units of Community Housing; and
WHEREAS, the City of McCall encompasses approximately 20010 of the region's
population and employment; and
WHEREAS, 20% of the housing needed to catch up with demand. as identified in the
Housing Needs Assessment is 110 to 122 homes, including 16 to 84 low to moderate
income homes and 34 to 38 moderate to middle income homes; and
WHEREAS, the City of McCall is presently comprised of approximately 40% year round
primary residences and approximately 60% seasonally-occupied homeS; and
WHEREAS, the City of McCall desires to maintain the current ratio of year round
primary residences to seasonally--occupied homes as the community grows; and
WHEREAS, the McCall City Council beld housing policy discussions at City Council
m-eetings on July 14, 2005 and August II, 2005; held public information sessions on
housing policy on August 20, 2005 and Augoot 23, 2005, and held public hearings on a
proposed Housing Policy on September 7, 2005 and September 22, 2005; and
WHEREAS, to assure the existence of a supply of desirable and affordable housing for
persons currently employed in the McCan area, persons who were employed in the
McCall area prior to retirement, the disabled, and other qualified persons of the McCall
lIIea, the City of McCall adopted the following Commuinty Housing Policy (Resolution
05~19) on September 22,2005:
1. Responsibility
1.1. The City of McCall is responsible for developing and implementing a
community housing program to meet the needs 0 f its citizens.
1.2. The City of McCall will develop and implement this program in partnership
with other local, state, and federal agencies.
1.3. The City of McCall will regularly refine its community housing policy to
reflect new information and changing market conditions.
2. SeasonallYear Round Housing Mix

2
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2.1 .. McCall's Community Housing Program will be designed and implemented to
maintain the ratio (60/40) of seasonally-occupied homes to year round
primary residences as the community grows.
3. Intended Beneficiaries
3.1. McCall's Community Housing Program will be designed to benefit:
3.1.1. Low, moderate. and middle income families
3.1.2. Local workers
3.1.3. Senior citizens
3.1.4. Special needs populations
4. Income Targets
4.1. The policy will develop housing targeted to meet the needs of the following
household types:
4.1.1. Low Income - 50% of median income
4.1.2. Moderate Income - 80% of median income
4.1.3. Middle Income -160% of median income

r

I

5. Job/Housing Relationship
5.1. Community housing wiU be developed primarily for peopJe with jobs in the

community.
6.

7.

8.

9.

5.2. McCall will house at least 50 percent of i1s workforce within city limits.
Production Goals
6.1. To keep up with demand and eliminate our community housing backlog
within ten years, McCall is committed to providing:
6.1.1. 43 additional low to moderate income homes annually
6.1.2. 22 additional moderate to middle income homes annually
6. t.3, Senior and special needs housing in quantities to be determined
OwnershiplRental Mix
7.1. McCaU will develop community housing to maintain at least 65 percent
owner occupied housing within the :year round resident community.
LocationlUnit Type
8.1. Community housing requirements for new development will be met within
the ge'Ographic bOlUldaries of new development to the extent possible.
8.2. Mixed use projects will be encouraged to incorporate community housing
into commercial nnd industrial orcas.
8.3. Public community housing resources will focus on infill and redevelopment
to:
.
8.3.1. Maintain and enhance existing neighborhoods;
8.3.2. Promote a jobs-housing balance;
8.3.3. Reduce reliance on the automobile; and
8.3.4. Promote smart growth principals and reduce sprawl.
Design and Quality
9.1. Community housing is civic architecture and reflects the values of the
corwnunity.
9.2. Community housing should be designed to fit its context.
9.3. Design within budget is a characteristic of good design; and

3
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WHEREAS, Resolution 05·19 directs staifto develop ordinances to implement the
Community Housing Policy for consideration by the Planning & Zoning Commission and
, the City Council, including an Inclusionary Housing Ordinance; and
WHEREAS. 24% of the City's households have incomes between 100010 and 160% of the
area median income, Bnd these households can no longer afford housing in McCall; and
WHEREAS, the best available data indicates tha.t the average price of a home for sale in
McCall currently exceeds $300,000; and
WHEREAS, the best available data indicates that the growth of the area as a resort
community will continue to fuel rising housing prices while concurrently increasing the
demand for a workforce that can not afford housing; and
WHEREAS, the best available data indicates that approximately 15% of the families
currently residing in McCall have sufficient income to afford the mortgage payments of a
$300,000 home; and
WHEREAS, the development and construction of residential dwelling units create the
need for local employees to service and maintain the dwelling units, and the residents
thereof; and
WHEREAS; some fann of community housing assistance and requirements are needed to
.
maintain a local workforce;
NOW; THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL
OF THE CITY OF McCALL, IDAHO THAT:
SECTION 1: THle 9. McCall Zoning Code is hereby by amended by adding Section
9.7.10, Inclusionary Housing, to read as follows:
9.7.10

A

INCLUSIONARY HOUSING

Twenty (20) percent of the lots and houses in all subdivisions, including
condominium subdivisions, approved and platted after the adoption date of this
Section shall be pennanently restricted 8S community housing to be affordable to
Cjty of McCall households with incomes in categories m and IV as defined in
subsection 2, Community Housing by Income, below.
1.

Options for Providing Community Housing
An applicant for subdivision approval may propose and the City Council

may approve, pursuant to the priorities and criteria established below, any
of fOUl (4) options, or combination thereo~ to provide Community
Housing that is required by this Section.

4

I 21~I

•\

!1

a.

b.

First priority is for the applicant to build cotnm\lll.ity housing on
the site of the subdivision.
Second priority is for the applicant to build comm:unity housing off
site of the subdivision.

2.

c.

Third priority is for the applicant to convey land for community
housing.

d.

Fourth priority is for the applicant to pay a fee-in-lieu for
community housing.

Community Housing by Income Category
Fifty (50) percent of the required community housing lots andlorhousing
units shall be affordable to households in each of the two (2) income

categories below.

m

a.

Category

b.

Category IV includes househ01ds earning more than one hundred
twenty (120) percent but not more than one hundred sixty (160)
percent of the Valley County median household income.

c.

'The median household inccme for Valley County is derived and
annually updated by the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban

includes households earning more than one hundred
(100) percent but not more than one hundred twenty (120) percent
of the Valley County median household income.

Development.
3.

On Site Community'Housing

Community housing units shall be constructed on tbe site of the
subdivision in such a manner as to create 5n integrated subdivision unless
the City Council finds the provision of on-site community housing is
impractical by making one (1) or more ofilie follOwing findings.
11.

'The Inclusionary Housing Plan proposed by the applicant includes
constructing on-site community housing, constructing off-site
community housing, and/or land conveyance and this plan is found
by City Council to be in conformance with the City of McCall
Comprehensive Plan and Housing Policy.
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b.

The community housing units are subject to federal andlor state
financial assistance and the on-site location cannot comply with
the tenus and conditions of the financial assistanCe.

c.

The number of required community housing units results in less
than one (1) nousingunit.

d.

The community housing units located on-site would be
incompatible with the surrounding lands because of conflicting
uses, site plan design or bulk.

.
i

~

!

4.

Off Site Community Housing
If the City Council finds that constructing some oJ.- all of the required onsite community housing is impractical, community housing shall be
constructed off-site from the subdivision unless the City Council
detennines that land conveyance better achieves community housing
goals. The proposed off-site location shall be suitable for community
housing by complying with all of the following standards.
a.

Development of community housing at the "off-site" Location will
comply with the goals of the City of McCa11 Housing Policy.

b.

The community housing units can be. designed and built in a way
that is compatib~e with surrounding Jand uses.

c.

Community housing at the "off-site" location will comply with
applicable Zoning and Subdivision Code requirements.

d.

The density pemcitted on the subdivision site may be devoted fully
to free-market lots and the off-site community housing units shall
be included in the total number of subdivision lots when
calculating the community housing requirement

e.

The number of community housing units constnlcted off-site shall
be provided in an anlOunt equal to:
a. 125 percentofthe amount which would have been required 1!-ad
it been provided on-site if the off-site housing is within the city
limits of the City of McCall. If only a portion of the required
Community Housing is off-site, only that portion shall be
subject to the 125% factor.
b. 150 percent of the amount which would have been required had
it been provided on-site if the off-site housing is within the city
limits of another municipality located in Valley or Adams
County. If only a portion of the required Community Housing
is off-site, only that portion shall be subject to the 150% factor.

6

c. 200 percent of the amount which would have been required had
it been provided on-site if the off-site housing is within
unincorporated Valley or Adams County. If only a portion of
the required Community Housing is off..site, only that portion
shall be subject to the 200% factor.

,i
i

r
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5.

.

Land Conveyance

If the City Council finds it is impractical to construct on-site oonununity
housing and determines a land conveyance for community housing better
serves the City's conununity housing goals than the construction of offsite community housing, the conveyance of land for cotllmunity housing
may be accepted pursuant to the following standards.

a.

The land shall provide for community housing in appropriate
locations by complying with the following.
1)

Community housing on the land shall comply with the
goals of the City of McCall Housing Policy.

2)

The land shall be near existing or pl/UUled employment
centers, schools and commercial services. .

3)

Housing on the site shaH comply with applicable Zoning
and Subdivision Code requirements.

4)

Notwithstanding this subsection, the Council may accept
land that does not meet these criteria if the I!ale of the land
is anticipated pursuant to subsection e, below.

I.,

b.

The fair market value of the land shall equal the total subsidy
amount for the number of required community housing units as
calculated in Section 9.7.1 O.AA.e as the subsidy amount is
calculated by the City Community Development Director pursuant
to the Community Housing Guidelines, as amended.

1)

A professional real estate appmiser Iiooosed to practice in
Idaho shall establish the fair market value of the land to be
conveyed.

2)

Fair market value shall be established on a preliminary
basis at the time the Inclusionary Housing Plan (subsection
9.0 below) is reviewed.

7
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c.

i

\,

The in lieu fee shaU be paid prior to the City signing the final plat
verifYing subdivision approval, unless the City Council approves
other arrangements with financial assurances. In lieu fees shall be
deposited into 'a separate account pursuant to subsection 11,
Community Housing Trust Account.

7.

Deed Restrictions
The Jots and houses for community housing shall be pennanentJy deed
restricted as to the initial and resale price, minimum size and construction
standards, and qualifications of buyers and renters, pursuant to the
Community Housing Guidelines, as amended. Provided however, if within
nine (9) months after a community housing unit is first available for sale
there are no qualified purchasers of the unit, the City Council shall, upon
request of the developer, remove the community housing deed restrictions
and the unit may be sold by the developer at a market price.
As an alte.rn~tive to pennanent deed restriction, an applicant may request
that up to twenty five (25) percent of the lots and houses be subject to an
"Bquity~Bunder" program pursuant to the Community Housing
Guidelines.
.

,
~..

.~

8.

Timing of Occupancy
All community housing units shall be ready for occupancy. or their
construction costs bonded and a specific timeline approved by the
City Council, no later than the date of the initial occupancy of the
free-market portion of the residential subdivision for which the
community housing is required. lfthe subdivision is approved for
phased development, the community housing units may be
constructed, or bonded with en approved timeJine, in proportion to
the phases oftbe subdivision.

9.

I

.I

Inclusionary Housing j>lan
An applicant for subdivision approval shall submit an lnclusionary
Housing Plflh concurrently with the initial application submittal for the
subdivision. The Inc]usionary Housing Plan shall be prepared and
reviewed pursuant to the following standards.

a.

I

The Inclusionary Housing Plan shall include the following:

j

I,
I

!
I

!
i

I
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3)

4)

Fair mm:ket value shall be confirmed at the time of review
and approval of the final subdivision plat for the free
market portion of the subdivision.
Fair market value shall be net of any customary real estate
commissions for the sale of the land.
.

c.

The land oonveyance shall occur prior to the City signing the final
plat verifying subdivision approval. unless the City Council
approves other arrangements with financial assurances.

d.

The lend conveyed shall be used for the. development of
community housing units or conveyed pursuant to subsection e,
below.

e.

The City C01.lDcil is pennitted to sell land conveyed for community
housing if:
1)

2)

All proceeds from the sale of the land are placed in the
Community Housing Trust AC<X)unt (subsection 11.0
below); and,
The proceeds from the sale of the land and any interest
accrued

i..

thereon

are used

only fur subsidizing or

constructing community housing within ft reasonable period
of time.

I

I

6. .

In Lieu Fee

The City Council shall accept an in lieu fee for any fraction of a required
community housing unit. The fee. shall be: calculated and coUeoted
pursuant to the following standards.
a.

The fee shall be calculated by averaging the subsidy amounts for
providing a conununity housing unit in each of tho two (2) Income
. Categories III and IV. The fee amount shall be proportionate to
the fraction of the community housing unit required. The subsidy
amounts for each Income Category shall be calculated by the
Community Development Director pursuant to the Community
Housing Guidelines, as amended.

b.

Prior to September 30, 2006, and on or before September 30 of
each following year, the subsidy amount used in the in lieu fee
calculation shall be evaluated by the Community Development
Director, and if necessary, adjusted to reflect current land and
construction costs and the current median income.
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1)

The calculation of the number of community housing units
required.

2)

The proposed method of providing community housing
(on-site, off-site, conveyance of land andlor payment of an
in lieu fee) and the appropriate justification.

3)

If community housing units are to be constructed, the Plan
shall include:
(a)

A conceptual site plan and building floor plan
illustrating the number of community housing units
proposed their location in relation to the other
development on the site and surrounding land uses,
and tbe number and size of bedrooms and square
footage of each unit.

(b)

A tabular SUIDl11ary of the number of community
housing units, the number and size of bedrooms of
each unit, tho reotaVsale mix, and the sales price or
rent for each unit.

(0)

The proposed restrictions to be placed on the

conununity housing units to ensure they remain
affordable and comply with the Community
Housing Guidelines. as amended.

I

4)'

Ifpayment of an in lieu fee is proposed, the Plan shall
include the amount of the fee to be paid and the supporting
calculations.

5)

Ifland is to be conveyed, the Plan shall include:
(a)

A survey depicting the location, size and
topography of the land proposed for conveyance.

(b)

A title report dell1ons1rating clear title, physical and
legal access, liens, easements, and other infonnatioD
necessary to fully describe the legal status of the
property.

(c)

Verification that conditions of the ]and; any
restrictions on title to the land (such as covenants
and easements) and,the applicable Land Use Codes
allow the development of residential units on the
land, and that the site generally can be developed
for community housina.

to

(d).

An appraisal of the fair market val'-:le of the lanel.

(e)

Any additional information or studies detennined
by the Community Development Director to be

necessary to verify the suitability of the land for
.development.
6)

Community Housing Agreement
The agreement by a developer to implement the Plan shall
be established in a Community Housing Agreement. The
Agreement shall be in a form approved by the City
Attorney end shall include the foHawing;
. (8)

lfthe Plan proposes the construction of community
housing units, the Agreement shall identify: the
location, number, type and size of community

housing units to be C<Jnstructed; sales and lor rental
trons; occupancy requirements; a timetable for
completion of the units; construction specifications;
and the restrictions to be placed on the units to
ensure their permanent affordability and cOClpliance
with the Community Housing Guidelines, as
amended.
\ ...

i

b.

(b)

If the Plan proposes the conveyance of land, the
Agreement shall identify the land to be conveyed,
its fair market value, and the time at which the land
will be conveyed 10 the City.

(c)

If the Plan proposes the payment of an in Heu fee,
the Agreement shall identifY the amount of the fee
to be paid, and the time of payment

(d)

If the Plan proposes a combination of methods
(construction of units, conveyance of land, or in lieu
fee), the Agreement shall identify the appropriate
.provisions fur each method ofmitigation.

Review of the Inclusionary Housing Plan
1)

Tile procedures for review of the Inctusionary Housing
Plan shall be the same as for the subdivision application
with which it is submitted.

2)

The Plan shall be approved, approved with conditiol1J!, or
disapproved by the Planning & Zoning Commission and
the City Council, based on the standards of this Section. A
decision on the Plan shall be made prior to a decision on
11
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the re.<lidential subdivision with which it is submitted. A
subdivision plat shall not be approved without an
JnClusionary Housing Plan approved pursuant to the
procedures and standards of this Section.

(

3)

10.

An approved Inclusionary Housing Plan may be amended
or modified only in accordance with the procedures and
standards established fur its original approval.

Community Housing Guidelines
The construction and occupancy of all community housing units shall
comply with the Community Housing GUidelines, as amended from time
to time by the City Council. If any conflict should arise between the
Community Housing Ouidelines and this Ordinance, the provisions
contained in this Ordinance shaU control.

1J •

a.

All community housing units constructed pursuant to this Section
shall comply with the sales and/or rental terms, appreciation rates,
housing type, and occupancy requirements of the Community
Housing Guidelines, as amended.

b.

AIl community housing units shall comply with the size, materials
and design requirements and construction standards of the
Community Housing Guidelines, as amended.

c.

All community housing units shall comply with all other
requirements of the Community Housing Guidelines, as amended,
'to ensure they are maintained, occupied and owned/rented as
community housing units.

Community Housing Trust Account
a.

Fot the purpose of ensuring that any fees collected pUIsuant
to this section are spent for community housing and consequently
benefit the fee payers, an interest-bearing Community Housing
Trust Account shall be established.

b.

All fees collected pursuant to this section shall be immediately
deposited into the Community Housing Trust Account. .

c.

All proceeds in the Community Housing Trust Account not
immediately necessary for expenditure shall be invested in an
interest-bearing account. AU income derived from these
investments shall be retained in the trust account until spent or
refunded.
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d.

12.

A~l

funds deposited into the Community Housing Trust Account
and accrued interest shall be expended only for tho purposes of
planning, subsidizing or developing community housing units in
McCall.
.

Refund of In Lieu Fee
B.

A fee collected pursuant 10 this section and three (3) percent
interest compounded annually, shall be returned upon written

request, to the developer of the subdivision for which It fee was
paid if the fee has not been obligated within five (5) yellI's from the
date the fee was paid. Notwithstanding, if the City Council has
earmarked the funds for expenditure on a specific community
housing project, the Council may extend the time period by up to
five (5) additional years.
b.

To obtain the refund, the developer must submit a written request
to the Community D()velopment Director within one (1) year from
the end of the fifth {5~ year from the date payment was
received, or within one (1) year from the end of the time this
refUnd requirement is ~tended by the City Council. Said request

shall be accompanied by proof of ownership of the property at the
tim.e the refund is requested or contract or option to purchase at the
time the refund is requested, and a copy of the receipt verifying
payment of the fee.

c.

13.

For the purpose of this Section, fee payments shall be deemed
spent in the order in which they are paid. The first (1 st) payment
made shall be the first (I II) payment spent.

Adjustments
a.

b.

c.

The requirements ofthls section 9.7.10 may be adjusted or waived
by the City Council if the developer demonstrates and the Council
finds that there is no reasonable relationship between the housing
impact of the proposed residential subdivision and the
requirements of this section.
The developer shall have the burden of provfding economic
information or other data and evidence necessary to establish that
the housing impact of the proposed residential subdivision has no
reasonable relationship to the requirements of this chapter.
The developer must make seid demonstration conCllt'!ently with the
first submittal of an application for the residential subdivision.
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d.

The City Council shall make the detetmination to adjust or

maintain the requirements of this section ooncurrentlywith the
initial decision to approve or deny the proposed residential
subdivision.
SECTION 2

t
!,
i,

Severability.

t,

In the event 1hat any court of competent jurisdiction enter~ its judgment or order
declaring any portion of Section 9.7.10 to be invalid, then such judgment shall only affect
that portion ofilia ordinance so adjudicated, and all other remaining portions shall remain

in :Ml force and effect.
EFFECTIVE DATE
Regularly passed, approved and adopted by the Mayor and City Council of the
City ofMcCal1, :~ltfi~Xt~~#~Y of f:Q.C'J1..(\.ry! 2006.
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A SUMMARY OF ORDINANCE NO. 819

c)

PASSED BY THE CITY OF McCALL, IDAHO
AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF McCALL, IDAHO AMENDING THB CITY OF .
McCALL SUBDIVISION AND DEVELOPMENT CODE, TITLE 9 TO REQUIRE ALL NEW
SUBDIVISIONS TO INCLUDE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF COMMUNITY HOUSlNG
UNITS TO BE AFFORDABLE TO THE CITY'S WORKFORCE.
The principal provisions of Title 9 by adding Section 9.7.10, Inclusionary Housing,
requires as follows:
• Provides for InclusionBry Housing. which provides for at least twenty percent of
the housing to be affordable community housing and provides options fur
providing the conununity housing.

• Provides for Community Housing by Income Category. which requires that 8
minimum of twelve (12) percent of the community housing lots and/or housing
units to be affordable.
• Provides for a Community Housing On Site section.
• Provides for a Community Housing Off Site seCtion.
\

\

• Provides for a tand Conveyance section.
• Provides for a Fee In Lieu section, which provides that a fee shall be calculated
and collected according to certain standards.
• Provides for a Deed Restriction section and includes a prOvision for a nine (9)
month period ifwitfrin this time period there are no qualified buyers of the unit
that the City Council may remOVe the community housing deed restrictions.
•

Provides for a Timing of Occupanoy section.

• Provides for an lnolusionary Housing Plan that provides for calculation of the
number of housing units required and review of the inolusionary housing plan.
• ProvideS for a CommWlity Housing Guidelines section.
• Provides for a Comnl1.mity Housing Trust Account section to ensure the fees
cotIected benefit the fee payers; that the fees are deposited into the trust account,.
and to allow for an interest-bearing account and for accrued interest.

• Provides for a Refund ofIn Lieu Fee section.
• Provides for an Adjustments section.

t
I

T
I

l.

The Ordinance shall be effective upon pUblication of this Summary.
The full text of the Ordinance is available for review a~ City Hall and will be provided by the
City Clerk to any citizen upon personal request. The full text is also available online at
www.mccall.id.us.
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EXHIBIT "B"
ALPINE VILLAGE

DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT
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For Rccording Purposes Do
Not Write Above Tb.is Line
DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT
ALPINE VILLAGE PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT
This Development Agreement is entered into by and between tho City of McCall. a
municipal cOlJloration of the State of Idaho, hereinafter refetted to as the "City", fIDd Alpine
Vil1age Company. hereinafter referred to as "Alpine Village", whose address is 1101 W. Rivet
Street, Suite 300, Boise Idaho, 83702, and who is the owner of the Alpine Village Planned Unit
Development ("the POD"), which ia more petticularly described in tho attached Exhibit <fA",

,..
i

WHEREAS, tho Preliminary and General Development Plans for the PUD have been
granted by the City, as PUD No. 06-3 and the Prehmlnary Plat for tho POO has been approved
by the McCall Planning and Zoning CommiSsion, as Subdivision 06-7,
WHEREAS, the said approvals contained various conditions regarding which the City
and Alpine Village have reached agreement and which agreement the City and Alpine Village
desire to memorialize.
WHEREAS, Alpine Village has submitted its Application for Approval oithe Final Plat
for Phase 1 of the PUD, and anticipates submitting final plats fur the balance of tbe Pun in
phases ("the Phases"),

WHEREFORE, the City of McCall and the Alpine Village do enter into this Agreement
for and in consid~ration of tho mutual covenants, duties and obligations herein set forth, do agree
as follows:
ARTICLE I
LEGAl; AUTHORITY
L1

This DeVelopment Agreement is made- pursuant to and in accordancc with the
previsions of Section 9.6,06 ofthe McCall City Code,

DlIVolopmcnt Agreement - Alpine Village PtID
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ARTICLED
SANITARY SEWER SYSTEM IMPROVEl'dEl'I"TS
2.1

2.2

Alpine Village shall relocate the oxisting sower through the PUD /IS part of its
construction olPhas!) 1 of the PUD and shall complete such work in accordance
with. the approved plans therefor as a condition offmalllpproval orits Phase 2
Final Plat. Alpine Village shall be responsible for establishing to the satisfaction
of the City that the existing sewer line has adequate capacity for the PUD and its
proposed uses, together with tho current upstream flow. Otho1Wlso, Alpine
ViJlago shall repla.ce tho line as necessary to assure such capacity. The City shall
be responsible for the pro rat!!: cost of materials and labor for any additional .
capacity upgrade which is requested by the City.
The City shall be solely responsible for any replacement of the Washington Street
sewer line, or any portion thereof, whi.ch is deemed necessary by the City, as wen
as all assooiated services and stub-outs.
ARTICLEIU
WATER SYSTEM IMPROVEMENTS

3.1

Alpine Village shall compieto all of the folJowmg described work: in accordanco

with the approved plans therefor as part ofits construction of Phase 1 of tho PUD
and shall complete such work as II condition of final approval of its Phase 2 FillIIl
Plat:

3.1.1

Installation of II new 8-inch water line on Washington Street, from 3rd
Street to 1It Street. Alpine Vi1\age altall be responsible for 100% of the
cost of this work, as well liS the re-conneoti.on of all existing services to
the new line.
.
3.1.2 Relocation of two (2) fIfO' hydnmts on the PUD Property to locations
which are reasonably accoptable to the City. Alpine Village shall be
responsible for 100% afthe cost of such relocation.
3.1.3 Unless determined unnecessary by the City, replacement of an existi.ng 6
inch line in 1'1 Street, approximately between Washington Street and
Railroad Avenue with an 8 inch line. The City shall reimburse Alpine

Village for 100% of the cost oftrus work.

Development AgIcelll8nt - Alpine Village 1'00
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ARTICLE IV

4.1

4.2

4.3

4.4

. ROADS
Alpine Village shall pave all of Railroad Ave from 1st Street to 3rd Street, at a
nrinimum width of twenty (20) feet, in. accordance with City specifications, by no
later than the later to occur of the following: (a) twelve (12) months after the City
secures the required right-ai-way; or, (b) the final approval of the Final Pla.t for
the Phase of the PUD which includes Building No.3. as shown on the Application
for PUD General Plan approval.. In the event that the City is unable to secure the
required right-of-way, then Alpine Village shalt pave the portion of RaiItoad
Avenue between 1al and 3,d Street for which adequate right-oi-way exists. Alpine
Village shan be responsible for 100010 of the cost of this work.
As a condition of the final approva.l of its Final Plat for Phase 1 of the PUD, in
lieu of providing sidewalk, curb and gutter along RaHroad Avenue, Alpine
Village shan construct sidewalk, curb and gutter along 1he Washington Street and
3nl S1root frontages of the Bryan's Burger Den Proporty.
As a condition of the final approval of the Final Plat for Phase 1 of the PUD,
Alpine Village shall prepare' and submit a complete application to the Idaho
Tran~ortation Department ("TID") for construction of a center tum lane along
the 3 Streot/Highway 55 fhlntage of the PUD; and, upon tho issuance of such
Permit by lTD, Alpine Village shall construct such center tum l1Ul6. Snch
construction shall be completod in accordance with the approved plans therefor by
no later than the later to occur of the following: (a) twelve (12) months after lTD
issues its final Permit for the project; 'or, (b) the final approval of tho Final Plat for
Phase 2 of Ule PUD. Alpine Village shall be responsible for 100010 of the cost of
this work.
Alpine VillAge shall repave' the full width of Washington Street wherever
adjustments to the promo or the CI088 section of the Street are required for tho
PUD and shall reconnect Washington Street to existing driveways and entrances
which aro disturbed by such adjustments according to approved construction
plans. Alpine Village shall be responsible for 100% of tho cost of this work.

ARTlCLEV

STORM WATER
5.1

5.2

Alpine Village shall Iclooate the existing 24 inch stann water line which passes
through the PUD as part of its construction ofPhaso 1 ofthe PUD and shall
complete such work in accordance with the approved plans therefor as a condition
of final approval of its Phase 2 Final Plat. Alpine Village shall be responsible for
100% of the cost associated with the relocation.
The City has determined that an increase in the size of tho line from 24 to 30
inches is required to accommodate existing and projected flows. The City shall
pay for the increased cost ofmatorials for such upsizing.

Development Agrecmtmt- Alpine Village PUD
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5.3

Alpine ViJ1age and the City shall continue in good faith to evaluate the feasibility
of a regional stann water BMP and the possible use by A1piJ:te Village of and
participation by Alpine Village in the cost of creating such a BMP.

·ARTICLE VI
PARKS AND ~NOW REMOVAL

6.1

6.2
6.3
6.4

6.5

As part of its final platting of Phase 1 of the Pti'D, Alpine Village shall dedicate
all of the area within the PUD which as platted as "Plaza Open Space" in a
manner which assures that sUoh area is opell to the public during reasonable
commercial hours and subject to scheduled special events. Material modifications
to such dedication shall require the prior approval oftbe City.
Alpine Village shall provide one public restroom facility (ie. for men and women)
which shall be open to the publio during reasonable cotnm¢l:Cia\ houra.
The Alpino Village Property Owners Association shall be solely responsible for
the maintenance and upkeep of the Plaza a."1d tho restrOOmB.
Alpine Village shall construct a connection between the Plaza Open Space and th.e
pedestrian bike path located north of Railroad Avenue. This work shall occur
prior to the submittal of Phase 3 final plat or prior to january 1,2012, the eatlier
to occur.
The Alpine Village Property Owners Association shall be solely responsible for .
the snow removal and storage. Ponding p1atting ofthe final Phase of the PUD,
snow shaJj bo stored on~site. in the area designated 88 "Future Development" on
the Final Plat for Phase 1 cfthe PUD. A pennanent off-site snow storage area
shall be prpperly established prior to the final approval of the Final Plat for
whichever of the POO Phases is tho last to be platted.

ARTICLE VII
COMMUNITY HOUSING PLAN

7, 1

Alpine Village's approved Community Housing Plan is attached hereto as Exhibit
"B". Alpine Village waives and releases the City from any claims whatsoever
regarding or stemming from the pending litigation between the Mountain Central
Board of Realtors and the CLty (ie. MO\U1tain Central Board ofRealtotJ. et n1 v.
City ofMoCall, et al, Valloy County Case Number CV-2006-490-C) as to
Community Housing Unita which are sold pursnant to this Plan prior to the final
disposition of such litigation. The Plan will be r6Viewed and modified, as
nC9ossary, to comply with the fmal disposition of tho litigation as to any
Community Housing Units which have not been sold prior to the final dispositlon
ofilie litigation.
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ARTICLEVm
CI'l'Y COST CONTRIBUTION

8.1

On any of the aforesaid items of work performed by Alpine ViJlagc fur which,
under tho t01mS of this Agreement, the City has agreed to reimblll'lle Alpine
Village f01 part or all of the cost of ~ch work, the City shan reiml>u!1e Alpine
Village as follows:
8.1.1 Upon completion of such work in accordance with t.he approved plans
therefor, Alpine Village shall deliver a Notioe of Completion together with
an Invoice for the actual cost to Alpine Village of BUch work to the Cityj
8.1.2 The City shall notify Alpine Village within ten (10) days after receiving
such notice and Invoice of any claimed deficiencies or non-conformities of
such work with the appJoved plans, and/or of any entries on the Invoice
which the City considers inappropriate under the tenns offhis Agreement;
8.1.3 Absen1 such notification, the work and the Invoice shall be deemed
accepted by the City;
B.l ,4 In the event of such notification regarding work deficiencies or nonconformities or Invoice improprieties, the parties shall attempt in good
faith to resolve any disputed issues. If the parties are unable to do so, then
any such remaining disputea shall be resolved by binding arbitration
according to the rules of the American Arbitration Association.
8.1.5 The City shall remit the fuil amount of such Invoice), unless adjusted by
mutualagreemcnt or arbitration, to Alpme Village no IlI.teL' than forty-five
(45) days after the later to occur of the following: (i) the City's receipt of
the Invoice; (ii) in the event that corrective measures are undertaken by
Alpine Vmage, as provided herein. the completion of such corrective
measures; or, (iii) in the event of a dispute between the City and AlpiM
Village regarding Ihe work or the Invoice, tTle final resolution of the
dispute.

:ARTICLE IX
POWER, TELEPHONE AND CABLE TELEVISION
9.1

Power, teleconnnunications mid cable ill currently available to the PUD,

ARTICLE X
ALPINE VlLLAGE' S FINANCIAL ASSURANCES
10.1

Alpine Village shall guarantee 125% of the estimated cost to complete all of the
public improvements for the PUD described in this Development Agreement, in
accordance with the provisions ofMCC 9.6.067(13) as follows:

10.1.1 Tho estimated cost to complete the Water System Improvements for Phase
1 of1he PUD is $&9,985.00. 125% ofthatsum (ie. $112,481.25) willbo
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gua.rsh.teed by Alpine Village prior to Phase 1 Final Plat recordation by
means of either It Letter of Credit.

10.1.2 The esilinated cost to ~omplete the improvements to 3M Street I State
Highway 55 is $90,391.50. 125% of that sum (ie. $112.989.38) will be
guaranteed by Alpine Village prior to Phase 1 Final Plat recorda.tion by
means of a Letter of Credit.

10.1.3 The estimated cost to complete tho aforesaid storm water improvements is
$122,947.00. 125% o~that swn (ie. $153,683.75) will be guaranteed by
Alpine Village prior to Phase 1 Final Plat recordation by means of a Letter
of Credit.
10.1.5 Completion of the public improvements for subsequent phases of tho PUD
will be guaranteed by Alpine Village prior to Final Plat recordation for
those Phases, in the manner provided above.
ARTICLE XI
MI~CELLANEOUS

11.1

This Agreement may be modified only by means of a subsequenUy executed and
ack:now1e?ged written agreement.

11.2

In the event Alpine ViHage fails to comply with the commi tmfllltll set forth herein,
within one hundred twenty (120) days of written notico of such failnro from the
City, in addition to any other remedies which the City may have available to it,
the City shall have the right, without prejudice to any other rights or remedies, to
cure such default or enjoin such violation and otherwise enforce the requirements
contained in this Development Agreement, and to collect the direct costs
associated with such action from Alpine Village.

11.3

In the event that a judicial dispute arises regarding the enforcement or breach of
this Agreement, or arbitration ensuea pursuant to Articlo VIll above, then the

prevailing party in such dispute shall be entitled to recover its attorneys' fees and
costs reasonably incurred, including fees and costs incurred in on appeaL
11.4

If any tenn, provision, commitment or restriction of this Development Agreement
or the application thereof to any party or circwnstances shall, to any extent be
held invalid or unenforceable, the remainder of this Agreement shall remain in
full force and effect.

11.S

After its execution, this Development Agreement shall be recorded in the office of
the Valley County Reeordor, at the expense of Alpine Village. Each conunitment
and covenant contained in this Agreement shall constitute a burden on, shall be
appurtenant to, and shall run with the PUD Property.

This Development

Agreement shall be binding on the City and Alpine Villago and their respective
heirs, administrators, executors, agents, legal representatives, successors and
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B8Signs; provided, however, tJu.t if all or any portion of the PUD Property is
divided, each owner of a legal lot shall only be responsible for duties and
obligations assooiated with an owner's paroel and shali not be responsible for
duties and obligations or defaults as to other parcels of lots within the Property.
Alpine Village shan not be relieved of its responsibilities l1lld duties under this
Agreement absent an agreement with the City which designates Il successor to
Alpine Village, who accepts such responsibilities and duties as are then.
remaining. .
10,6

Any notice which a party may desire to give to another party must be in writing
and may be given by personal delivery, by mailing the same by registered or
certified mail, return receipt requested postage prepaid, or by Federal Express or
other reputable overnight delivery service, to the party to whom the notice is
directed at the address of such party set forth below:

McCall:

City Clerk

City of,McCall
216 East Park

McCall, Idaho 83638

Alpine Village:

Alpine Village Company
1101 West River Street, Suito 300
Boise, Idaho 83702

Attn: Mike Honnaechea
With cppy to:

Steve Millemann
Millemann, Pittenger, McMahan & Pemberton LLP
P.O. Box 1066
McCall, Idaho 83638
or such othernddress and to such other persons as the parties may hereafter
designate in writing to the other parties. Any such notice shall be deemed given
upon delivery if by personal delivery, or three (3) business days after deposit in
the United States mail, if sent. by mail ..
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EXHIBIT liN'

SECESH ENGINEERING, INC.
ase Dt1n/lard Una, 8tJ1ta 1
f>.o. Box 70
M<iJ8u, I:l 83639
2oa.e3H33S. FAX~08·G3HS22

DATEI
May 25, 2007
PROJECT: 0415
PAGE:
lOFZ

LEGAL DEBCRIPl'ION

ALPINE VILLAGE CONDOMlNlUMS PHASE 1
A parcel of land, a part of blocks 2, S and 6, vacated Lakeport ·Addltion. located In the SW 1/4
of Section 9, T.l8N•• R.3 E" n.M., City of McCaU, Valley COQnty, Idaho, more partlcularly
descr lbed u;

COMMENCING at tho BOlIth 1/4 comer of said Section 9.

A.)

N.38°38'32"W., 869,03 feet to a point on the west Right-of-Way 1ia.e for Third
Street, and the SB corner block Ii Vacated Lakeport Addition; thence, along said
Right-ot-way,

B.)

N.cr03'08"E., 102.01 feet to tho POINT OF BEGINNING; thence, departlng
sald Rlgbt-of-Wa.y,
.

1.)

N,9O"OO'OO·W., 36.28 feet: thenco,

2.)

N.OOOO'OQ"E., 37,91 fect : thence,

3.)

N:45°00'OQ"W., 129.94 feet; thence,

4.)

N.90000'00~W ..

5.)

S.4S·OO'OO"W., 8L66 feeti thence,

6.)

N.90000'OO"W •• 94.78 feet: \hence

1.) .

N.ooOO'OO"E., 62.52 feet; fltenco,

8.)

N.44°59'55 1'E., 151.44 feet; to a point on a cutve, thence.

59.94 feet; thence,

23~

.1

••

9.)

NattheMwly along said Clll''1e to the left ,havIng a radius 012934.93 feet, aD atc

length of 234.08 feet, through a central angle ot 4OS4'll", and a chord bearmg
e.nddlslauce ofN.42°5S'53'S., 2.34.02. feet; thencl)

10.)

S.oo46'47"W•• 45.QS feet; the>me. '

11.)

S.B9~54'10·E..

12.)

S.l°07'41"W., 63.00 feet: thence,

13.}

N.89"44'40"B., 162.52 feet; the."I(:e,

14.)

S.oo03'OS"B., 305.54 feeti to' the POINT OF BEGINNING.

121.93 feet; thence,

CONTAINING 2.2B Acres, more or less.
SUBJECT TO aU Covenants, Rights-of-Way and Basements ofR.ecord.
i
y-

,

EXHIBlT"B"
TO ALPINE VILLAGE DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT
COMMUNITY HOUSING PLAN
FOR ALPINE Vll.LAGE PLANNED UNIT DEELOPMENT
.
(May 22, 2007)
.

.

PUD Final Plan - 100 market rate units 0 more than PUD Pceliminary Plan incorporating Burger Den property)
Community Housing Requirements: 20 units
Proposed C.H. Units on-site: 6
Proposed C.H. Units off-site: 17. calculated as follows:

Remaining required C,R. units: 14
Off-site "penalty": 125%
Total C.H, off-site requirement: 17,50 (fractional unit to be
covered by in lieu fee)

Implementation Relative to Project Phasing:
Phase 1 (consisting of25 market rate units): 2 C.R. units on-stte + 6 Timbers
Condominiums (2.25 ,mits more than

phase requirement - 3Z%ofunits)

Phase 2 (consisting of 15 market rate units): 2 C.R. units on-site + 5 Timbers
Condominiums (3.75 units more than
phase requirement - 47% of units)

.

.

Phase 3 (consisting of25 market rate units): 2 C.R. units on-site + 6 Timbers
Condominiums (2.25 units more than
Phase requirement - 32% of units)
Phase 4 (consisting 005 market rate units); .50 unit in lieu fee
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STATE OF IDAHO,

)

County of Valley.

)

(sa.

On this ~ day of bu,
, 2007, before me, ~Y~ ~ ~f»...
a
Notary Public In and for said State. personally appeared lJii=·t.r1:rM
known or identified to me to be the Mayor of the. City of McCall, who executed the said
instrument, and acknowledged to me that sa~d municipality executed the same.

.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal,
the day and year in this certificate first above written.
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STATB OFlDAHO,

)

County of Valley.

(8S.
)

On this .JL day of
ik
, 2007, before me, <SA fr Itn K. tJ ilV"iwt
,a
Notary Public in and for said State, personally appeared Fied O~it(
•
known or identified to me to be the City Clerk of the City of McCall, who executed the said
instrument, and acknowledged to me that said municipality executed the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF. I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal,
the day and year in this certificate first above written.
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EXHIBIT "C"
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER IN MOUNTAIN
CENTRAL BOARD OF
REALTORS, INC. V. CITY OF
MCCALL

236

To: 1

EXHIBIT "e"

1453514
00.173

Pue :1·<31
p.1 0DlI

:~B1I~=
FEB l' 9 a08

.

1

::NCI

&I,:-~IT~;;

TN 'I'lm DlSTlUCT COVR.,. 01 TIiB FOUl\TB JtTOtCIAL OISTRICT OF
'r.HB STA'I'B OF lDAHO,1N ANn FOR. 'l'H! COUl'rI'V OP'VAtJ:.BY

MO(T.t.fr.AXN CaNTRAL SOARD OF
RMtTORB, }NC., an Idaho N611-,PtQ:fit

Cotpomf!on.
oPt a1ntift,

Caae No. CV 2006-490..(:

VB.

10

CttY (Jp MCCALL, B. mu:nfclpnl CIOI-poration of
tho St'tlte cfIdeho,

MaMO.RANDWt1liatSION
AND O.RDlm GRANTlNa
p~p'S M01'IONliOR.
S'U'M:MAaY .ro»GMl3NT

Defe.Ddant.
:1.1

Da.v1d Gratton ~nd Viotor Vinegas, .fer tb& PlaWlift"
Wlllism A. M01TOW, CbrUt~pher D. Gabbert. end 1m s. H011n1ce, fot the O~t

1.

Motion !or Summar,; Judgment. On July 14, 2007, PtaUltift'illed "Notice of SIlPl'll!3Uental A\\thority.
J1ACTUAL AND PRO~l)unAL BACKGROUND

Thlt facts end

prOC~al

bI,tory of thlt 'case were sot forth iu mora detail in the Court'

u

pr~ol1$ly .61e~

Mmo.candum D.eclsio# and Otde.r DCll)'ins th~ D~ Clty oEMeCali'a Mollou

III

·Summat>' .TudgmC1\\ 1)%1 tho ISlltlCl ot'tandfng. Bs.anrWly. PleSntllfit ehallr:.nsin,gthe comUtUl1on;lJty Q

1141

two on:Unllnoes passed !n 'February of 2006 by lb.o City or McCall: Ordi'Q8ne, ~o. 819 which is

11.\

,
III
:1$

lnolusioMQ' ~.I crdilWlo.e. and OnUnBnco No. 820 wbfch 1. lbe reJIdeAtial llnlcage or Cl)tn\n~nI

:..

EB-28-2008 07: ee Froml
021 ~.19.20091 1 6114P~nTfn.£

tu ........ ~

......

-

-_

Aouslng fee ordlnl.nce. Suol1 or41nances W¢!$ eJleL;te4 to Cn9\1.rO tlld.l?~vida for atn,tdable hOUGlng ;n
'

tho Ci1y ofMoCall.
Under OrCina.aeta No, 819, all appl!cationJ fa.r new 9ubd1'Vl~ot1J ne \'eCl\2bd to aubtnlt
inoJu.sfol'\!1i' housing p1a.n pxovidlng 1tat lwelity ll=cnt (20%) ot to'tlllUld hous~ loa ,llerm.a!lenl1y d~

restrIcted tla afibrdablc cotllmunlty hmislJ1g as a pre¢onditlol1 (I) plat e.Pl'~ovat
7

I

10

SpeoiS~lYI Or

with ineoLmll In e~~o.l'l~ Tn ew.d IV n dafin~d. rn subBeottotl2, CommUllUy Housina by Income." City
.
.
' .
of MoClIll OtdinelnCO No. 819. § 9.7.10(A). TIUlSfl ~or(~s de£hle mod~ to mtddJe inoOlM.
Catcaoty m~olud.C! howehQlds witn ina01l1cs gtoateA' than. O~ h_ed J:l$NQ.nt {'OOO~) bu.t llOt mur
!1I.an Ql:Ie bund.Nd twenty percent (120%) of the Valley County median household tnoome. Categul')'_

srem: th!!'1 oCb hundr~ ~ty PL!ctleTIt (120~) but ~ot matt} than

12

lneludl!s holl~ehcldl with incol:ttl!s

U

one bulldted alxt)' percent (l60%) ofth. Vel1ey County medtan bouseb.old incotrut.

,f

~!:I
16

There oro ~t.W ways by which ~ applicant for wbdivlslon t.:PPl'Oval muy nlte1. thr: requ1reme.o.t

of Ordinaoca No. 819: (1) tho first priority !s to Pen:uA71c.otly deed ~cr twenty p~m (W%) 01 the
land. witbi1t 1iu I!\t&d{vl~o~ for a:.ffiJl'dable ho~~ called. lIon~slfOlI housing; (2)

w !eoOM prlerlty la to

17

,B

consuuot 6ucb..bouslng tlo:ff-sffO" 1\'om the propose4l1\.Jbdlv-!siont (,1) iha tb.t.l'd p1iotlty is to ec~Y$)'!.an •
and (4) the fO\lrth priority is to pay It fee fn.1:feu otthe previous 'three optio1lS.

20

- 1\

.u

I ~lthouQ~'o~d~nanoa No. 919 ~8 ~Bf.rr!d to &5 the incluaiona~y £Qnin~ o~1n.n¢, a~
Ord.!n&%lea No, 920 $.s I!h. lin"aga c~na.I\Qt, the court genfl:rdly ,:d'ara ~ thi..$
dec1don to 'Ooth !I'tdi:n&ne:I!. as :!.r..cLutI.!.QnalrY sonill1,7 c~&atLQeB.

23

To'~'

~34S3514

1'10.1'73

'Ulldet Otd.tnari~ No. 8~O, all applietm1l for

J

I!l.

Page:3;J1
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buIldi11l permit ore req,uired to pay a communi

" hOuslna fee for each regi4enti.a1 d.vvclllog unit the il proporti<mal to the demand. for c~unJty howl"
.1

created by the dwelling urut.

•

Income in catesorleal4ad.lT who ar~ necd~d. to .ttWn1a.in aD4 B~~ th~ lOBi4cnttl1l dweUitlg Ulllt.1 to

5

tD.come fs defibed In Catesor)' I as bou,ebQllb 'With jnoomas greattil' than :rUty peroont. (50%) but no

6

.l'I10": then

'1

Ord~*

'No. 120 is designed to bens4t cm.ptoyeOi orlow Or modem

~ percent (80%) 01 ~e Valley Cou.w:y m~Um hounhold ml)Oll:Se. lnoome Category

mQtudes bousoholda with incomes

S1~

thin eighty pcrCeJ1t (81)>6) but run more _

one b1l11dred

8
pe~t (loo~)

:u

of the Valll!ly County mettiaa. h01301i.old i.neome. Certain ro,ldential de\lll!lo,ment

OrdW.anoe No. 820, § 3.6.21(C).
Plalnti rr flied e. Vel'lt!ed Compl alnt on September 22.. 2006, sealdng dee_tory relic:! that the

l4

CI.ty of McCe.U'1 Ordinance N'umb0l'll819 I\ncl820 violaw both S1at~ end Fad.erallaws l.Dd.ooMla.l1ious.
and 8CCk!.ng a ~"'nent 1bj1lJ1Qtl.on E!l\iohuntt the City frotu enf'CI~oiJl& aL4l:b Ol.'I1ioanotJ against its

memben. , Oofin:ld~l" rued In MlrWet on Ootl)bw 18, lOO~r

~

Anll.Dlbar of aflirmative data

,I

f..
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LM1ntdn

A9&v1co the

24

:u

City

ana

a.nd Illu!lI"iee the dl'ldUn9 unit.

. Cat:e,e)lboll I anD

aa

be

ga~un1ty hD~~nq
ab.ll
c~'n.u.«te w~~h the ~u~rent
c~1"y houaing subsidy al1\~\U1t nq,.d.X'liu:t ttl d.~eJ.ol:'l
1:Cl\1ri:"'~Ql;
col\'lrn1.U1~l:y hous.1nljJ rOIr r.~f"I:Y (~O) ~Qrcent of tna employee. Med.ed. to

The

n.

!tIbEi 'I\~.#

~e81dential un1~ Ta~lea

~l HoC~ll O~~n&nc~ ~o.

of

I'm"

'lfUCI hay.. 1nQOIlIee .1\\ InC:alII•
MD.:!ltd, to JU&int.lS.b and

e~lQy'"

b.aed

OQ

tae s1le of the

820, t 3.&.21(0) (1)(;).

~n~t.

10:1aY

'351'1

Pue;4"31

NO.113

P.4···

!I

Twemy..Pivo (25) Pages Oll N'o'YimlblU 20. 2006. Th.Is CoUrt cJ).tered an. O:rd= Ora.tl.tU\g Pldntl.fr

4

Motion to FRe Brief 2lc~eed5na Twcnty..FI'Ve (2S) l'aaes on NC'Ielllber 29, 2.006.

,

!he .PMtIes filed a. Stip\llated LltigatlOl1 Schedule. Oefendant filed Il Sti~nlatJOll to ~ceeci Page Lhnlt 0

6

l1'obl'UfUY 7. 2007, allowing 'Oofendmt to iUa l Response Bd~f mexoes.s of,\h~ twe'!l.tY-ll'VO .Il.lim3.~,

0\1 Peeemb~ 6. 2006

ST4NJ)AlU) OJ REVIEW
Idaho Rule of CMI

PtoQ~urll

5G prDvides ~ S'Umm1!%)' ju.dgment is prop.er when

u

sztlsBed that "there Is no 8'\YIuh1e IsSUB as to t.u1.y materlal tact a.tul that the moving pony Is

111

judgmw as a m.s.~ ortaw," LltC,P, S6(e~ AU d15pl1ted facts are 10 b{;t resolved ind ~l

lEi

int'mllccs ma'II'ID .In fiL'Y01' of the! nOll..,mOV!.na party.

S68

I'.bl

Stqjfora II, KlCJStermun. ll4ldaho 20

17
18

P.2d lUg. 1U9 (2000). Sit/Un )I. M".Jdlan Joint St;n. DJs'. No.2, 128 Idaho 114. 719, 918

~o

evldetlCe, the medon must be denied. Jort/Ql1 'II,

21

.~ith.l~8 Idaho

22

?3
:i(.

211

.8~d3,

13S Idah.o S!6, 590.21 P.3d 90S, QI2 (1001);

at 718, Ql aP.2& a.t 5B7.

1he dJstrict cO\ll.i ~ th.~ trler of faot may d.ra.w TellSone.b1e inferences based upon the ev1den

betoro It lI.1lcil'lWl gnmt summary Judgment despltE! the pOSSibilitY of confU~ting lb!et~. Kel trmrm If.
Jamuon. 132ldll.'ho 910, 91:i, ~BO P.24 574, 571 (Ct. Al:>P. 1999) (oiting Camenm \I.

Hfitil, 1 0 Idaho

8911J 900, 950 P.2d 1231. U3~ (1997)). S'(J 01$0 Idaho Cod.oJ\nu.. § 10·1l0, (200'). Where
\

.

M:m!O~Ul( :DilC%SlaN

IUm Clm'P. - PAGZ 4
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Pa,eI5~31

1'10.173
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P.S

'I1J0'U14 bo tticd Without "jury, the co1ll'l J$ "free to IU:dve at the most PfObable \.nf'~e~ceB to be 4rlwn
uncQ%ltrow~d

evidentIary ,&ots." lAo""' .... Crty oIHalleJ'. 119 ldahD 434, 4.31, i07 P.2d 127l.

1

JTom

3

327' (19$11); crcQord SlffN!r 'II.

4

tne evidcntiQI)' facta !re not in dispute, tOO ttlll oourt

6

pOlSlbllit:i of oonflktias fnfc>rClloel, because tbe court alono will be ill th6 position of tesolvil~ tit

,,

co.nf1k.tlng b!ferenoes at trial. Rtv~r3fdB j)qverOl'lnfH' Ct).

Zfegl.rw~('t.mntra l.trJ..

138 Idaho 238. 2-4t, 61 P.ld S95. S98 tJOOl).
m~

'iI.

grant

r

IUlllD!1I1T)' j uCgtne1lt desp!tt

Rltohle, l03ldaho S1 5, 5J9. 650 P.2q ~1

6'6 I (19t2).

D

In ()t~ to ~lengc tM COI1SUtutionellty of a statute or ordlnanc:o. the plaintiff has 1h~ butd~ 0
10

showing the lm'alldl'tY of such

mtLlte

or re,Billation and must

OYe!OMUil

the .a1rOnB PI"I8Ull'lptfon

0

lJ,

".]Jellt)'. Ol.JlIl1l1. J.A. Fr,eman Co.• 117 IdAho 706, 709, 791 'P.2c.t. 1285, 1lSI <1 9)10); see also W,yokC!

12

'\I.

13

p~

14

conatitutional powers, and any dcnlb't eoncerIling illterpratatioJl of 11. st,tute is to be ~~vod I'll favor 0

u

JJflQrd DfCollnJy CcltU'lf.'/$.rIO'l1ef', 101 Idaho 12. 14, (507 P.ld 1066. 1068 (1980).

"It Is pneJail

thlJt loaiaJll!jve .c.ts are oonstltutional, that rbo S1.B.fe !esb;latu.ro hM acted wlrll14 it

that which w!~ rCllder'tbc srantte C,OllStitutioMl.'t 01.r~1fJ 111ldll.hc at 709, 7~11'.2d at UiIB. The]:la:rtY

17
1'8

ita applicaticn•.••. [And] that DO set of cb.'cumlta11CiQ cxiGta \ll']rkr whIch tho (law) would be va.l1d."

11

Amer1clln FttlTt R,servoir DfJr. N/,l.. :z y.ldaho Dep't DIW~tsr R.'I(,JW':", 1431dab.o 862, _, 154 P.l

20

433,441 (2007) (internal quotet Qmlttcd).

u

i:B

:u

DISCUSSION

eapcciBlly inslI&Sol1.a1 economy-based cODJInlll1itflll, to adcSras. the n~ ofprovitUng llffordablc 11.0'1111

fer tho local WoM01'C!. lo.oluwlo)1atY

~nl.ng

or in<OhJ.siOl18ly hol.lSlng

Qtdi~

;enel'aIly 1'CX{1lirc

as

2 1

To:1e0f

1

1514
HO.17S

ho\Ueholds. dom, BuJltkrl All 'n 01Norrm"n C41l101'1IJu \I, CJIy 0/ Napa, ]O'

1"411/16'31

P.G···

~U~.ptt.:zd

60, 62. n.]

(Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (citlng LaurA M. 1'8l1Wa, .R.fj1BCllo~ 1)/1 mcJusJ01Jaty HOlllin: and a ~fnlWed l.co
:t

&11 itl Vl4bllfl)l,l3 Jol0fJttaL. bY. S39, 540 (1995»).'"
\Vh11e a .Ilnmbor of jurlsdicuonl haviiI ease law t!iIL:ussiug 'the eml.9tltu.t{ont!l;ty

.. '

II! Illelusl

s

:ZOlUns o~.

6

PC legislative! Ilut:horlty in Idaho j)tOviding for inclusioll~ zoning llrovi.!lions. Although nQt tcn!l:'ol1in

'I

10

tbi~ Court

thete b t\o ~e pteeed!;,a.t wbloh hU b~ established in Idaho. 'PurthertnaTe, tb~e ill

ts a.ware that a Decision 011 SummlJ:y l'~Cllt Wi! filed

jal)'

3, 2001. bt Bla.in~ Ct)~U'l

No. )64. izl Schl1.lIft.f v. Cfty 011::.'7111 Jl'alItIJ!. ldubo, Case No. CV..0(5·882..

11

t}ll;

City of McCall. This Coutt. c!efCl"3 to the City or McCs11', detc1.'milltltion of a. \aalt. of atrord:a.bl

hoturinQ 6I1d to their

In Idaho,

"8.

l~ab1e

bltention to address the

~:p.'VA; th~

q,uestion f'0l' thb Court, hc'WIlYCl. i

muniolpal oorporation \~ ~erof~ orUy thoS8 powers armted to it by

Uat\!lCQnllt.ilUllOAOTth~leslta.tur~

•••

,It

C~~Ulrv\ Sl~fel

eith~

the

l01ldaho lSH, 160, 610 P.2d St7, 519 (1980).

19

Artiele 12; seotiOl1 2 oftbe Tdaho Stf1tc Conslituti011 pttwiaes f~ an,.. county, city, 01' to~ to mokc 1111

aQ

enforce all 8ucl11ocal po1iee, Se.nltaty, and other rBgWatiou wb1~h are not In ~omnet wittl. itl cb,arter 0

2\

with the aeneral1aws. Idaho Conat. Art. 1'2 § 2. The IdDho Su,pr&me Court h~! r ec t111ruted 'thl1t "'[tJh

1(

, l'fo.. Sq.!.td.ra A.... odaf:.1ot; Q£ NOrthe.r:n C$lU·on.!a U1.I:U:ft1!~1:.' th,. ue~ tOW6
U\Gl.lIl1cm;l'l;·~ IIQn!.nq oz:cd.nlU\QGs, espeOia.Ul( 1%\ cal.U!o:rI'lJ,_, ~e~a 1:h6t'e ~. I!Illbenl5h«il
lfbghlat.io/\ ~lrovid1n9' for atl!c~dal:ll.a hoUil19 i.rIoent1vGQ.
s•• CU. Coyl c Ood. f
6S!80 G~ 8~q.
~~a Qaae ~ellBd upon by th9 cit~ of ~C.ll ta o! l1ttl. a.'l.tCn~.

to court. in ldAho where ~ha~. is not
1nuluaLonary 2~in~ o~dina"oea.

e~ten$1~

l.9~41at~ve

,

.

authority for

2

To::.... ,J345351Q
f'(O.173

t

Pue:7 / 31
P,?'

power to rastriot tM met of p:opt~ is withbJ the polico powet· ofth~ atate, dd.cgab.le to .It!! m.un1dp

a

fU1::,dlvJrrion,/ Nld is .not pet Ie repulIQanUo the CCUlSt1tu1\cu; of tb.a 'Om'tOd Statll,.:" WhhlV,

J

'Q/(I,

04

polLes 1'ower of' the staw, IIflQ !ocaJ. legislatIve entit'~ are uuthorl=4 to $naot ~Qnmg ord.lll

6

TOIIU'lot1Dg

,

KHitrltln. 107 Idaho 80,

?

Calml)', 98 Tdllho 506. St 1. s~1 P.2d l2S1, 1262. (1971).

C~ Of '/.'wJ

U Tdaho 17tl, 1$2. 338 1',24 778, 781·82 (l9S9), Therdlls, the power to zone dmives rrom lh

I:ht: uSo of PfOEerty wItllln. the ootporate limits of the legislative entItY. City ofLlfWitfon v.

e3,

tSSS P.2d g21, 824 (1984): ;'Irl

(l/J()

Dm¥,wl':! En;Bl'prl'~/1 Inc.

\I.

BIt1w

II

,

10

The Looa.l Lcd Uae PlaJ:).Ulng Act (!LUPA), _ Idaho Code Stctietl 67-6$01 tl ttq., was eu&~te
in 1?75. 1'he Idaho Suprema Co\l!t.has fcund wt uncll!lt LLUPAt 'tho leQislatu:to intendoo.lO ~\'e lrtcal

.11

&ovemlns boa:tdu broad powe:, in tbl!l arel of

12

ColtiMlrsiolfWt, U91daho 396, 400. gO P,3d 332,

1)

Coun(y. 104 Idaho 833) 66~ P .2d 1135 (Ct, App. 1~8m, Suah ~ pO'loVW 18 .not \.Inliruh:~. blJ.t.tn1J$

1<1

~ar 1\ reasonable relatlon to the goala of the stl\te pursuant tQ the state" polJ.ce pO'WOfl. SPf~,

is

Grubb &- At$Qt:.r, /1Il. v. Oity

pl~

31~

and zoning."

Whlttt \I, Bm!rrQrJk CUlm

(2003) (~ting W'l>'ffcJI JiWy. Dflt. Y. KOOIL'l)1Q

0/Hal1fJ),. 127 Idaho 570# 583, 903 P.2d 141, 748 (1995) (cItlng City 0

L,wf.vtrm v. KnJ""tnn, 107 Idaho 80.83, 68S P.2d all. 824 (1984»;.1e, also Dczw3cn EnrQrprl.r'3,

Inc.

1.'7

n

98 Irlabo ",t Sl1, S61 P.2d aJ. 1262.

'the i'O~nttl'poWet to 1l1terii:l'e by 20u1nS' t:e.QtIlatfons wIth the 1leMttd. rlahtB of !;he
]ll,11d owned b)' restrletiug tl)e c~el' of hill \lBO, iI not unlimJted, and ot1~r questions
tll'Ilde, lIUoh restriction cannot btl im.,posed it' it does 1101: beI!Jl' a .ubstant\all'elatlon to tho

eo
:La
23

• pubUc hea.lth. aafcty, mows, 01' general welfare.

OlJ'lllSon Enr,rprlll/!, inc., 98 ldaho at 5J 1, S61 P.1d at 824 (cittng Ool,,-Cpllflter FI,.. PrClllctlon DilL
V.

011)1 (II »Dfl~. 93 Idaho 559, 468 P.2d 290 (1970) (quoting N,C1OW

1~

'II,

CIQi

01 CflMhrlt/glt 277 U.S

118 (1927»)).

i
2~

TOll20 r
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111f1i Idaho Supreme CoUrll)SS recognb;ed that LL'UP A it! the e"clUlfve end mandatOly,SOW'CIS fo

1
2

& lnunlo1palJ1)1~s

Id~ 3~O.

..

PUlf:S"31

p.e"··

pJannhls md I::onma f1uthorlty. Spr~ng~ Grubb

'* ..wo",

!~.

v. City 1)/lIaflsJI, 133

321. gS6 P.2d 343, 344 (199£1). tr~r t.blt LLUPA, a govcmlnli b~~ cllnB1atms of eitiltr

oity QI)UllC11 or a pl"OperJy delega.ted plamllug and ZQnlnB commission, 11 give.tl the pow;;xs a\uhoti7;'
undet t1\C l...UJPA. tdaho Code Ann, § 67~S04. Under s~tJnn 67..6'08. tho pla'Ollll1s aud zont

,
iii
J

:Al2 an..lyals of ,PlOvlaioJlI which may be

~ to blsul-e tha1 lam\. \lse polieiClS,
Illd fees do not violate private pIoperey rlgl:1l2, adversel1lrnpact
property values or create ~ce$'saxy ~al llmiflltloJ:lS oa lb. uso of .Property Sl1Ct
analyaLB as presor1bed t.mCet' the decluratlout of purpose in ¢l\"pim 80, titlo 61, ld'aho

1.0

J:'tRlrletl.~, -condition,

Code.'

12
3,.1

14
15

An walta j , of houslug conditions and needs: 'PlatIB £Or improveMent of lll)ming
standards; and plans. for tho provIsion of ~afu, samtluy, 8lld addqUllte hot~sl.n" tnohcd!ng

tho 'P)'ovislon for low-cost lXluveu1i.O:aal hou~ the siting ofm.anuftl,otuJ'Od housing c.nd
xnobile holn~ In. su'bdLvfrlo.cs Ul\l parka and ou .iAdlvtdl'l8l lou whioh I!t~ NfficlW to
sntdl\tB1n Il oom.pet:i.1iva mftlket for each of those howdnetwos and to addresa t.Iu: needs of
thb con,mun!ty.

.17

19
;20

ldalto Codo Ann. § 67~508(1).7
betweeu proteotl.ns

.

• 'l"1U. 67 I

"'[he

ptol'erty rlgbu and

ollllpt:Ol:

no

LttJl1A elC}nefSly ident:1t1es tba ueod to ml!mtab

It

balance

ptov1dl1lg for a.('{ol;'dahle housing bf ttf.l:.!nf& that one of ild

01: the l:d.aho Code J.8 xnalln IU the tdabo ll..1,\llAi;lu:y :r.lIinqll
:ev1ew pro~ess tQ evaluate ~.;ul&to~i taki~qa.

~~tl ~h1¢h .,ta~l1sh~5 B

• $llDsaol!!an III' Qn pt!openy dql\~lI wall Addeci in ),9915. l.Qcal Land tlae. phl\'I'Iil\<;Jt.rope:l'ty IUgbt"-t'.lan..'11n!lf am! Zoning C~i ... iona, ch. Ul., feO"1 • n·6!1DS, 19 \IS
t~Dno

seas. Laws

~.J.

~ll.

24
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1
It

l

purpose. Is "[tJo praroot l'lOporty rights while rclkm' accommOda:t!OIlS £01' otber

P,c,:rV"-v

l1ecesslU)' t}'j'eS

de"\let(),Plntllt auah as low..oost houdng and mobile home parb." Idaho Code Ann.. ~ 6?·6S02(a).
With rca"eet to ~g ordinanoes. thD LLUPA lJIOVldea that the g.O....eming board aha!l "ealflbllsh

4

sta.nd~.

S

alteration. repe.b: or use of buildlngs and strUctures; p~entt\.ge of tot OCC\lJ)8l'1cy, $t.;. of coutl.\l, ;yarQs,

,G

and ~~. BP'acesi -dr:na1ty Df popula.tion; and the lOCltlon And 1.lS~ of building, and s1rI1etum." Idaho

to regulate W1d. l'C&1rict tho haight. l1U.Dlber of

ot~rfes,

size, aot'l.StrUedon, rco.onstrua1io.n,

Code Aw1. f 67-6511. Purtherm.orc. tIte s.cvlft!Jn, board m-.y ''req\lke Or pcrm.it u.s a. el)l).d\Uo:D 0

I

,
10

re7.~g

that

Em. O~

or developer :.:nakc ft wrl,tten comtnitme1\t oon~m.il)g the U~ or dcftlo;m'\ellt c

tha lubJe.ct parcel," Idaho Code Anrl. § 6?~6511A.

II

looation. The City of McClll &rilles it is regulatln, tnll use to which certahz lend or hoU$htg maY' bu p

\,

by requirfng c1e~ra to deed restrl~ a pargantagc of new dcweJ.opl'IleQt as ef£orc.ieb1c

1&

bOl.Uing. 1'hero is no d.oi.l1:l't that the City at McCRll detmuined there ex.Iats a !le~ fOt lWordabJe housinG

:u

Of

ccnnnrunlty

_a

in McCall. Alth.ougn LLUPA sp$gificallY IllloWi a city to inolu.d.I;J wlthfn its ¢umpte.Uensivo pI

1"

a

reguls.uolU -attectmlil property :rIghtS

,u

w\lethet' tbll City of McCall.

12 0

tel.~vc!y 'leDe)lt tctncl

QJ;

~

housing condltlOllB, LLUPA doc, 'CI.Ot

tp~oally addr~ss

aw other e.it)r may annot hlclua:oJltlly zoning ordina.oces. O1Vexl th

towards hwllUlo.lW'y 20nDla ordJne.n;¢l tinoe LLUPA has beCl1ltll2Otltd in Idaho
\.

.

2$

.
1 1.1.0 it. 19~5. the l'.asrhl.atun insel.'teo tblll lanquar;re u~:rcU..1\IJ low-ClOst h.oudJUi.
1.0081 7.larLo OU Platln1hf-l?t-opt.rt:y Rightll-t'lal'lninll and ZQI'l1t'l.g C~U'Im.. Ilh. In.
$eo. 4. S 67·6508, lilts .:xci.no S~IJ •• Lllltf,s H.a. ~U.

2 I5

To;1eeJf
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PUI!:1I!F31,

1'10.17<1

1

2

p.1a~

whe.tb.e.t the City of McCal11:tlB:l \'equiro affQfdabl. housing through a land. 'l!.SO regulation til a mattar c
uut i'l'npI$lIIipn which tN, Court m\\st dcQlde.
A. :Reatrlctlt)'QI 0$2 the CltyotM~Ctlll" Polleo POyvBt'I

The Idaho Supreme Court bas

"
S

..,

powOtll (1) the cl't1lnanee

te!r.:c$D1~d

threa po.;cal res1r1ctlons on a. nrunJ.ctpaltty'a police:

~llSt bG oOpfinec1 to the liratts of W 80vcnunenUil body anaetins ~ aamltj

(2.) SllOh ordinlD'l~~ ltW$t not bel !n co)l1:lict wtth other generallawB of the state; &nd (3)

lUcA ordhw~ca

must not be an Wl'easDl1able or arblt~ enactment. Roehl v. Abra>tJ1. 104 l~ 20'. 207, 657 P.2e!:
1013.101S (19&3).(citing Slaid V. C/m-((. S8 Idaho 36$. 374.l9S1 P.2d 955,960 (196S».
11

L 8cgy1allDn lfirhtn

Ute City Ltmitl gfM¢;Call

ll1 HQbbs, the oouncy passed an. ord{tlSIlc& wb.Ld1 prohlbite41h.e SNO ofbw in k~ In '*Ftat'lkl

11

County," lind allO prohibited tho POS'es!ilon Qfbtler mkegs witlrln '!he '''W:dueorporated ill-lUiS ofF:an

to

sell boo: in F:ranlcllnt Idaho end Preston. Jdaho. The Tchlho Supreme Court b=1d ibat the pTa!nllft' dl

aot have stand.ing to chaiJ.enaCl the ordinance sblce his busl.ncsses were witbln en incorporated otty Qnd
~ cOW\i)' die! not bave thts authority to re~llll.te a.etlvlties Mtbin inool'pOl'Irt41d cities. JtI. at 208, 651
'J. 'I

:10

that su~ crcdl'O.Bt\ces navo b.:en impletn~lltod In purtncrsl1ip With Velloy C01lllty, Adams CoUnty, end th

:11

eommunlties of Casoade, DQmelly, QI'ld. New Meadows.

2"

land US!) pe!.rmits .til the Cil:)l of MeCall. ¥ Thc.tafQl:e, Oldinenoe No!!. 819 and. g20 would I1llot apply 10

23

landowner who O~ &.rid. 'Wieboa to wbd.!vide lan.d located olrtSfde tho olty limits of ~I\ll.

;IS

-

/Hi

tb. ctevel.opctlr ls ::equiu4 t

,

P~au~nt

to

•
Or~inanca

Ordirum06 NOB.

Na. i1S, 1: a developer
C>

plI:ovida loU

~tQVld$. ~un1ty ho~.Ln; cf~-.ltt,

~I:'x-cent

MDf.O».ND'tlK DEe:tSt~ ~ C:aX;I'.'U - JilAGl'! :1.0

819 and '20 e~ .mID: l'1:(\WU

of thQ Bl1IOl.U\t CJt lane! ",111ch .,D'I2'l

TOI ___ d34S3514
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a,

P.11··-

No: In ClWtliqt wfrh ather Genepll Lcl\11I qftbs $(md
1.f'Qlie:t tho second prong (If HoM/, tbts Court 11l\1St ~ine whatb.e{ Otdluneo Nos. 819 III

3

sao aM h\ conflict with other general law. of the stm~. The stated purpoae of these ordlnanoea iJ L
p'l'OY1!.ic: a «re81onablel supply of att'ordableJ deed. mtriCltcd workforce hQuslng (c:MUllunlty hol.ltlng)" to

5

&(o.aaU1'~

tha.t ar.ll1oa1 professional workers.

p~)(imlty

eS5~tial

.ervice pet"sOl1C.elt

~Ild.

serv100 workers live with;

to thetr 'WOrk to prov1dlll munioipel end "l'1vuc aeoter s!!lrVices," lD Ol·d.et to obtain a buiJdln

permit tosuWfvl~ latd and btdlc! hauaea or dwelliWI units. a ]andoWlle!4' J11USt de.cig/lllllllt least twen

,
LO

percen.t of the laad or lots

tlJ

deed--J'I;S'I:rlctlld. oommunhy houllng und81' Ord\nanoe

No.

8l!~.

Pu.rtbennore, in. old.:! to bulld ml.d=t\al dweUh\Q unitt, a Landowner is re.q,'I.1l.red to pay a C1OmmUl.'lit)'
ho~ foe

for a buU&J pcu:mit under Ordinance Nt!, 120.

PloU'JUlUlt t<l ~cc No.8 J9. u.pon.pplfIng for IUbdlVision appt'O'\'al, a devoJaper mUSl submi

,U

an to(;.luslonatY Housing PIIl1 which deslpatcs tbe.t at least twenty percent of all the lots and hQUNr I
the Wbdi'\'islOll have bten »1!lI.U$l\entIy d*-reltrleted~ lUI oommWlf~ boustns 8.Ild llifurdal)le 10

houaeholdl in MoCaU with motlllfAtD or .middle income!!

mClltegories In r.nd tv.

apeoi1lelllly states that providing ol1-8fte OOtmll.'l.mit)' housLna w!th!ll the nr:w

OrdloMce No. 81

~bdMalon

is the fits

17

prIority'. HoweVtlr, If a lalido\llUQr or dcvelo,p=r ;; ,I1ot flblo to demgnate cottJ'rlUlt11ty hOL\sU:tg \IIlthl.o. th

n~VQ bee~ ~'~1ted o~-si~e,
a~ty

1~1tl

of

~o~he#

or

11 the otf~.~t. hcu.i~i £8 ~~~thln ~h. oitv llmit$
it the OU... ih l'IC1t1d.l1§ J,. locatad '\\Kith1n the

Alt4U'nll~t"e1y.

tna City af t{¢.CaU ,II

~~ntcipality

~~c&t.d

1~

va~ley

o~

~~a~

County,H

~he

liavelope.c! iI :c'l!qtllt'ef! tQ ~l:'ov.l.de 150 PlUlo_n't. of 1:1\11 aJIIOLl"t \.11\\01\ wow.ci hay. "'eAll
~eCi\lirc.:d on-l1t.te.
It"o the extent: t11a.t th!l City o~ foCcCaJ.l abte'l\l'Pta bo J:~~).et:e

noueL~~ cut.1de ~t.
I nd. ""oia.

y Ordinanoe

hou,.,

li~lt,

819

.~.o

be .ubject

to an

~.»trL~~~o~!

• nd

city

~o,

the

aUQh

~rov~~~a

prQvia~Oh i. ~ithout

th&t 4.

~

~evelo~er ~y ~.quO$t ~nat ~p ~o
"&qu~ty-a~llde~~

effect and thtrtfore null

.1~'rnat1v.

twenty-five
p~cir ••.

to

~=~n.nt

p~~Qne

d.~

of tb. lot •

2 7
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the !~\bdLvlsion. or "off'..,l~!' The thIrd P\~ol1ty 11 for a developer to convey I.aJ3.Cl w~e aty of McCall
fb't O¢tmlluW.\y housing.

And. the fourth prlo),itY b to pay n in in

neu of c01u1nunltY houstna.

impmWoal.

Under the first

,

u.trlta

1,)ut

twO

o~~sh1'p

prIorities, a. la:odownc:r still ret&113

ot B.'Jch cOl1lm.lw,ity hOUlin

is JeStrloted r~g8l'dj11a iel.1lni or l"eDtil'1$ cOll'lmW1ity hou~lne unlts. HI lbe. third and (om

ptiorltl.ea are 1'I!IIlerv&d for sl~OlUl in which it ie 110t prae1lcat !Ol the landowner to develop COll1tOUIU

Ii

bQusln8

el~r

on or oft she beCllllse the rcq,uired cOlt11nunity btlus/.tlg units

resu!t~

in 10$,9 than.

On

9

lO

ho'lsinS 'Imi.,tl 11 Un<:ler the 'third 9lld fourth .p1iat1~es, 1l1e landowner eitl}ct' COflV-cya lW'\d c!\loulated II fi
Illatket ve1uGS, or pays a fee e'1tW to tho ~talll1.ibIlJ4y ~'\Il'It 101: the required o01"mWl1t.y nousblg umu,

:'.2

Additionally, if ttI.O l1I.unoer of 1'e'l.uired 0011ll1lumLy h.oustna UDils l't)iUlt In a ffaotiotl under the tlr$t 0
,ec;oDd prloxlty I 'tho lanc1Qwa.cr mi1~ ptloy all in liw tee eq,\.\a1 ~o tho subsIdy amount ttl: fllat traetiou.

F'Ol" Il\)' oommllll1ty !loUSing u.nit& provided 1,W.der th~ tiut or r.l!ooud
n1'1.1S1
1&

IimtOt

into

\-eq\Urtm«otl.

11

Co;mrmunfty Houstng

th~ aal~

or rental tl!l1'm.l

Agreatrl~m whi~

1U1d

~0t:1'tlea,

aets forth, 1\m0ll8

the r=strlotlons to

Cll!Ul'8

II.

tM develope

numb.. 01 othe1 .

tl'J.E! peonanent Itt'f'Ol'dahlllty and

17
1&

cotnpHauoo with. the Coll1tl:tunity ROWing GaidblWul:. Th6 McCalllllanni1lg &:. Zonlng Collllll!fslol1 IIl'ld

tho City CC)unoU have the :power to reYiw £\Qd apprOYe the f:nclusionary H'oull~i Plan. lfth~ CIty

CouncU QOUcots In. lie" feea purs\umt to

.

~

tbUt1h priority,

Or

feca for any ftactiotal a,mouryt

ocmmunity hOI1$\ng. such f\lnds are to be dopo$i.te4 into the Comn:runlty Ho\lSini 'trust Aeeount to b
22

" ?o~.I\U.l buy\!;n

WoCl11 t=
24

~la~~(v

.
01::

Eo:

r"l'\l:cs:a:. muat uet

a~~~~dabl~

hou4ifig.

the .t:1lqu.t~fllPal\tlll ea~U$hl!tt

!:IV the ~lt~

ot;

~I !I.cacse the deV'e!opa:t: ill ,na..,.itaQ t:.CI $!$t IISlda \:wnn.ty pel:'cent of th_ IlnJ.t:a l£
cOIIlmllnJ.ty h0\11111'\~, ~l\. mtl\illl\.ll!\ nwnber ot wdt. a c!.avflloplu.' lI\ust cilll'll'alop \.IMe\r thea
ft.::n O~ ... cal\d 'l?dQritS.•• WOU.ld. be fLIT' I1nLt., of wh1t:h CI\. ",nit: II\Ullt btl c~tlr'

To:.

..<33"153514

1'10.173

spem fer plmn1ngJ 5ubsididlla, or developing community bOWling '\111it$ J.a ~Cal1.
~

J\.

Pan 1 13"31
P.l::!..••

!endown8l D'~

petitlon for a rdund Qf tho in liou fees if tUM fees hAw not be-c.o. ~ed by the Oily of McCtll witlm

fIVB Y"atS,

PU\'tb.<mnCtoe, the CIty of McClIlllnay a4}1.ISt or w.i\'o the ~'equJreJt2CQt' Ul).dar Otdln~ 'Nc. i I g

,
a

,
10

if rho dave.lol'er demQ'nltrates md the CIty Councll flnds 1bera it ''no rea90zablc relAtionship between tb
homing l#1pKt ot lho

prOpOi~

.1'esldential lIU'bdivi~ioll and the roqul:remen19 of tltfA section." CIty

MoCaU O!dl~cc No. 819. § 9.7.10(.AX13)(a). Tho developer hu the'burden of provldins eoot\olni
int'o~Uon. or data neces*y to

ernahlish thl!.ttherc Is 00 rea.sOllabJe relationship.

O:dinanoe No, S:ZO reCJ.ulre.s that

11

fIlVet:I

lamdDwne:r ISCCldllg

1.\

buUdhlg ptlXtnlt fb.r a realdenUlll

dwtdUaa U1Ut, not exet1l,J)'teCi by tM ordilllLllt.lA:,l:l i$ required. to pay a oOn'l1n.U1rlty housIn,g fee. ,[,hls Fe
rep.rl1llent4 the Jubsidy Bl'IlOunt required to dovolap tmri oonstrw:t cOl:mnUl1ity .hQ~ for fifty pare=w 0

the ez.npJoycca JU1:ded 1D ml'lintanllUld serviOl$ the dwellina wit and who ba\l'e low to nloderato ln~ome

~'J

19
20

howr'\l\9.
c~tner

II[

"'11..

Su.bd.ivi.lbnf wltl'l lass t.ban

the third

O~ !c~rth pr\~~iti6.,

fQllQwing

.hou"b~ :faa I

"

2.1

J.

~oblle

6,
7.

Se.

.xpan-~Qn up to fiv. h~ndr8d .qul~a
p~'-.M'et1n; ~.'~ntial clwell!nq u~it.

whe

5,

:r:1l8.1.4I!J1,Ual de~lopment unal ar. 6"~i: ..d

tzorc

'flUl .t'&dov61Op;lent, ~$lI\Qd.e1in\:t, or reJ.ccar:.icn be A 19S'IlJJ.:f
~.ILGe~t~Al ~nit p~vtded nO neW o~ addLt10nLl ~e$1de~t~.' unLt

2.
...

t.1v, un.l,t.l pnsvl1IlIbly would Pc eu.bjeoe t.

9~sl floo~

namea.

Sld,l1..t,l nur."Lzo.Ijf ho.u.Lt1es ..

~ot!~n~ O~ &.eL'te~ 1~Y~n9
rDlte~
~roup homes.
Cc)ll\ll\un1.t:r ll~dn'iT l.U1it ••

Ci~~ o~

teet of

!'re-uh:;l.ng

ia ~~.a~ed.
erea ot. 1egl11

and

MoCall

O~nQnc~

homQ$.

NQ, 120.93.8.2110).

2 9

.

07:2t1 Froml
at/m.1Sl.20000 Gll?PWu 'rtTHE .... AR HEWS

TOll20f

:-e8-~-200B

.
five yars, AzJ. appl1(;atl' may

2

alISO

Polllt:14"'Jl .

NO. 173

spent -wjthh' ftve yurs unless the Cil'y has ~ed s\1cll -AmdJ and
1

"'3514

UU,u\/. .. 1o - _..

e~tended.

1".14 ..

the time an addttJO/1!l

a.WI)' for a. TedUOtiOD. ar walver of the ¢om,m.\l:I:l.i.ty housbll 1U ~f ~

3 J:lCl'SOJ\ receives ineoJnll wlth\n, tho Inoome Categorlt. ident1fle.d Il.txrvo or belfeves the repJdentW

•

does )lot Ielate; 10 tho purposes ~d staIld11rda of Ordinmloc No. 820.

4
5

Piafntlffargues that Orolnmce Nos.. 81~ MOo aao ~~d the C~ty's zo~ aLlthotlty bOC61,\9C the

G

att=mpt to regul.e ownership as opposed to 1J!i1l of the ptopert:y. Fwthe:trnQre, ~ltilirtitr iU'guea that lue

.,

,

ordina.n~ vIolate

the genetallaws of the state bO~ll.\ll!e rCjulatloJll rdatl,ng to .commmUl}' hous1ns ha...

8

b~el1

a
u

p1'COlnpted by other

~

le.w, thAt eutb ordinm,cell llnOQnstitutlonalty conttol rem. 11111t ntch

OrdilwtOes na d'iigu1sed itnpact fee!, or tb.e.t ~y unpose lUtglll biXet.

n. Whether tlte AtllllorlfJ,l to Implemfmi A/lordabla HDUrlng hCIR b,,,n Implilld1; Pl'sampttd. by SltUe
L~

,,
~:t

.

While Artll::lt 12., Secrtion 2 Ot1hD !d.llhoConsLitunon il .. gran, of local polioa pDW~ to Idaho
oities. this t5Qllee PO'Wtf i.e

llro!t~ in ~

lellSt "tIlvo

J~ott!ml: TCSpcdts.

'Fint, Qiliet ~t IIOt lJl. an ere

which is 10 oompJ.etely coveted by general1a.w as \'0 indicata that it is Il mat1~rof stale oonoern. Seeond..

101 Idaho tS8, 161,610 P.2.d517, 520 (1980). Und~tha d.oetrll1o ofhnpl1~proetnption. wh=rea.s~
17
1.I

he.s acted In. 13\ Bl'eEl msucll a pcrvulvlI manner. it Is Iluumed 1ltat tbs ttate 1meAded to OOClll')' !be entire
dos~Lte

l..

f1eld 0'( rep,ulat'ton

2G

entities. It! (ol.tll1g

'-1

&68,870 (la. 1971».

22
23

III

the lae1c ~~?J.b.)' ~ciii<: laniutge PI~pUnS regulAtlon by iDeal sove;mmell

Urrlt~d

Tuvlll'l'l

Ownm'$

oj Phtl~d'lph'ia

'II,

SOhool D/GI. of Phl/acZl1lphlQ, 272 A,.

1961, the ldaho tA;h;1atlUe enacted tho liousing Attthorlt1ea

Code Se~oll. S0-1901 el leg.

~ld

Coope:ratf.on Law at Idaho

ny enact1l:1a thilJ statu\:a, the Legislature reeopJ.wi tho :leed tQr sani

aud nfo dWl:l1lllg aocommodAliol)S far pmcns of low lncom.e. See Idabel Codo Am\. § SQ.1902{1I.)

2

To.

33453514
/'D.t?3

Pat,115;31
P.tS"·"

8s.olltially, a ho~s1na authority il created as an lDdepe:nde!.lt publie bQdy ootpo11l.te and poUdc by
').

re501ll'tton of'the govemiaa body oftb.c city. but 1& not an flgene)' of the city. Idaho Code Ann. ~ SO
~

1905~ Sif4 alto Idaho Code Ann. § 31 ..420S (county hc~il1~ auth0rit5ea).l' The houdng authority h.

imbued with a Ilwubcr of powers netenaxy or oOllveruen1 to olin'Y0ut and effilotua'ht the puxpose. MQ
5

provistollii of tho toet. Spcclflce.ll)', a. bo1l$Jng lI.uthorl.ty hilS the power to contract with ot'hor hOlJsi"

,IS

autborlli,M fur sorvl~:I, oreate bylaws. ruhu and reJUlations, prepare. OIl.t'3:j' out, acquire, lease,
o,Pera.te l'lQ'l.1Slng J;ltojeett. lealo or

n:nt dwdlulgS. ellt8.blilh end rc'V(se reats, own. hold and implOve r

II

10

(bl. end (c!).
OVerall, Chaptel' 19, Title 50 of th¢ Hous1n,gAut:borlties IU1d Coopl!l'atioll Law dJsctlS1e$ II
bOt\$tng authorltr'. ability to own and IlCq\lfra ,..a1 property. SueSO;ti04 (d) gr:a.nts the hOlWne; ..umoriiy

c.toV1eo, or amlnO;lll <1.omm.n~ Pl'ld solllnQ. exchanatnj, tnm~1 migni.D& plodSl.l'l1 OT dlsJ)!)ling of I.tt
,

City of

M~11

may have in e. landoVlller'. real ~operty' whlch .is r.eqljlrDd to bl e~erk~4

l'

111

comn1'Ullity housms uc.del' tho fa-tit ty,rQ priorities of O~ No. a 39.

:8

1'h!1 Co~t bcllevM tlult the Idaho Legislll.Wl'e 1w eareMly designated powers witbln a hOl.1sm

20

lutbority lD. Cb.a.ptor 19. Title SO trod Chapter 42, TItle 31 t (If the Idaho Co4e (c:rca.tcd elthor by It. c{'ty or

U

OO"tUlty) to ldd.re$s housing pl"oblema o.nd prtlVicic for affbrdable hou,ing to low income

~i

PurSQatlt to thoat ood. seoti-oos.

7.3

lllealwtiJ11l81

the})OWOf

II. ht::lusing

ho\,~ebold!.

allthodty may aequir~ J:ea11'roperty p.rlmarUy W'01.tgh two

of e:mU'\ent domam. and the !8S\'Ulnce of 'bonds upon proper resolution. Idaho

114

26

1. Cb.~~er 19. Tiel. so 0: tba ldaho Coda ~bLab 9c~~~p c~~~ hO~$~~' avth~~~t'c. Lf
ODo."U.al1y Lde1'lt.1ca.1 to ChapUt C2, fltle n ~ovlu:,,"ln9 oout\1:y ht>udnsr "'\l\:hcu:!t:hlJi.

To:1e0

1
2

codeArln. §§ 50·1~14, .1916;

31-421~ ~16t

"3514
1'10.113

Pille: 16....31'
P.1S:··

Wiih Ill1ab bonds, Ilhousl.ng aulbolitymay p~e 0

obta1A rtal prcpOl:ty.~· A housini JUthorit)' ma.y also e.o'lulre real pro.perty by "it\, g.ratlt, b~Il'\1~ 0
d&vlse. Altel\1iti'Vely. a ha1l$U1g authority may also aoquire real FOP~Y throuSh loc.n.. lde.ho Cod
Awl. §f 50.1 P04(j)i 31.4204(f).

5

Punbenno.re, A eft}' Or county may land D1" donate .D2O'iU:y to the housfl2

n.Utholity. Idaho Code Ann. §§ SO.. 190!)~ 31·4209. And the federsl Aovemmcnt may alSo. loen,

contrlb\lte or pro'Jir!e grmt$ or -o'lhet fll1ane1a1. usi6tM.O'a to hotn!ng authoxitiea. Ichth.o Code Ann. §§ oS
j

1923; 31-4223.

e

If a 010/ or county finds that theN ~Gt ('illSan1b1rr or UDlafo" I1weUl.ag aeco.mn.'\odatlo'Os O~ th
there i, a. ahortage of sa.t'e IUld ~tary dwelling aooommOda"liollS lMilabL~ to low ~o!.'ne hoWloholds.

't\Jh g,avemio; bod.y shall
12

a.dopt a. tcsohtloll deo!WI that ~ ill

il\

necr.l for

I.'!.

hQusing !l.Uttlotity.'

IdMo Code Amt. U SO-190S; 31·4205. Although a city o.r county ill oat required. to oroatc a houain
~ri1,)',

it JelmlS apparent that 1f the city or county h :faeed wIth a. oecd to e.dd.reaJ affordablo hO\llltDs

is

thb 8pprop~ate machanilrtt tor t overa.1.'1g efiordab!e bousbl$ through a hQ'US[lIg authority llu.tr\\~t to
either section So-UlOl sf sell-. _or Beetioll 31·4ZOt

tl

reg. IS BMentUilly, these statutes provi~ th

iiaa:rewotk in whIal'r local SQVC1'l1mCDta are to address IliIOrdabJe b.oU:W1tr17

U

H ~f low ir'lr:.ome I\Qud.nq b
au~hoxl~y,

t~

would he

Qwned by a nOI\-p:.:ot'jl.t: or~ltn~ sat1.o/\ fl.lcb

~li91bl. ~o ~$ ese~~ f~om ta.~t1Qn un~~~

:deno

&II

II hOIl.in

Co~a

u

$ectlQn
'[he Idaho lm.p,a.ot t:'ee AQ~I Idaho "od.a Soc:t:l.Qn 67-£1201 CIt: s.q., allo
~el'l~:LD.lI an illt:anHvo fo:r:' dtc:d.~l.e hO\1$£.n9' "
1'..00&1 9'ovcm.'f.en-:. may waive 1111 ox
p .. ~t o:t! an:,- j,mpact fau &1 an inelilnl~h·. for dave!loplllre to J,ncludlS aUordablll

22

n By p.ue,l\St1.0A ~O-OS, Valley County ancl AdaUla county o%&a.ted

2Q

.u

24
R&
ZG

63-'02G"0.

hou.~ni'

%d'no Code

~

67-B204tlO).

/I I'!oun~y lIQuld.nll
1:0 Ida.hO Cod. !fca.:aUOl"I :n·~U08.
rhldClI tbe
eact.:!.cll, A lSo',sn1.:y NY a,uthox:Lu the Qoa!:!.on of a hQUcsit'lQ author:\ty, t;'il;l\ 1:'.11
8,1:I;I,),.1:I:Y 1!o tr!UIlJac:t p~a SJ\ea8 Il1\d exerolu POW-UN I pUr8tls,nt to a ~::¢gez: t'esol\ll:J.on
Aut:.ho~!ty

kl'LO"In

4~

VAMA pU1;luumt

1;0 function.
~esoluelon 10-06 wu A~OlIl!ad 0
!I.i,'I1IUI~ by tnra VAlley Cf:)UL'l.ty COf\llV,!aej.OClf'.II:S.
whlla tb.Q Clty 0
KCCal1 did not exp~e.ely author:LIEI a c~ty ho~.1nf aU~hor&t~, t~ app4ars to rely 0
the tindinqs and. s"cpa~r:Lsa oJ: vAAII,II..
~dQr to tb" <::I:.... t!on tTt: YMHA. tb_ City ot!
McCaU, pUl:l!!d a<lSOlut:.J.Oll oS"U ptcv1d1n9 tor iI t;CIllUnWlhy noulSinq poL1cy "Ihieh 14'iU
dcsned by Hayer lI'1,rk L. lllimel!'4' on S~pt:~fJ: 22, 2005.
ordin.noQa Ho ... 1119 and a:to

deoht1:a; 'tM nMcl. hI' an flu':hotJ.ty

.:1I&t\UAry 13 I

l!!dtl6,

~IiU\N'OQH

:D::E:OUXoN'

AN!)

()1mJilp. .. P1I..Q;S :1.6'

2

To

.183453514

puel17"31

NO. iTS

P.t?

~.

14 197J, the Idaho LegblM1.It'e tl1ll.Ctcd Idsllo Codo SootIOt1 61-5101 .t S'Q., whioh created e. state
1

2

,

lp!\C)', tho

Idaho

Ii.OUlina

~.Jl.Y. the sb\tQ
1

a:o.d FitlMCle AslIoel11.11M, to a.ddrosa tbo asuo ot "ffordll.blo hOllsl.ni.

'hO'l.1lUti ZWloo.latlQ.l1 Is empowe:od to oOl1dtlC.t i1s

.. avee:ments or ,??nb'&ctl, and to
5

l~e.

bwjlle~,

sell. ccms1ruot, flnanoe. uy housing pra,ier;tS

mako and cl{ec

4 to e.lIlbllsh

'1m

revIse rents or .:ha:Bes, Idaho Code Awl. § tS7.6~OG(a). (b). (e). and (1). The s1:atI!I hotls g muooiation b
alao cmpoworcc!

to OWIl,

hold e.nd. Improves real ;p:ropcrty.

~e,

tease, and obtai options upon,

Ii

and regulatlolU applicable to the looality oflho ll.owS prcjccu. Idaho Code Nm. § 6 -610~. S\m!le:
to

u

hou8i:DJ rutholit,lcs.. lbe state howlng usoCltLtioll hat the 'Power ot aminr::nt doJTLR1n

tUlle bond. to Aolttcve: its puxpose Qfprovid{t1Q a.ffc~dable housml. Idaho Cede AM. i
T.b.6 Le~sla.twc: ha.s also created the Idaho Houshlg Trost Fund for the purpo

to

8&slstlow-lncome md very low-mco+rto oiUPlUI in meeting tlu:ar basic. houllnii 1'1;

11~

,21)

ofvcl)' low-l.acotl1& oitizc:njl sho\lld b() gfven priority!' Idaho Codo AM.

~ ~7·81 01.

The howl

(ft) N~w '-lOnstruetiOll, rehshilltat!on, or acqu1Jit3on of houslng uniti for oc amy by low
mOClrtle and vet)' low-lnoom~ houac.holds;
(b) Rellt substdJ$* In m'W eOlllltruo1!on or rthabilltated mu!tffanU!.y ll1uts for I w-Illcome

veIY low-JncatnO bOuse!lOJd.;

22

ral y on CC$tlIu".I.ty GI11d..lin~.5 enacte.d. l:IS' VAIU!.1\. at\('! to th. extent chat: ~b. City of
~•• ol~~!~ al1o~4
the 0ity of ~oC4l1 ~o $n~at in~i~.~o axy KOn~
~td!n.nce., ~hQ .~~n1s~~.t~9n Q~ .~ch o~~lnanc.~ ia 90verned by V~.

Nceal~'c

2

To :120E'

1514
NO. 173

P nil!: 18;31 .
P.1S"""

1

(e) Admlnisnuvc cosU for boulh1s ~lf.s1ance group" or orpnizatlan8 whIoh Pl'O'VI4a hou&in
wilen Noh grant or loD.l\ will 8nbstantlally Increase ~ ree!p'ent', aOQ~S to housing f'un
ol.b~r than. tnolll 4wOablo \lnd~ tb!s chaptet;

!

Q.) AcquIsition of hous1n& units for tllO PW:p040 of l'rcBCl!'VatfQn a.s hous!l1a tor low4c¢wo an
vert lOw-fAcomo hOllse.holda;

..
\

4

Idaho Coda AnD. § G7-8103(2). Local governments IUld loclll hawing al.ltbotitlesll'\a}' ~OQ'~ve ~siSf:iIlllo:e
Ii

fi:om tho stats hQusing ~loclatlOJ1, Idaho Cod." AM. § 6-Ml04.

Spe~t:ally.

tho Idaho Housing 1'n1s

,

Fund Act £l,p~lin to low a'!ld V&ry low mool'11.e housebold!i il.Od d.efine, Iow-1n.c»m" Musello1c1! as thoa

Ii

with a m.ediQh. income of ,ltOre dw:t iUty PGrOent b\lt leu than cidlfy petoeJtt of the medl~ income Qfthe

9

1l1'e1t J:bd vcty~low incotne houael,'lolde

te

Code Arm. § CS1-al 02(9)t {lO).

11

1a

as these with les. than. f~ poroeut af'thc D1~diBlllnoomo. I4aho

Tho Plaintiff argues the Leglsla1:t.\%o. B'poclftcally chose to lddteli$ rifolliQble hl1tlaing U, separa
mel dis:unet statutes. The Jte.~8 clttd eI'bOVIS do I10t make it ll1llbaoluto rcq~nt to \)uild aftordablc

1,3
lot

RD.~,

b.ousWa.

the Pla1ntfff a.rguei Bucb statutea l11'Olt a local government', ablUty to provid

as tax or hupact ~

:1.5

dordllbl0 llousina t~ 'bonds or eminent dotllal.n. or to Qfft::r luoendv6s

1~

exem,PdQlll1 to davalQ,Pcr.. 'l'b.$ City ofMeCftll, 00 the othbr habd, argues' Lh~ t1(1ne aitha above statulCIII

17

prohibit the City fion\ passlnj IGgbSatloll 'to provfde for bousfna tha1 ls e.ff'ordablt to the CIty's

!S

W01Jd'6rCC.

19

tlwou~ \b.c Mallo ltousing IIl'lCl P'!rwlc~ AssQc.!ation e& well as leaal houdng aurhorl1ies at the e1ty ao

:1(1 I

:u

What the above statutes Illalce olear 19

~

llUob

the LegIslature hM enaetli'd Pl"Ovlsionl bot

COlmt)' !llVsl to t(Jgult!.t~ BlfO.rd.ab]e ho~.
lioMV~,

the tda.t\a SUprern.c Court he! hel4 ths.1 'I(allocal.

otdl.tw:l~

wblch merely

eo

I

II. ~ ttatl.lt,e

.U

tl.1rthel' than

2'

$tatoJIlW." Ji"oyt.!l

2~

\.lIlC!e: UUPA.,

Y.

in bnpoaln& adclltt¢naJ tegul,flol) of" givtm QQLlduot docs JlC)t. oonfllct with

City o/Nampa. 97 [daho

~4[Wlhel1t'Ve1'

S~71 501 1 S48 P.2d 121? 1221

(1976). FufthcrnlOl'C,

the orditla):lCC8 made under tbh chapter fmpose hll:tllet Iltanda.rds tbaa. Itt

2

FE~~2e-C008 07;8& Froml
, Ol/ttB.19.200S11 6:1ePM'1II1','ITHE; STM NEWS

tequlrod by IIl\Y othet

$

To:

33453514

Paee119'31

1'10.17:3

J/.I.cJU\& ..................

q,rte Or local otdinenr.::e. the provi&iorul of o~. mJdo

P.tS

pU,l1Ul\ct

to rhi

l.

1

~

~

shall ,o"~rn," 1 aho Code Anu. § G7-6518. Although thoro .Ls Dxt_vo olIta.tu1ory .relCu/.atfo
~da.blo bousblg to;' low meomf: ho\lSel')olda, tlrl! Court does I10t &ta tbat th

recazdins ca=mun\ ty or

.. . LeB!a'fllL»'e lmpliedly1'

)l'lpted '!be entil'e 5e1d af e.1Yordable houshls. While such. leei,JatiOl1 m

6

provide: ths 1tamowork f4 laguJadoo, relatiDi to sftbrdabJe housing, thM=-lB nothing in 1bltSl& stafUtes

6 .

wmcn.tppear& to p!:e.venr. cit)1 £Tom ena.otiug a. zoumg ord_Qb "Iitb. reaped. to aifoTdabte bQ~~in~ •

.,

II. If'lfC!tlw' Ordlmrnct: M • 1:1 (i OJ1~nttl!$ (J1 att UnfIRtlJQI'ft,tl RfJ1tt Ctmvoll'nw41t;n

No. 819, l:f a. daveloper ~ct! comrrumlty hOUldllS ullits
tar into

II.

COOl»\\U:m1y Ho\t1ing Agreel1leJlt

IU'

rental!, th

whic.h. provldos the collS'truc.tion

reatal te.nnJ, and tb rcstrlotions plao=d on tho Ul:lhs

'ttl

ens1.Il'e thai

compliance Wltll tbe Couml."illli1:Y 'Houstng GuideUnu. Such

flo_

i

Ii affordable boqslng su.bject to tho regt.ilationll govem.bJ& pot@tlal rentcx

1.3

ela. VARFlA reCol:Omends r_Jltal or ,ate prices

,.Jlb:rd~ble houslng

to

the Clty of Meedl,

cle.ui:ft do!:! remain tied 'to the propertY a.t2r1 1'U.Il wifb. the land to tiJ.ture owners.

Th~

City of MoCaU or8UtI! it %CWos an 1ntereat !n the deed-restricted oottmiUnity hou.tfua throul!h U\&
Inl.t

19

ente:rc4 into by ~ property ownerlt and througb the .teaulatloM wWch

10

cn~e

Silo

Phuntjf! argues that such r nt relb.i c.l1o.M JlJ.nount to B. "iolat1on of.lchho Codo Section 55·307(2).

:1..1

14

that !\wh houah'g r

II.W affordablel thus prese::vingthe iOVIllDl~tal JJltereet In 81lab prop61'tY.

Idaho Cede Seano 55-307 ~...iclcil inl»rtin~t pan us follows:

A local gOV~&tt
that would have th
tt$ld~).tia1 'P'toperty

rt.t

2

To;12af

":351.~

1'10.173

Puel20-'31 .

P.26·-

l

rdaJ\O Code An.n. § 55-307(2) (ompho$ilf added). The s~t~ ex.pteBsly a.llows a local goVemmt1\tal Un!

;.1

to enact

I.

hoUGini:.

~plrJning

rcsQIQtloJ) thai. would huvo the offeet of COlltrollll1S nm.t If' (he aovernmontal Ul)it hti

3

tnat ~ts illWt!li, wMle Mt a po,uessory Interest, is a. r02\llatotY bQ o.dmioislratlv

t\

inteteSt "lIpplled through VAlUfA, to maintain the tlpkecp and usef'u.!.ness of s\loh o:ffordable bousin
.,

\llutl And to IInllUto tha.t sueh unit! are utflb:ed only by those 111d1vlduala quall~g for the low mcom

iI

hOll8iug,1I

p
),0

1i.

H

Und~ Idal).o Cod!! BCOtiOl)

S()"l9'04, aoityhoUlllng a1JthOrlty ha.s the ,bower to "leQl.onen1

dwellings .• , embraced In all}' hl'>l1tins: ,proJect ••• [and) fa establish aod tcv.ise tho lenls or ch~l~
therefore." Idaho Code Ann. § 50.. 1904Cd); l'll/rJ a/:a tlhlho Code Ann. § 31-4204(d) (t.ounty hOQSiAe

real pr{')pstty throueh emiDent domal.n or with ~ds obfsined throujlh !!I.ruIU'lee ~f !1. boad. S" idaho
-42~6.

A housing authority would olear!)' ha...e l <>property

l!i

Corie Ana. §§ 50-1014. ·1916: 31-4214,

.u

lnterel1f'in lioob property and tlw authority £0 co.l!t:ol rents. St. Idaho Code A.tl.o.. §§ 50·1913 Illjd 31-

l'

42 T1, nis COi.l.rL does

1 (I

authority Whfch OWN real properl,.y.

mi~ DO~luc(a

that the City of MoCall possesse., tne sarnO interest Q a hnusln

The CIty of McCall adInl1:a it 'bIS only A re~tQty 01' ad1rJnlstrative interest. 1'hia em is n
«lnvlneed tltat NCh interest e.o:s.otUlts t~ I. ~opert.y i~t'ire$t'l ilIlder sectiol1 55-307('2). The ludowncr I)

.u

d$velopel' of dFordable hollSing wolll4 :fI)t/1ln a pro~arty Interest aubJQ01 to regulation. To hold tht

local governmol1f entit)' has _ pXQpofty Interest in real prcpert)' when it e;'U!lretses only a 1'C.;ulatory 0
24

adnunJ.stratlve fUll.etiO'Q. would esson~l1 evifi~erat!S Idlllo Cod& Section. SS-307, which prohl.bits a 10(1

To; . •d3~S1~

Pafe;21/31

NO.l13

P,21-··

do 'WAaIIUf 1111 Ol'tJtH.I1IfCU Exact an '{/nizllllltlrll4d .7'" 111' nn Df,quue41IHpact FlAil

li:lltialty

.0.

GtstinctiOJ1 l'nUlt be cUlwn with te!lpeot to

Or~oe

Nos. al9 and &20. Thes

ordlnaUOl:8 m os.=tially atbml.p1ins to proytd~ t'o! affbrdable bD'uIinl rather 'th.an ~ affordable

, htlu.ttns.

A.lthouah the Court d.efell to tho City'of'McCe.U'$ findlnp rela.tlng to thl need fOf affordable

houehlll Md. tM City's slnoere eftom 10 provide for &Uoh, tb!a Court ia b=1ng

,

asked. to dOl:ldo tb.

colUtltuti onaUty of the l11eflnS Chc C1ty of McCall is ll.d.l12l.nS 10 provide fot affordable l~O\Ildng. 'rho ctt

of McCUl hus ~tieulous1y engmeere4 1\ land u.s!: }'fQv\sion v.hlch .equl.res landowners and. dCIVeloper

Q

to
10

give OVOt Sometbh1g of v~ue in ex(;bange for the rIght'to develop a suhdt1l1Bion 01 build. a l'eslden .

UIlil While the Oity of MCCall argues dust OJ'dinmee Nos. 819 nne!. 820 Xt1dil'cl:; reg1.l1ato tho JTOwth 0

11

:residential hotlSing .In McCall, It 511 undeniable tbAt the .nated goab of such ordlnanoEl8 Il.'e to provide fo

12

"1. xoaaontlblo lIupply of atlQrdaols, deed. remiel:JC workfo.tcb nO\lslng (con.Jmtlnity hO'llSIng}." Such
ordinances OOlltem.;J!ate that fa
dovelQP~

u

~'ll:IgCl

for approval and bSl.W\ce: of a building permit e. lancio'Wtl4T 0

must ~ve over somcthin8 of ycrluff, whether it be an agtee.ttl.ent to pro'Vlde

inc.[ull1omuy housJr.g, th~ oonve)'illlcc oflillld, or a fee Ullliex Ordinanee. NOI. 819 or

~cd" r$stri~te

no, Therefure, thl

Court %m.llt ~e whetn.er the City ofMcCal1lw! authority for CX8.otl..tl.a sucll "tee.1.111
l'

19

20

22

.

the \am "f~II" £'t: i l :'ltfe:r~in9 to sny mnd. oIJ.1 of thQ
pr:!.edtiell l1stac:i und.. zo Ordil'lat\CI!I No. tlU, and nqt mct'tly t.he "in li~u teeN unae.r
tho !ouJ:th lI'riodt.y.
r.,u:tM~e, it h 'J1'ld.e«,t6oe t;Mt Ulldar O:dinllllC4 NO. sao,
tn.. ccnm~nJ.l:\y l'IO\lJl!n.g tell ,ts II "tea" in l:Iny g-1lInoral. Ul'1IfO c:! the W'iI:I./:'Q, 71\8 C'Qurt'lI
analyUI 18 not relStl:ict.ed to t.he fllcll that W\41!:j:: the Urst 1:WO pr10%'A.'C1t!1 of
ol:d;l.nanO$ bfa. lI1.i, (:.he 1Ilndo\ol4tU: 1& 1101: nUQCjUhhing- cum~:rol eVel' 1'118 ~l:' lUll'
'P~op'u·t:y. !J!hh ::Iou no I: m~eh tllat tile la.ndOwnU 1.8 1\41:: in Ulfen.Cfl pa.yint a pl:'J,l:e c",

U

WhOl\

the

Cot.U't

Wie"

~h.1.'! City of MccaLl. !CI~ tht p!d.V111t91i1 tlf '@~vic:Un9 or ue(!tln;
On his D~ »8;1:' land.
TM. Cou:rt ~el:ogl)i&u the fr-.ot: I:hat; e~s C~ ty 0
KOCA\l hills ch,lu::'C'oteriz.d lltach nqu.i.r: Olt4nt III a QaUoJ1(iy. amoUnt," alii d1!ll1ned bY tna

a

"ee,"

to

~lI\PrO'\Te.mef)t..

p~cvi.~on. for lInd oQaveyanoa end ~h_ ln llau fee.
8•• CLty of ~Q.~l Ord\oana
lIo. 819, J ,,7,::LO(A) ("I (e) ll'ld. 9.7.10(~,(5)Cbl. fluH:efor$,.I..t: U 1IPl',I;op:c.s.jl'c9 fo
tbia c:ouxot.. t.a Unci. that. the Uli\l:!.;:ef.l,enta ~c:lIItr. .:my oS: \:l\a f!OI,l~ to d,o 1:i1: J..,II 1.

Ol:I:!!..nl:ncCII ~o. 81i C=01\81:,it:l:lt.. II "EsfiJ,"

2 7

TOI1~

M1.lJl1D1J;1lliues axe \I.\lowecl

putf.\l&l\t \0

the I~ CQU

'3514
NO. 173

t!.on to enact fees

Q1'

PU~:2'2"31

.

F.22

impos= tax"

1.

Ma proJ~. Genomlly, d)6rC &:1:0 twa priInflll' wa.ye in wbi

tho publlo or on partlou1B:r pel'som: (1) by l~gllla1!"e
rnuntolpaUty to fund. a pr,oJe« throUgh
S

~

e»

dlay UnPOSI> chuge$ 0

wbldl Jpe.litieally p¢rmits th

BlIsessment ot tax s or foeS; or (2) p\U'aullnt t.Q tb.o pallo

power far &te eolJ.ect1ol\ or reVCl:lUCI incidental to the mU'01'
COhr~r()" A.ss'n \I. Cil)l clO;Js"". JJ 'AIBn"

'7

IS. mun;c;1paUty

nt of a. regulation. Se'4 J@ho Bulla,

116 [<w,\O 140, 74 -43, S9~ .P.2d 3'26,328..29 (1995).

Artl.cl= '. IIBciton 6 of tha Idaho COtlStitul.'Oll

~preu

provldes tbnt a cIty bas the power

II

•

as!$eSJ lltd COllect taxes for e11 ptttJ)oscs of tbe city {lorpora:tio
7. sea1ion 6 aftho T&l.ho ConstituflOll pe1'l:nit8 a mU)llcl¢

11.

pUl.')iOIleS ott.he CQl'potation, that mtna authority is not selfroex curit1g and is limited to t'hat Wdna '!)Owe

l2

glvCll to the 'ITlUnIelpaiity bY tho Idaho Leglslatura. It!. at 742,

l.Ilo

Pocutrt11t:l. liS 1&\'10 S02.. 503--04, 768 '{I.2.1! 765, 765-6'1

ORS». 'Ntitt-iElf party hat welted Ill'IY

statutory authotlt)' whioll would pennit the City ofMQCall to

pose a. tax through OrdlAanee. Nos, 819

and 8;40. 1ll tSot:. tile CitY of MeCall d~es that the reas or

st! imposed u-pon lu:ndoWQlJrs in eitha:1

)~

OrdtraAce NOli. 819 or 8'20 conatitut~ 8.~. Rathert tIlt Cily l!.\lO1 6tlCh fees ~ lawful PLlt'stWrt to
:til

i,

poti~ powers.

Under Article 12, sectIon 2 of !:be Idaho Consti:tuti

A

lll\uuoipaUty Ttla),

20

pur5uant to its po]!oe }lOwe: for the :f\.1.tth.ersllce of the pub c n=lth..

~l.

res1d~ts.

Idaho Co1l$t, Art. 7 § 6.

,?",'CS1,l!l).\

.
to thole llo\3.ce

IImty. m.orals~

enaot

1'Cgulo.tiDtl

or walwe of i

City of fO{j(J18/Jo, 11$ Idaho S02. 5004, 76& P.2d 765• .,

2

33'\53514
NO. 173

TOI

1
2
.l

prlmuily for XlJ'Jam:lt talsing pUtpostll,

pue:c:!:S"31
P.23

it it meSIlc.uce a t~ an<! mow)' be uphetld und.a.r the ~ower 0

l~l1i()1'1, /JQho Bldg. COnlf'4m07l1U8 'H.

1261dahO e.t 741, ago P.2d at 329 •

The City ofM1)CtdI trg'lu:& tb.at OrdinanOEl N'OI. 819 and sao are not nvtnl1e rafsina D1acbeni~,

4 but xather l~Q ute re.aulati~.ns ena.oted. tllrough tbt City', police POW¢rl to oatl1tol

:0_

rtgulat10n

Ii
II

Just as the City of Coeur '0'Alene Ilralled in ldrMIo BuIldtng COlli1'Qolar$ /1l1soDwtfon, ~ City ofMoCa

i
IS '

'W'Olfaro, safetY. and morals otthe :residents o.fMcCal!. Srfe Idaho Dldg. Contractor.r,4H'1I.12ti rd~l1g II.t

II

3.0

143, &90 P.2d at 329.

11
).2

13

;1\ the City o! Pocatltllo pursuant to Do fonuula re:fleotln8 the tratlio whlob WId estlms.ted to bo sen

:.4

'by tha.t partioular property. ld. at 502 1 768 p.ad at 765. The COurt beld duI't "'tho nven.U6 to ~ oollect

1.5

frotr\ Pocatello'!

~ f~e

bas no .o.ecessary rolationthil'

rrd:'hl'Jr 11 to sene.rate fimdt for the nOll-regulfitOlY

to

~llon

the r;aU1J!,tiOD of trJLvel ovet 1t1 streets. b\'l.1
of repairlna

~

ma;ntJIl rUng .treet., Th

1.'

.1.1

m.e.Int=1I.t'I.0tI and repm gf streetli fs a llOl1-reguJatoJ'Y' f\.t.b.61:{oll

8.'l

tho texms t1pPly to tho faou

ot th

(natant CPa:' Id. at 504, 76S P.ld at 767. The f.. lxnpo.!cd by the ordJIlSllOO in. 8r.nv.rlfll" ~fi'ectively we
20

a glmetal tax rather than IlA incidental Ie&1.UEltot'Y fee. w:u,. a general

rn

public s~lcc. rel'\d~red to tho partioular OQIlBUl11e.t. whll$ a tax Is 1\ foxoecS

SW$ \I.

feo 1; il. Chnr.\lD {ot a dhe.c

co.n1:tib~on by dlCl

publlo

llIl'it to m.ct \'U'blio lleod.~'· !d. at 505. ?!'is P.2d aJ. 76fl.

Under OrdIt1auce No. 819, t'b.e subsidy t;.re~ted either by requirlng lundo'\l'llleT8 to deoa reBtri.ct
lI(

peteoDte.ge

of Ut)( IS

ItS

oomro.un:it;Y l\oush18. to eol1vey Ifllld, Dr to PaY

ill'S.

in lieu fea: l:IppeCl."S to be Brl

211

2.9
----_._- ..

•
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1
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NO. 173

P.24

p\lr~t to ordinance 'No. S10 a.r~ tot'tba pi.!lpOSO of "plannllli. sublidi:tl.na. .developiha 01' construct!

¢os:nm.uni1.y housing." CiW of McCall Ord_ee No. 820., § ~.812\(E)(4). To bel!. valid :fee, the
3

must be !\wldODtil to tho enfOle~nll~nt of the re:aulatl.oll .nd bear 1\ 'reasonable relatiollSl1lp to tha cost. 0
tmi'orcing such resulatlon.
Ci~.

B'I'«W$lBr,

115 ldtU10 at 504. 768 P.2d e.t 167; sse ab'o 1'()$tfJl'" l'flG.

Y.

Bob

63Tda.b.o 201.118 P.ld 72.1 (1S>41).

The Chy of McCall
SUbii~

8rgllOS

!t ha:!I ~ecifi(J 6~ a'l.lfhorl.ly under the

'Under Ordinance No. 819, or

ho~.

tl

u,U?A to rtqlUro

fee under Ordinance 'No. 820, to pr()vlde fOI: safe, s.F\:ordab\

Oen.mUy spca.ldng. the. LL'UPA

~pveIlU ~nlng reau1",tion~ su.ch. M

.bel.ght %egulatlonJIl ,r)s, SprS11lSt', GJ'Ubb &

A.S~0C8.

set'bac.k:s.

~s1tYI

an

v. Ctry of Hatle)" 1211daho 576. !>Og P.2d 741

(19SlS). Bowevat, as dl!Cusied previously, tho LLUPA does not pmvido the CIty with any autllo1'l\y f!

llna.ct\r.i ordi.t:laMes which Jequl.re that de.veloperll provide Iffbrdable
In1pos~

Ii

fee or :req,u.h'e

&.

S\1'h,ldy 1iont l8;lld.ownett

to

h~1.1il.cSa

lot a1~ authority to

:further S\l,oh goal!!.

p~ e~Wlshed

17

:tQr pUEpoaea of 1"nltlgatin8 the fi.nar:.cial J.rnpaet! of de'll,lopment ltlU;t
comply witll 'ih& pl'OvUlOM of ohapte\" 82, title 67; Idaho Code. Denial of' a s\lbdMs{ol1
purtllit or approval of S. subdtc1isiol'\ pe.-rolt with tlOnd5.ti.o~a \tnaCceptable to the J.andowner
may be Jubjeot t'O the teaulatory taking anIIlyals provided for 'by ~ecUQn 67-800~, Idaho
Code. con&i.tt!ltwlfh iN req.ul.rement$ e&tabl1shed. thereby.
Idrl'lO Code Ann.

20
jZ1

I!l

f 67..6S13,

Chapter 82 is tbe Idaho Del1Cloptnent. Ir~paet Pec Aot, \1 and provides to,

the impoaf!.iOl1 by ordmanoe of alellalopn1ellt l1npact fees ... OQndition ofdeveloptnent approve.!. Idaho

...
" '1'he l;dllbo O.velopll\~nt: bo.pa~t. raa 1t.<:;t. ddj.n". "&:ffOl:c1a,l)lQ he.udng" e.s "bousin/#
afJ!otda):)l.. to ,h.llIUi,eQ who$tt inoOlMI do l'oot ~~ucl o~qt-.'!I:!f i'.=-lItenT. 190') Of \:11.
JI\-ct!tr1 1l'lOQIl. to: the Ii.~i~. II:':". 0" e.;:eal w~thJ..1\ ton" ju:riad1ct!,oC'J. o! ttltl
Qove~nral!lnt.l &.ntitv.
Idaho codl Mn. S lS7"Ud3(11.
I'w:tha::'mot:lll, t:h_ aot del.1ne
\'deve).oPlIItu'lt. t:oqui:z:at'l.ent H as "e. :l!'1!I~iI:'Emanll. It"tact\ed to a dllve1optl\antal Gppr;val Ill:
13the: ;ove~nmQnll.al .ot~on ~prg~i~q Dr lQthor1=tnQ a pa~~lcula~ d.velopment proj.et
s'n=l.l,Ic!J.ng. bu.u not lLt~i1:.d. eo. III uzoni1\I,IJ wMah l:.qW..~Qi'I\ent GotcIpe:\.1 the payment,
decl.Lcati.or\ t»: oOllt.~1bgt:Lon o£ goocllSJ .!!erviea., land, P1: 1T>¢I\i!lY al ~ condition ot
IIpp~"a.l.1I
:teLanco Code linn. 5 6'~UO)I~O). tr.;c1_l: lIer:t.i=~ S'1-UC-1,

2 ,0

To:

Pat.:2S<31

J3453514

P.25·-·

NQ.17S

Code A.ll.b. § 61·8204, A de\l'cloplTl.Cnt impact foe is "payment of JDoney lmposed AI Il. eonditl012 0
1
;I

dovcl.Qpnlellt (l;proval to pay for a pwpOrUcmate ihate ot tho con of ~ystem tmprovamtnts nBedcd 1

,erw dc-vei0pD1en.t." lana COde t\.W.l. f 67-8203(9). SUch feu "malt not

~ceed .. ptOpOrtiOQ1te &.hare

o!ttw ocstofsysmn !=prcmme.ms." ldaho Code Ann. § 67-8204(1).
'l"h= critlca.11ll\3Uage in tlle tdaho povclopmel)t Jmpact Pee l\c:t 11 that Lbo purpose ()f aUQb act is

,

to provide iimds neoo;ssary tel' u,Pla:nnini and tiIw).c:irlg: publIc ffloUi\~el ueedcd Lo servt: lJ.CW l\'Owth ill:

develapXl1ent •.•

n~ssary

. , • to J?tOIrlotc anti etooornmodate ordatiy .IJl'Owth. and. developtllOllt and lQ

protect the pu.blio hetJth, safety and gene.ral weifa.re." Ideh.o Code M'fJ.. § 61. .8202. .Public t'acmtIes aloe
1.0

12

det1nod e.s: water WQrl:8~

Wll.$\:e

!acLHtios, rt'fld9, ItreelS, an.d brldge$, stoml water collection, parii Illd

tnedlotl BltO ro.tcue and street lightins facilities. tQabo Code Ann. § G7008203(24). Vltimately. wbile the
Idaho '[)/M!!op:m.tmt I.tnpam- Pee Aot allow,

IUl eccept!OI2 ~

impOfil'1lJ e. devtIO'pI'Ilont impact fet 011

atrOl:dable hO\1SiagJ the AJ:;t does not contern,pll¢e the ~osition at dovelopmant blpw:.t feea to em
811 adeq,Wlte atftn'dable houstn& aupply or to dcs1le1op ,1Uah.

1.':be:t£o~

tbla Court i, UI18.1::l111 to o()uclud

17
III

A. d' .....lt1;prn.nt. UAp"ct: tee Qrci:lnanc:.. I:Ill)' !lKlI1fI~ all or pa.%'t. of •
paa:l.:lcu:l.ar devel.opmal'lt· project bQlt\ dave.loF\ent. 1mp1lOt: tees prQw,dacl
suc~ P~O~8Q~ 18 dete~n,d ~o =:G~~a B!fQ~deDle houeinq, provided.
~hat ~he p~l~c pol1cy w~ah supportG th~ ext~t1on la cont~1n.d in
icv.rnrn~n.t:iL" entity'. cQmp:r:chclnQivlII pll\l'I tmd pX:cv1dad thilt the eXlIlUpt:

th.t:

tne

dovalaPl\letnt l _

chrougb a

pt"O~orl:.iona1:.t!

ldall¢ Cod! $ 67-1:1204 (101 •

c:-aats.ol\

'Cl\a~

suoh

tJCeIflpT.ic'l'l

p~pO~t1on~te

18

than

of

IiYIi1::Cltt\

"l:i.i:h~,'tl

JhAXe of eYltmm

6~pt1tl!l

tna

c:1 ty' Ii

i~~overosnt.

1.

the

!u ttut fa •• j,YlJl:Iouct
~e..

eKo.p~ion

....alil:d

to the

of .ffo:'d.p.):,l&

~.

dClve1.opmllnt:

cQlt\P:'lihan.&ive

fund~d th~oUfh

... ate or tecl$.I:«1 l!un(liI'lV of .£fO,1;'debh hQllo.l.ni.
.$I.lch

~ro"'lm\W\c.

dQvela~~~t 1~ae~ ~.el,

J..t

fl,m.ded

illllent:i.l1ll:Yt a cit)' na.y pt'Ovlde: an .incand".

affordable hQu,d,ng hy

01

ahu/!

~eveo~•• o~ca cthe~

A.IllPIIU:'1!, feCI,

~J,r.n

anather

t.mi

tCl~

~j:\.

p:rov;/.dt

I;hr.~

"\Ie

.o~=& a~eh

,•

ul:\de~

Ot'd.\no.nC::1I: "Oli. aU .. net .20 .:ro. dllvelopment impact:. fUI,
contrAry'\:= 'the 1I1:.t..d loe'J~el.a;t;1VIII J.nttlnt:S.on 1:0 pz:oov:l.d.. •

~O.it~on o~ suo~

nau_i.nv.

WlD5CRJ\N1)tJl( I)!.Cl:S%Olq .1IJIll) Ol'bl!!i!. -

f8.8

undG~

PAG2

as

•• et1on 67-9204

ta~

the

u"v.l~a~

.

To: 12e'

')3514
NO.1?:!!

Pue12S"31,

.'

P.26

a tbfl Idabo DBvetopmen~ Impact :Fee Act.
3

A.dditionally, tho Idaho SUpreme Court t~ Idaho Bufldtnrr Ccmtl'IJatorl A.tro(!lal(on foll»d tbtilt the

(.

foe lml'osu,d by tho city's or~e l~pUrportG to Q$e!S 1\ fee to lI1lPPOIt additIonal u.mUtiet Ot'services

A lnade llccesSaty by the develo~l'u.ellt. Mod to shift the cost ofthoge additional facilities and. £etViees f'.rotn
the p\1blic at u.:ge to the d.evolopnu:nt itself." 1d. In Idaho Bul1dlJtg CC1JI/'f-lctor.J A.uoolaliol1. thl City D

Ii

,

Coeur DtAlcn.e hcu1 enJ!cted M QJ'cUnance wl,ich :rt>qui.rcd a eaptmHzation feo to pay lor el. prllPo,tI()XI!t

I

snl:l1'O DC the eo~ of llnprovememts ntaded to !:exYe development The oapita1i2ation fee waa imposed Q
i!ll bUildtng penults. in !Ill attl!lOlPt to ha.ve Bt0wth pay :fat growt'h. Itcl)'ltlg on the ~Is llllJrfflsttr.

1:)

:u. tl,e Coun held.:
[TJbe assellsment here i,g no diff<lrent tllan 8. oherBe for the privilege ot lIvl~ In. tha City
of Cow: d'Alene. It Is a pll.vllcl,o AAI'4'CQ by ~ Sez1Ct'Bl publio which utHf:zes the aatIlI
fhoilitSea a.n.d ~orvJCI)II fl5 tho$e ptU'C1\csl.l:lg bulJ.dj,ng pennlts fOr now l;C.bnI:1lC11cc. 'rba
impact fee at Iatue here Ier\'eS t/yJ lJW'pt!BI Q.(prDl!i4t.ng limdlng for quhltq Im'Mt lit
lqrp. e!J!l ngllo. fb, i'l1d'~lthtql MldUt!J. _ therd?mr tr @ tar. The fact that addLtlonaL
tlSTVlCes arc nmde neoeuaI)' by gtowth snd development *'01 not oha:nge the ~s~t!$l
\lI.tUr$ o!tbe !mlo9s provided: fh01 are for the public at 181'£6JrJaha .BIag.

CcmtrtrClOrl ASlIn, 1~6

Idt\ht) at 744. 8~O l'.2ei at ~30 (ornphasle added),

Th.$ Tdaho Supremo C<lwt dlsting1ili:hed ~SI fi-oln p'CS'. stating 'that "taxcs serv~ the purpose Q

providing 'fi.m.dins for publio scmoes at loxge, wueteN a. fee serve; only the pU\'POSt of coverIng the co$

;1.9

of the partl.cu1ar service provided 'by the !tate to tb.o lll.dMthla.l," Ii. (cUing AlpI:l'f y, Boue Watqr Corp.,
t 18 Idaho 1)6. 145,795 F.2d 298. 307 (l9!1t»). Quoting the ;ar«w#er COUrt, tho !¢aho Supreme Co

aoknowtadgcd its previou$ holdl.ng litatlng:
13

,

It 11 only reosonabte and fair to rCl.'.luiro the busilleJ~, tr1ffio, IlDtJ 0," thing that n.coe$sltate~
pOliotna to pa.y this ~e;nse.. To do ao hu been UILif'O%tDly upheld by tho oourt!, 0" liitl
0111" hand, r/fir

pow,,. 1'1U1)) -,,01 o'S rellor/ed to at a shield 0,. woterjUge,

undl!r which fa

macr and ,,,/orca a n,,'nUtM4isfng ordincrnt:a OJ's/otrJtlJ.
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1

1hc Idaho

Supt~

~POib.l' fcos

Court affirm.ed tho dlsttlot

OO'IJ.rt'li

dCQi,ion hotdl.ns that th= munioipal ord1ntnc

was not ~\lthOl'lzed by the Dege!.opmtmt tm:paet 'Fee Act and. that moh fee Will essemially

tlX pl'Ovldhaa i\tnditli:f'Ol' »ublic servJcCJ at lmp,

Litewi... the City of

M~

II. at 743-1-4. 890 P.2-d at 329-30.

is I-ttcmpting

t;l

have srowth in MeCal!

p~

for growth.

Essoutlally,landoWlWrS and developers are being ehlll'sed a. prem1\.ln\ by '\lU1ly Qf either, subsidy or a foil,
to

•
1C:

Uvc in tho City of McOall. Tb.Cl1I hu lloen no ruggoaUon that tho landowner or davelopOl' elljOY8 60$

benefit.- othu thlUl. Do be"dlt ostenlibly to be fea~od by !he plolb1io at l&'rp, £rom payJna the aube2dy c

'build1lli por.t.r:dt fee t1lld0l' Ordinallco NoS'. 819 and 820. 11 While the lando'\lVMl' or d$volopel may be

don1cd a permlt

to develop a $Ubd.Mslon

OJ

b\\Ud

Ii

re&idemial unit If .he

OT

she f'alls to provid& the

Ja.btldy or pay the fcc. the "'bcnDtit'f he or she ~c~ives in aubdivldini hi" or helltmd does .not distin

Ihe sobsid.Y or tee from Il tax. Admlttedly, the beneJit Fovlded it. to assure "Il. teasonable 'tlpply 1.'1
affordable. deed rc;slncted wona'cr.:ehousfnl (..ommunl~ housin$) being made eml&bl" ., {to] crltici
16

17
HI

lind mated by the rmbUo Ilt large. 'the lMlC of Ilffotdabte WOIltJbrce hou.c;ing b a prQbleln tor wblch th

pubUc ano1;lld bea:r the (lost to reined" re.ther that!. hnposlng tile bwQ(!Dl. on .. few laodo"llY:lers

0

?o

..

2\

11 U'hra City t>1 HcCal.l &\:b~t$ to I1=-Olltl that the l:IlneUt to the landoWYICl'C' 111 ~wo

fOldl
(1) ea.u:anoe that ue~i~iaal pto~e •• ion.l worx.~IJ ealDnt1al
personnal and unice 1I1Qzokn" 1:1.'111 within p:t:o)l;~m.i.ty to thaJ.~ wClrlo: to
m~nio1p.l and priv.~e seator ,ervic&e,p a~d 12l .!.nc~~1va. such as den&Lty

se~Yic~

~t'Cvld.e
bOnU~$81

tqu1ty Du:l.ld.u: pX'e.~U.fI, anti. pZ'~.o:ritY' $.1'1. SSlflUJt and water hQo~uP". Tn. blnd'ill of
C.$ential wOr.~£Q~04 ~e~y~~e. ~b I be~.£L~ sha~~d by t~ •. ?~l~Q .~ lot~.. AI to thQ
1novnt1vflll e la1lcioWhtl:' rflcti.vuf !"ol't Lncl)ne.LvfJG c;t'e not Ql.urly olltUned in the
or:d.1Da~G ~hlt.lllllo1v·Ga Ilnd (:hJ.- O<I~ .c. not p(f~$\lIU:!.lId tb«t 1I\)()1'l J.J)~.ntiv •• lire
prov'dsq in ~ehl"qe to~ tne subsidy or faGe pa1d p~.uant to Oxd~nano. ~o., 819 .n
UO.

lUi

,

2~

>351~

To:l2e

PaeelE!8.... 31·

NO. 17.

I.ove1open.

'I.'IImfo,., Ih< p-..' oC th. "'' ' dy or r.......

Otdbanoe~

P."

\

... 819 .m 120 I, for Ih

I

1

l>eno5! of pUbU• ....toe. all".. rather th>n • bone& to Ih,lndl.lbl ......oe!.

'l'hb City of MoCalI1.Jl'iC8 that. thls Count. w.J.yala, 11\ ~ whetb.e.r tbe feet Ilnposed n

3

disgt1lsed mc&, should fllous on whether t11e ftmds collec;te& ~ dilib1olI5Od in BcCordance wfth th~ ail'.
P\l)'pO&\l of the rogul",ti,oJl.. Jiowever, this step in u...e ~MS ~ould eome only
&
'1

B11£ til determination 'tha:

tb.c City ofMoCall 11ad 1l.\l1horlly to impose suer. feu. In loamiY v. City ofH(1.fl(JY, 119 ldflll0 434. 80
P.~d

tan (19g1), tol1~ usa b\ Schmidt Y.

YtlJa:w qf Kimbdrl)l. 74 Idaho 48, 2S61'.2d 515 (953), th

Jdabo Supremo Court toUI'\d. that tl.llI fee$ tmpaQed wct1!!I oollected. pursuant to the I~al%o Revenue .BOn
10

ACt. Und.~ th05$ ci~e&. the Coun was :tC}Q.\red to QC!/:ormU1e whe:th¢r 'the fees were collecte

t.Wder thr: anise 01 tho Aot and allooBted and ~lt oiberwlac Oll projects not mated to rho ordlnanue.

Suoh. 1s ncl. tlle slmati¢n in the u.~der1i.ns ca!e. 'I11erefore, \1111"5
13

Ul1det Or~ & Nos.

tb.e, Co'tlrt 'fl.uda

the fees it\pos

8 Z9 end 820 are propor!y en&(;t¢d ptirttUlnt to tIle C.hy', pallos {,owers, It ~ed not

$. WhtrMr QrainQl1cs M26. al9 andBEO Py~ lJJysawl"ele ot.4.tVilratl!.
The third prong 'U1lder Hobbl is to dete.nnlc.e wh«b.Qf Ord.i1l..am== No. a1~ is a reQ'onablo

arbi1m.ry e.MB'!lnent. 'l'he Pla.l.n.tfff IIl'guea thrrt Oldtnance No. 819 operates as i1 't'cgUiatiOI\ at' ownetsbl
2.0

rather.1han a laud ilsa regulatl.o11. AA IIX1 ordlianee regu1ath\i!: a Isndownar'Q cwnml1ip rather lban usa, 1

:u

g:i.vcp. b}' tho due proceu Gtatlse. The P1Alntiffre1i~ on O'COHn4l' V. CIty ofMc$cow. 69 Id.eho 37, 20

P.24 t401 (I 949), :for the ptoposition d1lt a 20\1i,ng ordin;mce w.y only regulate usc. Ilot ownettbip, 0
property. 140 e.t 43. 201. P.:1d at 404 ("A ?onlnlJ ordh:l..snce daahl basically "wtth the l\8e. l101 owneJ:Ship. c
25

ptopetty."'.
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elU54S! flflta~ those whLo~ teaWate
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zomnl tegulatiotl! IU'O divided

brto

two

the height Md. bulk ofbllllcif:zlp w11bin cmaln d~d dialrlcts,

:I

Id, &t41. 202l»,2d at 403, llle City of MoSQ()w ~od to restrict certain 'businesselto

,

pUt.'1

It

of the bllJirtess /!istr;Qt in downtown by a40ptUlg

8

would oomtituto

,
e

attemp~ 10 seU

8.

Q

OM

ordhumc4 i:ht.t 'P~V{dcd my Qblmge of o\IIUcn"lhi:p

nlJW or additionlll busi.l.\ess. theRfore, my 11Otl.-con1'om:J1ng bush:as wb1

to Q. n~ owner V/Ould 'be prob1bi~ from operlrting 8ll1lh 'bUJintsI5 8S it was a. ''new

sdd.itianal" businesa.

10
,,~

ownc::nhip to be .. new buslne~. was vDI.d as btin! au ar"!'InI.ry eru:t ll11l:eaaomsbl.c

~,

po1ieo 'Power \'iolatl.ns the confltita.tionel proteotiOWl giVI!n by the due prooess clau.se. Ttl. at 43, lOa p

~J

at 404, By ~ an an31nante telatiDg to the business cUsbiQt an4 tI;1.e use, ofpropeny with.lr! cntl

).4

Umits ofb Qity. the City of Mosoow ......'as tegulatfng the use of INOh pm\1crties. H~Ut attempdttg to

:u

L8

cXCI:I:~lse

Qf the otty'

malt:c a. ob~ in owrmship Il ''x2aW lruafncsssu wu atbit'aly and unreallo~le.

rellIde:xttial

Qf

l:lomm=w, However,

th~

City or MoCall'. requitetl:1eltt that twenty

l"er~t

of De

loP

aubdiv:l.stona 00 deed-ret1:rlcted as cOllllllunity houahlg reguhtes much lXlOte th.a1l a lendowne.r' & ''llIe'' 0

SI Q

l1.iJ tTl her property. Tho teltri~tiom for eommunity houslng dictate 1he Plioe for which the pt0:pext'i 1'111:

a2.

be lold mel ~ whom tb.e tllOPBXty may 'be solei. liven ifthc tl11clown~ b1:IJlQa r;"Utel units, the restrietio

aa

that twenty pe:rcent oftba units be community ho~ alsa llii1it LQW mucll. x6Ili a landowner !DaY chari
8l1d to Whom. the uniil may bl\\ JCted. Tbeae rcstrlctlonl go mllc::h !u%:ther 1Wul. tnere1y J"eguia1!J1g the US

of 'J'TO'Pertyj ~ '!:hey essenua'Uy regulate owneraMp of the ~PwtY b~ dictat&:l,g 1.0 whom a unit ma
•

I

TI):l20f

"351'1

NO.l73

3

Pue:3~"3i'

1".:30

This Com is convinced.1hat tile fJnp~aitlDn of the subsidy or feo tetlmr$d uc.d.et Ord!nance Nell.
819 and BlO Drl, In reality. a. ~ r1.Ild not a. regulat\cm. Through S\\c'!L ord.inanc",. the City ofM'cCat! h

Ii

s
1

~pted. to prGvid9 fbr

affordable hou&1ng eifber by req\rlrlng d!ve10per6 to pay for su.c:h bi' subslal

1he homing ma:rlwt or hy teql.1trlna lJuldownerll 10 pay a c~unity houtdng ree for l1tM' r8$ldemial
bUilding pe.r:nntlf. There jl'l no'thing which regulates 'the use of land. ather than re~a II. laudo'Wl.)ef

8

pay such au'bsidy or tees.
l.Q

~

this Caurt flnda that Ordinrmoe Nos. 819 flllci 820 lDlpermisslbl

excead. thI: CLty's police pO'W'ena u they Onpose 111i1X withQut l$lai1ve autl10rlty allowma tbI City

McCall to ~ S1lOb. tax. Purthermon. to tha I'IJ{tent tb.at aUQh ord!llattce$ a.ttcalpt to reg~t\att; ow;u~bip,
!2

(I.e. re~Dg a lAn~'_ rlsht

to

sell at rent lots aud. \Ullu by

r.~

aft'o:dabJt housing

proviJions). suQh Ol'dlnances arc atbitnIy and ucreasonable.
Gtvcm thbsG CQlU)luaions, there is no nec:d tQ a.ddtess the reTJllil:inJng: i&sucs or cb.aUeXl3eJS by t
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Por the foregoing relUo1lB, this COurt hel:"eby G~.
3

JUdgtl\Cnt, tlnding qty of MQCel1

tP4 Plalntl£rs Motion ~or Bumm
,

,

,

0!dinanoo Nos. 819 and 820 ~oeed: tho Cit)' of McCel.1'a poll

powOt"$ u by ptovido for 'Unauthorized tllges and up, tltetefbtd.
5

,

~oid'fUld

without forco and.ere,

Co\lXlllOl for 'Plaintiff ahaU B'nQnUt any pt'OpO'~ Judgments consistent with this deoiBion,.subjeet to th
I

dgbt ofD~fendanfs oO\UlSDl to rcwi.ew for fonn.
7

.
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CERT1F1CAT.E OFMAlLlNO

Thereby carlli'}, tbS.t on this
otlp>, or th~ Mtblrt insn'\.lIncnt to}
.

!.:l day of Jii2.&'~J/ 2008, 1ma.Ucd (J!etv.ed) a. nuo and correct

Oavtd (JratlO1\
6

Vlytor V~eJ

EVANS KEANE Ill'
'1

•
9
3.~

1405 WestMaln .
f,O. Box 9S9
Boiac, Idaho 83701-09'9
Tcl.et'hollC: (2D8) 38+1800
Pe.osimUt; (208) l45·3Sl4

.

William A. MQUOW
Christopher D. Gabbe1t .
) :s
3.(
lS

11
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l"'ue:::Sl"31 . ,
P,31'~.1

jill S. }TolirJ<a
Wl-I.rrs PBTE~ON, P.A"

5700 Bast 1~ra.nklJn Road. Sclte 2.00

Nam:pa,ld.allo 836&7.190 l
'I'el6phone: (208) 465-9272
Facsfmile: (208) 466-A405
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EXHIBIT "D"
MCCALL
ORDINANCE NO. 856

269

EXHIBIT "D"
ORDINANCE NO. 856
AN ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF McCALL, VALLEY COUNTY, IDAHO,
REI'EALING SUBDIVISION AND DEVELOI'MENT REGULATIONS CODE, MCC
9.7.10 TO REQUIRE ALL NEW SUBDIVISIONS TO INCLUDE A CERTAIN NUMBER
OF COMMUNITY HOUSING UNITS TO BE AFFORDABLE TO THE CITY'S
WORKFORCE (ORDINANCE 819), AND REPEALING AN ORDINANCE OF THE
CITY OF McCALL, IDAHO AJlrlENDlNG THE CITY OF McCALL ZONING CODE,
MCC 3.8.21, TO REQUIRE A COMMUNITY HOUSING FEE TO BE PAID FOR EACH
NEW RESIDENTIAL DWELLING UNIT (ORDINANCE 820) AND PROVIDING AN
EFFECTIVE DATE.
BE IT ORDAINED BY THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF McCALL,
IDAHO WAT:

SECTION I: Enactment. MCC McCall City "Code 9.7.10 and 3.8.21, Planning and Zoning is

hereby repealed in its entirety as shown in Exhibit A.
SECTION 2: Savings Clause. The repeal of fonner Ordinance 819 and 820 shall not affect

voluntary contributions to conu;nunity housing as specified in subdivision and zoning map
amendment development agreements.
SECTION 3: Effective Date. This ordinance or 8. summary thereof, shall be published once in
the official newspaper of the city, and shall take effect upon its pElSsage, approval, and
publication.
.

PASSED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF McCALL, IDAHO, TIIlS 24th DAY OF

APRIL, 2008.
APPROVED BY THE! MAYOR OF THE CI1Y OF McCALL, IDAHO, T

24th DAY OF

APRIL, 2008.

ATTEST:

Brenna Chaloupka, Acting City Ct'erk

Ordinaru;e 856
Aprl124.2008
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ORDlNANCENO.819
AN ORDINANCE OF mE CITY OF McCALL, IDAHO AMENDING THE CITY OF
McCALL SUBDIVISION AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS CODI; TITLE 9
TO REQUIRE ALL NEW SUBDIVISIONS TO INCLUDE A CERTAIN NUMBER OF
COMMUNITY HOUSING UNITS TO BE AFFORDABLE TO THE CITY'S
'WORKFORCE, PROVIDE FOR A SEVERABILITY CLAUSE AND PROVIDE AN
EFFECTIVE DATE.
WHEREAS, the Housing Component of the McCall Area Comprehensive Plan includes
the following objectives:
o Prepare for the housing impaCt of major development proposals and
expansions on the City of McCaU, its impact area, and surrounding
vicinity;

o Encourage or provide for affordable housing; and

WHEREAS, the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of the City ofMcca11 is
dependent upon a reaBonable supply of affordable, deed restricted workforce housing

(community housing) being made available to ensure that criticaI professional workers-,
essential service personnel, and service workers live within proximity to their work to
provide municipal and private sector services; and
(

\

WHEREAS, the City of McCall has detennined through public input and the
comprehensive planning process that a reasonable supply of community housing is
needed to promote the social Bnd economic div.ersity of the City; and
WHEREAS, the economic vitality and well~being of the citizens of the City of McCall is
dependent upon a reasonable supply of community housing. and that persons such as
medical personnel, peace officers, emergency personnel, fire personnel, and providers of
other professional services, which are vital to the community, are dependent upon the
availability of community housing; and
VlHEREAS, to advance these objectiveS the City, in partnership with Valley County.
Adams County, and the communities of Cascade. Donnelly, and New Meadows,
commissioned a Housing Market and Needs Assessment for Valley and Adams County
(Housing Needs Assessment) that was completed Jul):,. 2005; and
WHEREAS, the Housing Needs Assessment determined that 210 community housing
units are currently needed in Valley and Adams Counties, including 145 low to moderate
income homes for families earning 50 to 100% of annual median income and 65
moderate to middle income homes for famiHes eaming 100 to 1600h of annual median
income;

and

,.

WHEREAS, the Housing Needs Assessment determined that 200 additional homes are .
(

j

needed in VaHey and Adams Counties in the next two years, including 138 low to
moderate income homes and 62 moderate to middle income homesj and
WHEREAS, the Housing Needs Assessment determined that housing is needed for the
families ofa signincant number of the 700 to 1,000 construction workers estimated to be
working in Valley and Adams Counties and commuting to their homes elsewhere,
reducing the vitality of the local economy; and

WHEREAS, the Housing Needs Assessment determined that the total number ofunits
needed to catch up with demand in Valley and Adams Counties is between 550 and 610
units of Community Housing; and
WHEREAS, the City of McCaU encompasses approximately 20% of the region's
population and employment; and

WHEREAS, 20% of the housing needed to catch up with demand, as identified in the
Housing Needs Assessment is 110 to 122 homes, including 76 to 84 low to moderate
income homes and 34 to 38 moderate to middle income homes; and

WHEREAS, the City of McCall is presently comprised of approximately 40% year round
primary residences and approximately 60% seasonally-occupied home~; and

WHEREAS. the City of McCall desires to maintain the current ratio of year round
primary residences to seasonally-occupied homes as the community grows; and
WHEREAS, the McCall City Council held housing policy discussions at City Council
meetings on July 14, 2005 and August 11, 2005; held publio infonnation sessions on
housing policy on August 20, 2005 and August 23, 2005, and held public hearings on a
proposed Housing Policy on September 7, 2005 and September 22,2005; and
WHEREAS, to assure the existence of a supply of desirable and affordable housing for
persons cUlTently employed in the McCall area, persons who were employed in the .
McCall area prior to retirement, the disabled, and other qualified persons of the McCall
area, the City of McCall adopted the following Community Housing PoHcy (Resolution
OS~19) on September 22,2005:
1. Responsjbility
1.1. The City of McCall is responsible for developing and implementing a
conununity housing program to meet the needs of its citizens.
1.2. The City of McCall will develop and implement this program in partnership
with other local, state, and federal agencies.
1.3. The City of McCall will regularly refine its community housing policy to
reflect new information and cbanging market conditions.
2. SeasonallYear Round Housing Mix

2
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2. I. McCall's Community Housing Program wiU be designed and implemented to
maintain the ratio (60/40) of seasonally-occupied homes to year round
primary residences as the community grows.
3. rntended Beneficiaries
3.1. McCall's Community Housing Program will be designed to benefit:
3.1.1. Low, moderate, and midd1e income families
3.1.2. Local workers

,
I

:r

3.1.3. Senior citizens
3.1.4. Special needs populations

4. Income Targets
4.1. The poHcy win develop housing targeted to meet the needs of the following
household types:
4.1.1. Low Income - 50% of median income
4.1.2. Moderate Income - 80% of median income
4.1.3. MiddleJncome-l60% of median income
5. JoblHousing Relationship
5.1. Community housing wiJI be developed primarily for people with jobs in the

community.
5.2. McCall will house at Least 50 percent of its workforce within city limits.
6. Production Goals
6.1. To keep up with demand and eliminate our community housing backlog
within ten years, McCall is committed to providing:

6.1.1. 43 additional low to moderate income homes annually
6.1.2. 22 additional moderate to middle income homes annually
6.1.3. Senior and special needs housing in quantities to be determined
7. OwnershiplRental Mix
7.1. McCall will develop community housing to maintain at least 6S percent
owner occupied housing within the year round resident community.
8. Lacation/Unit Type
8.1. Community housing requirements for new development wiU be met within
the g~ographic boundaries of new development to the extent possible.
8.2. Mix.ed use projects will be encouraged to incorporate community housing
into commercial and industrial areas.
8.3. Public community housing resotirces will focus on infill and redevelopment
to:
8.3 .1. Maintain and enhance oxisting neighborhoods;
8.3.2. Promottl Ii jobs-hollsing \;lalance;
8.3.3. Reduce reliance on the automobile; and
8.3.4. Promote smart growth principals and reduce sprawl.
9. Design and Quality
9.1. Community housing is civic architecture and reflects the values of the
community.
9.2. Community housing should be designed to fit its context.
9.3. Design within budget is a characteristic of good design; and

3
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WHEREAS. Resolution 05-19 directs staff to develop ordinances to implement the
Conununity Uousing Policy for consideration by the Planning & Zoning Commission and
the City Council, including an Inclusionary Housing Ordinance; and
WHEREAS. 24% of the City's households have incomes between 100% and 160% of the
area median income, and these households can no longer afford housing in McCall; and
WHEREAS, 1he best available data indicates that the average price Qf a home for sale in
McCall currently exceeds $300,000; and
WHEREAS, the best available data indicates that the growth of the area as a resort
community wi1l continue to fuel rising housing prices while concurrently increasing the
demand for a workforce that can not affurd housing; and

!
I

)

WHEREAS, tho best available data indicates that approximately 15% of the families
currently residing in McCall have sufficient income to afford the mortgage payments of a
$300,000 home; and

1

WHEREAS, the development and construction of residential dwelling units create the
need forlocal employees to service and maintain the dwelling units, and the residents
thereofjBnd
WHEREAS, some form of community housing assistance and requirements are needed to
maintain a local workforce;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL
OF THE CITY OF McCALL, IDAHO THAT:
SECTION 1: Title 9, McCall Zoning Code is hereby by amended by adding Section
9.7.10, Inclusionary Housing, to read as follows:

9.7.10
A

INCLUSIONARY HOUSING
Twenty (20) percent of the lots and houses in all subdivisions, including
condominium subdivisions, approved and platted after the adoption date of this
Section shall be pennanently restricted as community housing to be affordable to
City of McCall households with incomes in categories III and IV as defined in
subsection 2, Community Housing by Income, below.
1.

Options for Providing Community Housing
An applicant for subdivision approval may propose and the City Council
may approve, pursuant to the priorities and cdteria established below, any
of four (4) options, or combination thereof, to provide Community
Housing that is required by this Section.

4
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2.

ft.

First priority is for the appUcant to build community housing on
the site of the subdivision.

b.

Second priority is for the applicant to build community housing off
site of the subdivision.

c.

Third priority is for the applicant to convey land for community
housing.

d.

Fourth priority is for the applicant to pay
community housing.

It

fee-in-lieu for

Community Housing by Income Category
Fifty (50) percent of the required community housing lots and/or housing
units shall be· affordable to households in each of the two (2) income
categories below.

\

.......

3.

a.

Category HI includes households earning more than one hundred
(100) percent but not more than one hundred twenty (120) percent
of tbe Valley County median household income.

b.

Category N includes households earning more than one hundred
twenty (120) percent but not more than one hundred sixty (160)
percent of the Valley County median household income.

c.

The median household income .for Valley County is derived and
. annually updated by the U. S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development.

On Site Conununity Housing
Community housing units shall be constructed on the site of the
subdivision in such n manner as to create an integrated subdivision unless
the City Council finds the provision of on-site community housing is
impractical by making one (1) or more of the following findings.
a.

The Inclusionary Housing Plan proposed by the applicant includes
constructing on-site community housing, constructing off-site
community housing, andlor land conveyance and this plan is found
by City Council to be in conformance with the City of McCall
Comprehensive Plan and Housing Policy.

5

b.

The community housing units are subject: to federal and/or state
financial assistance and the on-site location cannot comply with

the terms and conditions of the financial assistanCe.

4.

c.

The number of required community housing units results in less
than one (1) housing unit.

d.

The community housing units located on-site would be
incompatible with the surrounding lands because of conflicting
uses, site plan design or bulk.

Off Site CotnmunityHousing

If the City Council finds that constructing some or all of the required onsite community housing is impractical, community housing shall be
constructed off-site from the subdivision unless the City Council
detennines that land conveyance better achieves community housing
goals. The proposed off-site location shall be suitable for community
housing by complying with all of the following standards.
li.

Development of community housing at the "off-site" location will
comply with the goals of the City of McCall Housing Policy.

b.

The community housing units can be designed and built in a way
that is compatible with surrounding land uses.

c.

Community housing at the "off-sito" location will comply with
applicable Zoning and Subdivision Code requirements.

d.

The density pernritted on the subdivision site may be devoted fully
to free-market lots and the off·site community housing units shall
be included in the total number olsubdivision lots when
calculating the community housing requirement.

e.

The number of community housing units constructed off-site shall
be provided in an amount equal to:
a. 125 percentofthe amount which would have been required ~8d
it been provided on-site jf the off-site housing is within the city
limits of the City of McCall. If only a portion of the required
Community Housing is off~site, only that portion shat! be
subject to the 125% factor.
b. 150 percent of the amount which would have been required had
it been provided on-site if the off-site housing is within the city
limits of another municipality located in Valley or Adams
County. If only a portion of the required Community Housing
is off-site, only that portion shalt be subject to the 150% factor.

6
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c. 200 percent of the amount which would have been required had
it been provided on-site if the off-site housing is within
unincorporated Valley or Adams County. If only a portion of
the required Community Housing is off-site, only tha.t portion
shall be subject to the 200% factor.

!

T
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5.

Land Conveyance
If the City Council finds it is impractical to construct on-site cbmmunity

housing and detennines a land conveyance for community housing better
serves the City's community housing goals than the construction of offsite community housing, the conveyance of land for community housing
may be accepted pursuant to the following standards.
11.

The land shall provide for community bousing in appropriate
locations by complying with the following.
1)

Community housing on the land shall comply with the
goals of the City of McCall Housing Policy.

2)

The land shaD be near existing or planned employment
centers, schools and commercial services.

3)

Housing on the site shall comply with applicable Zoning
and Subdivision Code requirements.

4)

Notwithstanding this subsection, the Council may accept
land that does not meet these criteria if the ~ale of the land
is anticipated pursuant to subsection e, below.

\,

h.

The fair market value of the land shall equal1he total subsidy
amount for the number of required community housing unUs as
calculated in Section 9.7.1 O.AA.e as the subsidy amount is

calculated by the City Community Development Director pursuant
to the Community Housing Guidelines, as amended.
I)

A professional real estate appraiser licensed to practice in
. Idaho shall establish the fair market value of the land to be
cOllveyed.

2)

Fair marlcet value shall be established on Ii preliminary
basis at the time the Inclusionary Housing Plan (subsection
9.0 below) is reviewed.

7
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3)

Fair market value shall be confinned at the time of review
and approval of the final subdivision plat for the free
market portion of the subdivision.

4)

Fair ma.rket value shall be Det of any customary rea) estate
commissions for the sale of the land.

c.

The land conveyance shall occur prior to the City signing the final
plat verifying subdivision approval, unless the City Council
approves other arrangements with financial assurances.

d.

The land conveyed shall be used for the development ,of
community housing units or conveyed pursuant to subsection e,

below.
e.

The City Council is pennitted to seU land conveyed for community
housing jf:
1)

All proceeds from the sale of the land are placed in the
Community Housing Trust Account (subsection 11.0
below); and,

2)

'The proceeds :from the sale of the land and any interest
accrued thereon are used oruy for subSidizing or
constructing community housing within a reasonable period
oftime.

6.

In Lieu Fee
The City Council sball accept an in lieu fee for any fraction of a required
community housing unit The fee, shall be calculated and collected
pursuant to the following standards.
a.

The fee shall be calculated by averaging the subsidy amounts for
providing Ii community housing unit in each of the two (2) Income
Categories III and IV. The fee amount shall be proportionate to
the :fraction of the community housing unit required. The subsidy
amounts for each Income Category shall be calculated by the
Community Development Director pursuant to the Community
Housing Guidelines. as amended.

,b.

Prior to September 30, 2006, and 011 or before September 30 of
each following year, the subsidy amount used in the in lieu fee
calculation shall be evaluated by the Community Development
Director, and if necessary, adjusted to reflect current land and
construction costs and the current median income.

8
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c.

The in lieu fee shall be paid prior to the City signing the fmal plat
verifying subdivision approval. unless the City Council approves
other orrangements with financial assurances. In lieu fees shall be
deposited into a separate account pursuant to subsection 1I,
Community Housing Trust Account.

,,

t
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7.

Deed Restrictions

!

The lots and houses for community housing shall be pe:nnanently deed
restricted as to the initiall1Dd resale price, minimum size and construction
standards. and qualifications ofhuyers and renters, pursuant to the
Community Housing Guidelines, as amended. Provided however, if within
nine (9) months after a community housing unit is first available for sale
th~ are no qualified purchasers of the unit, the City Council shall.. upon
request ofthe-developer, remove the community housing deed restrictions
and the unit may be sold by the developer at a market price.
As an alternative to permanent deed restriction, an applicant may request
that up to twenty five (25) percent of the lots and houses be subject to an
"Equity-Builder" program pursuant to the Conununity Housing
Guidelines.
'-,

8.

Timing of Occupancy

All comm:unity housing units shaH be ready for occupancy, or their
construction costs bonded and a specific timeline approved by the
City Council, no later than the date of the initial occupancy of the
free-market portion of the residential subdivision for which the
community housing is required. If the subdivision is approved for
phased development, the community housing units may be
constructed, or bonded with an approved timeline, in proportion to
the phases of the subdivision.

9.

Jl1clusionruy Housing Plan

I

An applicant for subdivision approval shall submit an Inelusionary
HOllSlng Plan concurrently with the initial application SUbmittal for the
subdivision. The Inclusionary Housing Plan shall be prepared and
reviewed pursuant to the fonowing standards.

a.

!

The Jnclusionary Housing Plan shall include the fonowing;

1I
I

!

II
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1)

The calculation oftbe number of community housing units

required.

2)

The proposed method of providing community housing
(on-site, off-site, conveyance of land andlor payment of an

in lien fee) and the appropriate justification.
3)

If community housing units are to be constructed. the Plan
shall include:
(a)

A conceptual site pian and building floor plan
illustrating the number of community housing units
proposed their location in relation to the other
development on the site and surrounding land uses,
and the number and size of bedrooms and square
footage of each unit.

(b)

A tabular summary of the number of community
housing units, the number and size of bedrooms of

each unit, the rental/sale mix, and the sales price or
rent for each unit.
(c)

The proposed restrictions to be placed on the
community housing units to ensure they remain
affordable and comply with the Community

Housing GuideUnes, as amended.
4)'

Ifpayment of an in lieu fee is proposed, the Plan shall
include the amount of the fee to be paid and the supporting

calculations.
5)

If land is to be conveyed, the Plan shall include:
(a)

A survey depicting the location, size and
topography ofthe land proposed for conveyance.

(b)

A title report demonstra~ng clear tit1e, physical and

legat access, liens, easements, and other infonnation
necessary to fully describe the legal status of the

property.
(c}

Verification that conditions of the land," any
restrictions on title to the land (such as covenants
and easements) and the applicable Land Use Codes

allow the development of residential units on the
land) and that the site generally can be developed
for community housing.

10
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(d)

(e)

An appraisal of the fair mar~et value of the Land.

Any additional infonnation or studies determined
by the Community Development Director to be

necessary to verify the suitability of the land for
.development
6)

Community Housing Agreement
The agreement by a developer to implement the Plan shall
be established in a Community Housing Agreement The
Agreement shall be in a form approved by the City
Attorney and shall include the following;

(a)

If the Plan proposes the construction of community
housing units,· the Agreement shall identify: the
location, number, type and size of community

hOWling units to be constructed; sales and/or rental
terms; occupancy requirements; a timetable for

completion of the units; construction specificatioD3;
and the restrictions to be placed on the units to
en8l1re their penn anent affordability and compliance
with the Community Housing Guidelines, as
amended.

b.

(b)

If the Plan proposes the conveyance of land, the
Agreement shall identify the land to be conveyed,
its fair market value, and the time at which the land
will be conveyed to the City.

(c)

If the Plan proposes the payment of an in Lieu fee,
the Agreement shall identify the amount of the fee
to be paid, and the time ofpayment.

(d)

If the Plan proposes a combination of methods
(construction of units, conveyance of land, or in lieu
fee), the Agreement shaU identify the appropnate
provisions for each method of mitigation.

Review ofthe Inclusionary Housing Plan

1)

2)

The procedures for review of the lnclusionary Housing
Plan shall be the same as for the subdivision application
with which it is submitted.
The Plan shall be approved, approved with conditions, or

disapproved by the Planning & Zoning Commission and
the City Council, based on the standards of this Section. A
decision on the Plan shall be made prior to a decision on

11
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the residential subdivision with which it is submitted A
subdivision plat shall not be approved without an
IncluSlonary Housing Plan approved pursuant to the
procedures and standards of this Section.
3)

IO.

An approved Inc!usionary Housing Plan may be amended
or modified only in accordance with the procedures and
standards established for its original approval.

Community Housing Guidelines
The construction and occupancy of all community housing units shall
comply with the Community Housing Guidelines, as amended from time
to time by the City Council. If any conflict should arise between the
Community Housing Guidelines and this Ordinance, the provisions
contained in this Ordinance shall control.

!
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a.

All community housing units co.nstructed pursuant to this Section
shall comply with the sales andlor rental terms, appreciation rates,
housing type, and occupancy requirements of the Community
Housing Guidelines. as amended.

b.

All community housing uIrits shall comply with the size, materials
and design: requirements and construction standards of the
Community Housing Guidelines, as amended.

c.

AU community housing units shall comply with all other

requirements of the Community Housing Guidelines, as amended,
"to ensure they are maintained, occupied and owned/rented as
community housing units.
11.

Community Housing Trust Account

a.

For the purpose of ensuring that any fees collected pursuant
to this section are spent for community housing and consequently
benefit the fee payers, an interest-bearing Community Housing
Trust Account shall be established.

b.

All fees collected pursuant to tWs section shall bejmmediately
deposited into the Community Housing Trust Account.

c.

AU proceeds in the Community Housing Trust Account not
immediately necessary for expenditure shaH be invested in an
interest-bearing account. All income derived from these
investments shall be retained in the trust account until spent or
refimded.
12
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d.

~t funds deposited into the Community Housing Trust Account
and accrued interest shall be expended only for the purposes of
planning, subsidizing or developing coIIlln:unity housing units in

i

McCan.
12.

t

Refund of In Lieu Fee
a.

A fee collected pursuant to this sootion and three (3) percent
interest compounded annually, shalt be returned upon written
request. to the developer of the subdivision for which a fee was
paid if the fee has not been obligated within five (5) years from the
date the fee ,*as paid. Notwithstanding, if the City Council has

eannarked the funds for expenditure on a specific community
housing project, the Council may extend the time period by up to
five (5) additiollal years.

h.

To obtain the refund. the developer must submit a written request
to the Community Development Director within one (1) year from
the end of the fifth (5~ year from the date payment was
received. or within one (1) year from the end of the time this
refund requirement is extended by the City Council. Said request
shalt be accompanied by proof of ownership of the property at the
time the refund is requested or contract or option to purchase at the
time the refund is requested, and a copy of the receipt verifYing
payment ofthe fee.

c.

For tho putpose of this Section, fee payments shan be deemed
spent in the order in which they are paid. The flrst (1 sf) payment
made shall be the first (1 st) payment spent.

(,

13.

Adjustments
a.

The requirements of this section 9.7.10 maybe adjusted or waived
by the City Council if the developer demonstrates and the Council
finds that there is no reasonable relationship between the housing
impact of the proposed residential subdivision and the
requirements of this section.

b.

The developer shall have the burden of providing economic
infonnation or other data and evidence necessary to establish that
the housing impact of the proposed residential subdivision has no
reasonable relationship to the requirements oftbis chapter.

c.

The developer must make said demonstration concurrently with the
first submittal of an application for the residential subdivision.
,
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d.

The City Council shall make the determination to adjust or
maintain the requirements of this section concurrently with the
initial decision to approve or deny the proposed residential
subdivision.

i

"
SECTION 2

Severability.

In the event that any court of competent jurisdiction enter~ its judgment or order
declaring any portion of Section 9.7.10 to be invalid, then such judgment shall only affect
that portion of the ordinance so adjudicated, and all other remaining portions shal11'emain
in full force ~d effect.

!
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EFFECTIVE DATE
Regularly passed, approved and adopted by the Mayor and City Council of the
City of McCall. :~iNi~ ~ay of r:<.b.rw-,r:J' 2 0 0 6 . · '
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A SUMMARY OF ORDINANCE NO. 819

.'

( )

PASSED BY THE CITY OF McCALL, IDAHO
AN ORDlNANCB OF THE CITY OF McCALL, IDAHO AMENDING THE CITY OF .
McCALL SUBDIVISION AND DEVELOPMENT CODB, TITLE 9 TO REQUIRE ALL NEW
SUBDIVlSIONS TO INCLUDE A CERTAlN NUMBER OF COMMUNITY HOUSING
UNITS TO BE AFFORDABLE TO THE CITY'S WORKFORCB.

.

t.

The principal provisjoml of Title 9 by adding Section 9.7.10, Inclusionary Housing.
requires as follows:
• Provides for Inclusionary Housing, which provides for at least twenty percent of
the housing to be affordable community housing and provides options for
providing the community housing.
•

Provides for Community Housing by Income Category, which requires that a
minimum of twelve (12) percent of the community homing lots andlor housing
units to be affordable.

I
)

,
I

• Provides for a Community Housing On Site section.
• Provides for a Conununity Houslng Off Site sectlon.
• Provides for a Land Conveyance section.

• Provides for a Fee In Lieu section, which provides that a fee shall be calculated
and collected according to certain standards.
•

Provides for a Deed Restriction section and includes a provision for If nine (9)
month period if within tros time period there are 110 qualified buyers of the unit
that the City Council may remove the community housing deed restrictions.

• Provides for a Timing of Occupancy section.
• Provides for an Inclusionary Housing Plan that provides for calculation Of the
number of homing units required and review of the inclusionary housing plan.
•

ProvideS for a Conununity Housing Guidelines section.

• Provides for a Community Housing Trust Account section to ensure the fees
collected benefit the fee payers; that the fees are deposited into the trust account,
and to allow for an interest-bearing account and for accrued interest.

I
1

~

;

• Provides for a Refund of In Lieu Fee section.
• Provides for an Adjustments seetlon.

28
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The Ordmance shall be effective upon publication of~is Summary.

The full text of the Ordinance is available for review at City Hall and will be provided by the
City Clerk to any citizen upon personal request. The full text is also available online at
www.mceaU.id.us. .
APPROVBD BY THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF McCALL, IDAHO, THIS
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EXHIBIT "E"
FIRST AMENDMENT TO
DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT,
ALPINE VILLAGE PLANNED
UNIT DEVELOPMENT
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Instrument # 334281
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12:15:34 No. of Pages: 4
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Recording Requested By llnd
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ARCHIE N. BANBURY
~et;,oo
ex-Off\clo R~arde, Deputv.
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.

City Clerk
City of McCall
216 East Park Street

McCall, Idaho 83638

For Recording Purposes Do
Not Write Above This Line
FIRST AMENDMENT TO DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT
ALPINE VILLAGE PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT

This First Amendment to De:veJopmenl Agreement (the "First Amendmenf') is entered
rnto effective thisa day of" '?[J];r, 2008, by and between the City of McCall, a municipal
corporation of the State of ~jnllfter referred to as the "City", and Alpine Village
Company, hereinafter referred to as "Alpine Village", whose address is 1101 W. River Street,
Suite 300, Boise, Idaho, 83702, and who is the owner of the Alpine Village Plalmed Unit
Development (the "PUD"), as the same is platted of record with VaUey County, Idaho.
WHEREAS. the City and Alpine Village entered illto Developme11t Agreements recorded
January!, 2008, I\S Instrument No. 328801, and recorded February 2, 2008, as Instrument No.
329168. said Agreements are superseded' aJld rep/aced in their entirety by that certain
DeVelopment Agreement, which was filed of record with the Office of Recorder of Valley
County, Idaho on April 7, 2008, as lnstrument No. 330524 (the "Agreement").

WHEREAS, the Agreement included a Community Housing Plan and contained
provisions requiring Alpine Village to pro,,~de Community Housing pursuant to McCall City
Ordinance No. 819 (the "OrdinRnce").
WHEREAS, the Ordinance has been declared void by means of that certain
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, which
was rendered by the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho in Valley
County Case No. CV 2006·490-C.
WHEREAS, the Ordinance has been repealed by the City.
WHEREAS, the parties have agreed that the Agreement should be amended to eliminate
the Community Housing Plan and any requirements that Alpine Village provide Community
Housing Units. The 8 Units approved as Community Housing Units can be sold as Market Rate
Units.
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WHEREFORE, the City of McCall and the Alpine Village do agree to amend and
modify the Agreement, as follows!
1. Community Housing.
At'tide VII ofthe Agreement shall be deleted in its entirety and Alpine Village
:;halJ be and hereby is released from any requirement fo pl'ovided Community
Housing for or related to the PUD. Exhibit "B" to the Agreement is deleted in its
entirety.
2, Continuing Effect of the Agreement.

Except as expressly modified I)y the terms of this Iljrst Amendment, the
Agreement shaH remain fully in force and binding 011 the pnrties according to its

tenn3,
3. Miscellaneous.
After its execution, this First Amendment shall be recorded in the office of tile
Valley County Recorder, at the expense of Alpine Village. Each commitment and
covenant contained in this First Amendment shall constitute a burden on, shall be
appurtenant to. and shall run with the PUD Propel'ty. This First Amendment shall
be binding on the City and Alpine Village and their respec1ive heirs,
administrlltors, executors, agelits, legal representatives, successors and assigns.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto caused this First Amendment to
be ex:ecut<;d, effective on the day and year first above written.

ALPINE VILLAGE COMPANY

CITY OF MCCALL

BY~

BY:~~~·

Micbael B. Hormacchea, President

Nor, rl Kulesza. Mayor

A'ITESt:
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STATE OF IDAHO,

)
(ss.

County of Valley.

)
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On
day of
,2008, before m"
Notary PublIc In and for said State, personally appeared dla~
k
known or identified to me to be the Mayor of the City of McCaU, who executed the said
instrument, and acknowledged to me that sai~ municipality executed the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Thave hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal,
~
.

the day and year in this certificate first above written. .
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STATE OF IDAHO,

)
(ss.

County ofVal1ey.

)

On this

~

day of

~.Ill

,200&, before me,

.J..':7~~w~~~7lf..UU'-

Notary Public in and for said State, pe~lly appeared. Vt
(.
known 01' identified to me to be the Acting 9ty Clerk of the City of McCaU, who
said instrument, and acknowledged to me that said municipality executed the same.

NOTARY P RLlC F R IDA,O ~
/50)1
"

My Commission Expires:
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STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Count)' of Valley.

)

(58

~

\

.

("· t . I

On this _~ day of ,) 1..\-t.L , 2008, before me, t)eft 11 i)tL..)( W\ t ('rCc. a
Notary Public in ulld for said State, personally appeared Michael B. Hormaechea, President of
ALP1NE VILLAGE COMPANY, bown or identified to me to be the person whose Hame is
subscribed to the within instrmnent and acknowledged to me that he ellecuted the same for and on
behalf of said Limited Liability Company. .
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal, the

day and year in this certificate fir~ above written.

NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO

My Commission Expires: (~; :}D' ') !J IJ
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AACHU: N. dAl~L1UHY, LEAK
~

Bv

Christopher H. Meyer [ISS No. 4461]
Martin C. Hendrickson PSB No. 5876]
GaseNo. _ _--"'nstNu..o_ - Fled
AM I,' til
RM.

GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street

P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 8370 I-2720
Office: (208) 388-1200
Fax: (208) 388-1300
chrismeyer@givenspurs!ey.com
mch@givenspursley.com
www.givenspursley.com

Atlorneys for Defendant City ofMcCall
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY
ALPfNE V1LLAGE COMPANY, an Idaho
corporation,

Case No. CV ·201 0-519C

Plaintiff,
CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

v.

JUDGMENT

C1TY OF McCALL, a municipal corporation,
Defendant.

COMES NOW Defendant City of McCall (the "City"), by and through its attorneys of

record, and moves the Court for summary judgment pursuant to Idaho. R. Civ. P. 56. This
motion seeks dismissal with prejudice of all of Plaintiffs claims.
This motion is supported by City's Opening Brief in Support ofMotion for Summary
Judgment, Affidavit of Martin C. Hendrickson. and Affidavit of Michelle Groenevell.
Oral argument is requested,

CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JlIDGMENT
1256216_1/4432-6
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Respectfully submitted this 16th day of September, 20 il.

GIVENS PURSLEY

LLI'

By

Christopher H. Meyer
By

~i~{Jr
Martin C. Hendrickson

CITY'S MOTION .-oR StMMARY JUDGME:-;T
1256276_114432-6

Page 2 of3

294

CERTIFICATE OF SERV1CE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16 th day of September, 20] 1, the foregoing was filed.
served, and copied as follows:
DOCUMENT FILED:
Fourth Judicial District Court
Attn: Archie N. Banbury, Clerk
Valley County Courthouse
219 Main Street

Cascade, IO 83611
Facsimile: 208-382-7107

o
o
D
o
o

u. S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

SERvrCE COPIES TO:

Steven J. Millemann, Esq.
Gregory C. Pittenger, Esq.
Millemann, Pittenger, Mc!v1ahan & Pemberton,
LLP
706 North First Street
Post Office Box 1066
YIcCall, ID 83638
Facsimile: 208·634·4516

o
o

B

o

U. S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-maiJ

sjm@mpmplaw.com
gcp@mpmplaw.com

COURTESY COPIES TO:
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin

District Judge

Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St.

~

o
o

U. S.Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail

Boise, lD 83702

Jason Gray
Law CJerk to Judge Michael McLaughJin
Fourth Judicial District Court
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, ID 83702
Email: jmgray@adaweb.net

o
o
o
~

U. S. Mail

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
E-mail

CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARV JVDGMEltr T
1256276_114432-6
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l'f. oANtiUAY, CLEAt'Christopher H. Meyer. ISB #4461
Martin C. Hendrickson, ISB #5876
GNENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street

eputy

;ase No. _ _ _klstNlo..O- - Flied_
A.M l .'f) (
P.M.

P.O. Box 2720
Boise, Idaho 83701·2720
Office: (208) 388-1200
Fax: (208) 388-1300
chrismeyer@givenspurs]ey.com
mch@givenspursley.com

www.givenspursley.com
Attorneys for Defendant City of McCall

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FORUm JUDICAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF V ALLEY

ALPINE VILLAGE COMPANY, an Idaho
corporation,

Case No, CV-2010-S19C

Plaintiff,
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE GROENEVELT

vs.

IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

CITY OF McCALL, a municipal corporation,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO

)

)ss.
County of Valley

)

I, MICHELLE GROENEVEL T, being first duly sworn, depose and say:
1.

I am the Community Development Director for the City ofMcCal1 (the "City")

and I was previously the Community Planner for the City. I have been employed by the City in
these capacities since September 9, 2005.

AFFJDA V1T OF MICHELLE GROENEVELT
1266660_2. 4432-6
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2.

I am familiar with the applications for Alpine Village that were flied in 2006, as

well as other development applications fiJed with the City from 2005 to present. I am also
familiar with the City's efforts to address community housing including the ordinances and

resolutions adopted by the City that relate to community housing.
3.

The statements in this affidavit are based upon my personal knowledge or upon

information contained in the City's official records that set forth the City's regularly conducted
and regularly recorded activities or both.

4.

When City Ordinances 819 and 820 were declared to be unconstitutional by the

Court, the City Council adopted Resolution 08-11, which authorized refunds of fees paid
pursuant to Ordinance 820. The City Council later adopted Resolution 08-17, which authorized
refunds of sums paid under Ordinances 828 and 833, which had provided for voluntary
contributions toward community housing.
5.

The City Council did not adopt any resolution providing for a return of property

or a refund of fees col1ected under Ordinance 819 because no property or fees were ever
conected by the City under that Ordinance.
6.

At the time that Ordinance 819 was declared unconstitutional, only two properties

under development were subject to obligations under Ordinance 819. One of these was the
Alpine Village project.
7.

When Ordinance 819 was declared unconstitutional, the developers were released

from any obligations for community housing under this ordinance and anyon-site units that were
identified as community housing for purposes of compliance with Ordinance 819 remained the
property of the applicant.

AFFIDAVIT OF MICHELLE GROENEVELT
1266660»). «l2~
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Se~.

16. 2011 12: 13PM

3.

No. 0440

\. . t Hc.11

P. 2

Sirrularly. any off-site units that were identified as community housing for

pwposes of compliance with Ordinance 819 remained the property of the applicant, and, after
Ordinance 819 was declared lUlconstitutional, the community housing deed restrictions were

removed.

9.

From February 18,2008 (the date that Ordinances 819 and 820 were declared

unconstitutional by the Court). until November 15,2010 (the date that the City received Alpine
Village's Notice of Claim). the City did not receive any requests for refunds or any other claims
that l'elated to an applicant's compliance with Ordinance 819.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
DATED this 16111 day of September, 2011.

Mi~it

NO~~~.
Residingatt:::J-=z1 cC~..IJ

Commission expires:

An'IDAV1T or MICH.ELLE GaOIN£VJl,LT
1*66ltt(2)..&>c.oIou

1"*-'7d I ,ItJ
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16th day of September, 201 ], the foregoing was filed,
served, and copied as follows:
DOCUMENT FILED:
Fourth Judicial District Court
Attn: Archie N. Banbury, Clerk
Valley County Courthouse

lSI

V. S. Mail

o

Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

o
o
o

219 Main Street
Cascade, 10 83611
Facsimile: 208-382·7107

Hand Delivered

SERVICE COPIES TO:

Steven J. MiJIemann, Esq.
Gregory C. Pittenger, Esq.
Millemann, Pittenger, McMahan & Pemberton,
LLP
706 North First Street

oo
o
o

lSI

U. S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

Post Office Box 1066
McCall, 10 83638
COURTESY COPIES TO:

[g]

Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin
District Judge
Ada County Courthouse

o

U. S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail

oo

u. S. Mail

o

E-mail

o

200 W. Front St.

Boise, ID 83702

lason Gray
Law Clerk to Judge Michael McLaughlin
Fourth Judicial District Court

Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, ID 83702
Email: jrngray@adaweb.net

o

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail

~ot~~
Christopher H. Meyer

AFF1DAVIT OF MICHELLE GROENEVILT
1Z66660_2. 4432·6
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SEP 1 9 2011

Christopher H. Meyer [lSB No. 4461)
Martin C. Hendrickson [ISH No. 5876]
GIVENS PURSLEY llP
601 West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720

Cast No._---'lnstNu..,o---Aled

A.M _ _ _....RM.

Boise, Idaho 83701·2720
Office: (208) 388-1200
Fax: (208) 388·1300
cbrismeyer@givenspursley.com
mch@givenspursley.com
www.givenspursley.com
Attorneys for Defendant City ofMcCall

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY
ALPINE VILLAGE COMPANY, an Idaho

Case No. CV·2010-519C

corporation,

Plaintiff,
CITY'S OPENING BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.
CITY OF McCALL, a municipal corporation,
Defendant.

CITY'S OPENING BRIEF IN Sl:PPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
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INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Alpine Village Company ("Alpine") seeks damages from Defendant City of
McCall ("City") for an alleged unconstitutional taking of Alpine's property. This opening brief
is offered in support of the City 's Motion for Summary Judgment filed herewith pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 56.
In its Second Amended Complaint ("Complaint"), Alpine alleges an unconstitutional
taking of property under the United States Constitution (U.S. Const. amend. V and XIV) and the
Idaho Constitution (Idaho Const. art. I, § 14).1 These claims are premised on the invalidation of
the City's community housing ordinances by Mountain Central Bd. afRealtors. Inc. v. City of
McCall, Case No. CV 2006A90-C (Idaho, Fourth Judicial Dist., Feb. 19,2008).2 It is unclear

why Alpine did not pJead a violation of Idaho Const. art. VII, § 6, which was the basis for the
decision in Mountain. Central. J
The alleged taking is based on Alpine's purchase of an apartment property known as the
Timbers. Alpine explains that it bought the property with the intent of using it for off-site
community housing to meet requirements then in effect under McCall City Ordinance 819. 4

I The original Verified Complaint alleged only a taking under the federal Constitution. The Verified
Amended Complaint is identical to the Verified Complaint except for the addition of the state law takings claim.
Alpine's Second Amended Complaint is identical to the Verified Amended Complaint except for the addition of a

third cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § J983 and the identification of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 in the attorney
fee request.
2 The Mountain Central case is referenced in the Complaim nil. 21 as the basis for Alpine's
constitutional claims. A copy of the decision is set out at Complaint, Ex. C; Affidavit a/Gregory C. Pittenger in
Opposition to Defendant's MOlion to Dismiss ("Pittenger A./fidavif'), Ex. 14 (July 21, 2011), and Affidavit a/Steven
J. Mil/emann in Support a/Motion to Remand ("Millemann Affidavit"), Ex. 10 (July 21, 2011).
3 The instant case is not an exaction case in the nature of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483
U.S. 825 (1987) or Dolan v. City a/Tigard. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). There is no allegation that the community housing
requirement was disproportionate or lacking in nexus. Instead, both the state and federal taking claims are
dependent on a violation of Idaho Const. art. VII, § 6, which Alpine bas not pled.

" The tenDS "community housing," "affordable housing." and "workforce flousing" are interchangeable for
purposes of this litigation. They all refer to housing provided at low cost to lower income persons and/or persons
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4'
Complaint ft 14-18. Those requirements were later invalidated in the Mountain Central

litigation. As a result, the City released Alpine from all its housing obligations, the property was
never conveyed to the City, no units were sold for community housing, and Alpine continues to
own the entire property. Alpine's problem is that the bottom fell out of the housing market and
Alpine now wishes it did not own the Timbers. Because it acquired the property with the
expectation of using it to satisfy an unconstitutional community hOUSing requirement, Alpine
contends the City has "taken" its property and is responsible for the decline in the property's
value.
Alpine's lawsuit faces an array of hurdles apparent on the face of the Complaint and in
the documents in the record. First, there was no "taking" because Alpine still owns the Timbers.
The harm allegedly suffered by Alpine (decline in value) was a result ofits own decision to
acquire the Timbers at the height of the market. Second, the state takings claim violates the 180day notice rule under the Idaho Tort Claims Act ("[TCA"), Idaho Code §§ 6·901 to 6-929 (notice
requirement at section 6-906), which, in the case of cities, is applicable to aU damage claims
pursuant to Idaho Code § 50-219. Third, the state c1aim violates Idaho's four-year statute of
limitations for inverse condemnation claims. Idaho Code § 5-224. Fourth, the federal claim,
although ripe in state court under San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County ofSan Francisco, 545

U.S. 323 (2005). violates Idaho's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury, Idaho Code
§ 5-219(4). Fifth, Alpine's decision to purchase the Timbers was not compelled by Ordinance
819. Because its decision was voluntary, it does not give rise to a taking under KMST. LLC v.

providing community services such as teachers and police officers. Contributions for community housing were
mandated by Ordinances 8 t 9 and 820. Only Ordinance 819 is at issue here. Ordinance 820 required fees to be paid
when building pennits were issued. Ordinance 820 was repealed before it became applicable to Alpine-or anyone
else. for that matter. Copies of Ordinance 819 are set out in Complaint, Ex. A, Millemann Affidavit, Ex. I, and
Pitlenger Affidavit. Ex. 1.
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County ofAda, 138 Idaho 517,67 PJd 56 (2003). Sixth, as part of its Development Agreement
with the City, Alpine waived and released the City from "any claims whatsoever regarding or
stemming from the pending litigation between Mountain Central Board of Realtors and the City
.... '" Seventh, the City has strong equitable defenses.

The City removed the case to federal court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.
The City had hoped for a speedy resolution of the litigation based on clear federal precedent.
Although Alpine's federal claim was not ripe in federal court, the City urged the federal court to
waive the prudential ripeness requirement (prong two under Williamson County Regional

Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank ofJohnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985» and dismiss the
action on the basis of the statute oflimitations and other jurisdictional bars. This failed.
Although the federal court recognized that it had discretion to retain jurisdiction, it elected not to
exercise it and remanded the matter to this Court.

This side trip did have the advantage of sharpening the issues. Alpine has now
articulated its legal theories, thus enabling the City to provide a more productive and definitive
brief on its motion now before the Court. The bottom line is that Alpine has stated no credible
basis for avoiding the defenses summarized above. Its case is both procedurally and
substantively flawed. Accordingly, the City urges that judgment be entered in favor of the City
and that this action be dismissed with prejudice.

S The Development Agreemenl- Alpine ViJlage Planned Unit Development ("Development Agreement")
entered on December 13. 2007 was the first of several. It is described in Complalnl 11 20 and set out in Complaint,

Ex. B.
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STATEI'IoIENT OF FACTS

This litigation involves a mixed use development known as Alpine Village in downtown
McCall, Idaho. The City has documented where each material fact may be found in the record.
For the convenience of the Court, a timeline is set out in Exhibit A to this brief.
Alpine filed applications for this development on June 20. 2006. Complaint ~ 10. The
applications were finally approved less than six: months later on December 13, 2006. Complaint

,13. Alpine proceeded

with construction and has completed the first phase of the project. The

other phases are not at issue here.
On February 23,2006, roughly four months before ALpine's applications were filed, the
City enacted two ordinances, Ordinance Nos. 8 I9 and 820, which set out various requirements
for community housing. Both ordinances were later declared unconstitutional and were
rescinded by the City.

Complaint~'

21-22. Only the first. Ordinance No. 819, is involved here.

Ordinance No. 819 required that 20 percent of the units in new residential subdivisions be
permanently restricted as community housing. Complaint" 7-9. Thus. Alpine knew on or
before the day it filed its land use applications (June 20, 2006) that it would be required to
provide community housing. Complaint 1MJ1-10.
Alpine could have satisfied its community housing requirement by providing on-site or
off-site housing units, by donating land, or by paying an equivalent fee. Complaint, 9. It chose

a combination of these. There were 17 units in the Timbers, which fell short of Alpine's
community housing obligation under Ordinance 819. Alpine intended to restrict all 17 units to
community housing. while providing another six units on site. The remaining 0.5 unit would be
covered by in lieu fees. See Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant'S Motion to
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Dismiss 2 (Federal Okt. 9) (July21, 2011) ("Alpine's Federal Response Brier); Complaint

W14-18.
On September 22,2006, a group of reaLtors filed the Mountain Centra/lawsuit
challenging Ordinance Nos. 8 (9 and 820. Complaint 1[ 11. This occurred while Alpine's land
use applications were pending and before Alpine committed to purchase the Timbers. Indeed,
Alpine and the City made explicit reference to the Mountain Central litigation in their
Development Agreement - Alpine Village Planned Unit Development ("Development
Agreement") of December 13,2007. 6 That provision released the City from claims with respect

to the Mountain Central Litigation.
Thus, Alpine proceeded with its acquisition of the Timbers and its execution of the
Development Agreement with eyes wide open that the community housing ordinances were being

challenged and that Alpine might not be required to provide any community housing. If Alpine
was concerned about being left holding the property, it could have acquired an option on the
Timbers and awaited the outcome in Mountain Central. Alternatively, it could have agreed to
restrict more on-site units or paid a larger in lieu fee and gotten its money back after ]I.,fountain
Central. In any event, it could have sold the Timbers at any time, rather than wait for the market

to crash. No one--certainly not the City-required Alpine to purchase the Timbers. Alpine
identified the Timbers property and chose to invest in it, knowing that ifthe Mountain Central
court invalidated Ordinance 819 Alpine would own the Timbers free of any restrictions. Alpine
got exactly that. Now that the market has turned, however, Alpine seeks to pin its investment
loss on the City. In short, the City has not "taken" anything. The City allowed Alpine to keep
something it chose to acquire but apparently no longer wants.
6 The

various iterations of the Development Agreement are outlined in footnote 24 at page 30.
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LEGAL STANDARD

The legal standard for a motion for summary judgment was recently summarized by this
Court in Buckskin Properties, Inc. v. Valley County, Case No. CV-2009-554-C, at 2-3 (Idaho,
Fourth Judicial Dist., Memorandum Decision Re: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,

Jan. 7, 2011) (on appeal).1 The City easily meets this standard. The materiai facts aTe not in
dispute. They may be found in the Complaint, other pleadings and briefs submitted by Alpine.
as well as affidavits and other documents of record. This case turns on questions oflaw.

7 In

Buckslo.in. this Court stated:
Summary judgment shall be granted only "ifthe pleadings, depositions. and
admissions on file. together with the affidavits. if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and thai the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law." l.R.C.P.56(c). When considering a motion for
summary judgment, the trial court must construe the record liberally in favor of
the non-moving party and draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of such

party. Bear Lake West Homeowner's Assoc. v. Bear Lake County, 118 Idaho
343.346.796 P.2d 1016, 1019 (1990). The motion must be denied ifcontlicting

inferences may be drawn from the evidence or if reasonable people might reach
different conclusions. Parker v. Kolrot, 117 [daho 963, 793 P.2d 195 (1990).
The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact
rests with the non-moving party. Thompson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc.. 126
[daho 527,531,887 P.2d 1034, l03& (1994). lfthe moving party meets that
burden, the party who resists summary judgment has the responsibility to place
in the record before the court the existence of controverted material facts that
require resolution at trial. Sparks v. St. Luke's Regional Medical Center, Ltd..
115Idaho 505, 508, 768 P.2d 76&,771 (1988). The resisting party may not rely
on his pleadings nor merely assert the existence of facts which might support his
legal theory. [d. He must establish the existence of those facts by deposition.
affidavit. or otherwise. Ed.: LR.C.P. 56(e}.
A mere scintilla of evidence or a slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to
withstand summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark Equipmem Co., 112 Idaho
85.87,730 P.2d 1005. 1007 (1986). In other words, there must be evidence on
which a jury might rely. Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865,
871.452 P.2d 362. 368 (1969). Moreover. the existence of disputed facts will
not defeat summary judgment when the plaintiff fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, and on
which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. Pounds v. Denison. (20 Idaho
425, 426. 816 P.2d 982. 983 (199 I).

Buckskin at 2-3.
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ARGUMENT

I.

THERE HAS BEEN :0.10 TAKING, BECAUSE ALPINE STILL HOLDS THE PROPERTY.

Let us begin by stating the obvious. This is a most peculiar takings case. Alpine

complains that its property has been "taken," yet it owns the property in fee, and the City has
imposed no particular restriction on its development or sale. In a sense, Alpine is complaining
that its property was not taken, and it was left holding something it does not want. But the fact is
the City did not take Alpine's property. And the City is not constitutionally responsible for the
decline in value of a property A1pine chose to acquire. When its ordinances were invalidated. the
City promptly and voluntarily released Alpine from any obligation to provide affordable
housing. That is all that is required under the law of takings. Suffice it to say, Alpine's theory is
novel, counter-intuitive, and completely lacking in legal authority.
II.

ALPINE's STATE CLAfM IS BARRED FOR THREE REASONS.

A.

Alpine failed to provide notice within 180 days.
(1)

Section 50-219 requires DOUtt within 180 days.

Section 6-906 of the ITeA, Idaho Code §§ 6-901 to 6-929, coupled with Idaho Code
§ 50-219, requires Alpine to provide notice to the City within 180 days of when the claim arose

or reasonably should have been discovered. As its name implies, the Idaho Tort Claims Act
applies only to claims sounding in tort. But this limitation does not matter because a separate
statute, Idaho Code § 50·219, requires: "All claims for damages against a city must be filed as
prescribed by chapter 9, title 6, Idaho Code [the ITCAJ." The effect of this statute is that all
damage claims against cities are subject to the 180-day rule in Idaho Code § 6-906. Sweitzer v.
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Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 571·73, 798 P.2d 27, 30-32 (1990).8 This includes takings claims under

the State's Constitution. BHA Investments. Inc. v. City a/Boise ("BHA 11'), 141 Idaho 168, 17476, 108 P.3d 315,321-23 (2004).9
Alpine admits that it did not file a notice of claim with the City until November 15, 2010.

Complaint" 28, 33. That was more than four years after Alpine submitted its development
applications (May 20,2006), over three years after it agreed to purchase the Timbers (January 7,
2007),10 and nearly three years after it signed the Development Agreement (December 13,

2007).1l Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Alpine's state law claim.
Alpine counters that the notice requirement does not apply to constitutional claims.
"Alpine's claim is not a common law cause of action. Rather it is a claim founded on the state
constitution, which, in accord with H-K Contractors should be found to not be subject to the
requirements of Idaho Code § 50-219." Alpine's Federal Response Bri~fll (citingH-K

Contractors, Inc. v. City of Firth, 101 Idaho 224, 6 I1 P.2d 1009 (1919».

8 There is no contrary authority. In Brown v. City afTwin Falls, 124 Idaho 39, 40-41, 855 P.2d 876,877·
78 (1993), the Court noted that tile trial court reached a contrary conclusion (that takings claims against cities are not
subject to the Idaho Tort Claims Act because they are not torts). This trial court's ruling was plainly incorrect.
However, the Idaho Supreme Court decided the case on the merits and expressly withheld any ruling on the ldabo
Tort Claims Act. Accordingly, this case is not contrary authority.
9 In Alpine's Federal Response Brief I I, Alpine dismisses the BRA II case out-of-hand saying, "However,
in BRA there was no express discussion of this issue." Not so. In BHA II. plaintiffs brought an action for "taking of
its property without just compensation in violation of the United Scates and Idaho Constitutions." BHA II, 118 Idaho
at l72. 108 P.3d at 319. The Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they should be excused from the notice
requirement under Idaho Code § 50-219. BllA II, 141 Idaho at 174, 108 P.3d at 321. Accordingly, the Court threw
out the state takings claim (as well as their state unjust enrichment claim). "The notice of claim filed by Bravo on
Apri122, 2003 was untimely." BHA II. t 41 Idaho at 174. 108 P.3d at 321. In contrast, the BHA II Court found that
the notice requirement in the Idaho Tort Claim Act is preempted as to &kml takings claims. BRA ll. 141 ]daho at
175-76, 108 P.3d at 322·23. The Court concluded, "[W]e affu:m that portion of the judgment dismiSSing the claims
based upon state law. and we vacate that portion of the judgment dismissing the claim based upon federal law." BHA
II, 141 Idaho at 177, 108 P.3d at 324. That is a clear holding that state law takings claims against a city are subject
to the 180-day notice requirement, while federal claims are not. Alpine has no basis for suggesting otherwise.

10 The Purchase and Sale Agreement for the Timbers is referenced in Complaint ~ 12 and is set out in
MilJemann Affidavit, Ex. 7 and Pittenger Affidavit. Ex. 8.

11

The Development Agreement is referenced in Complainl '1120 and is set out in Complainl. Ex. B.
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Alpine misrepresents the holding in H-K Contractors. The case, while mentioning by
way of background that the statute applies to common law actions against cities, does not stand
for the proposition that the 180-day notice requirement is limited to common law claims. The

key point in this two-page opinion was that section SQ..2l9 is "a statute general in nature" and
that it is overridden by the more specific recovery provisions in another statute. 12 The case in no
way turned on common law versus constitutional claims. In any event, other Idaho precedent
(identified above) makes clear that section 50-219 applies to all claims seeking damages, as the

statute itself says.
(1)

Alpine t , failure to comply with section SO-119 is jurisdictional.

Alpine disputes that its failure to timely file a notice of claim is a jurisdictional defect.
Alpine 's Federal Response Brief 12-13. This assertion is directly contrary to the holding of the

Idaho Supreme Court in McQuillen v. City ofAmmon, 113 Idaho 719, 747 P.2d 741 (1987):
Compliance with the Idaho Tort Claims Act notice
requirement is a mandatory condition precedent in bringing suit,
the failure of which is fatal to a claim, no matter how legitimate.
In summary. McQuillen's negligent issuance claim under
the Idaho Tort Claims Act is abSOlutely barred for failure to timely
comply with the 12o-day notice requirement.

McQuillen, 113 Idaho at 722, 747 P.2d at 744 (emphasis supplied).

12 The case did not involve a constitutional claim. Instead, the plaintiff asserted a claim against the City of
Firth under [daho Code § 54·1928, which makes a public body that fails to obtain a contractor's bond liable to any
person who supplied labor or materials for the project. The Court held that the plaintiff's failure to comply with
section 50-219 was not a bar to its action because a more specific statute regarding the bond requirement controlled
over the general notice starute. The Court said: "We deem it clear that I.C. § 50-219 is a statute general in nature
applying to common law actions against cities. Those statutes which require a municipality to secure a bond from
persons with whom it contracts for the construction of public works, I.e. §§ 54-1926, -1928, which require the
municipality itself to pay in the event the municipality fails to require a bond, are specific in nature and thereby
govern and control over the provisions ofa general statute." H-K COl1tractors, tol Idaho at 225, 611 P.2d at 1010
(emphasis supplied).
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This jurisdictional nature of the defense was recognized even more explicitly by the
Idaho Court of Appeals in Madsen v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare, 116 Idaho 758, 779
P .2d 433 (Ct. App. 1989):
Our Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the
language of I.C. § 6-908-that no claim or action shall be
"allowed"-to mean that compliance with the notice requirement
of the Tort Claims Act is a mandatory condition precedent to
bringing an action under the Act. ...
. " Because the action could not be maintained without
compliance with the Tort Claims Act, the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction and properly dismissed the action as to the
Department.

Madsen, 116 Idaho at 761, 779 P.2d at 436 (emphasis supplied).
Applying the analogous Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), the Ninth Circuit recently
overturned a multi-million dollar verdict on the basis that the plaintiffs had missed the statute of
limitations deadline in the act by one day. The Court explained it had no choice:
The FTCA's statute of limitations is jurisdictional and not subject
to equitable tolling or estoppel. Thus, FTCA claimants must
strictly adhere to the statute of limitations or lose the right to
invoke federal jurisdiction.

Adams v. United States, 2011 WL 3929589 at *4 (9 th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011).
The Idaho cases cited by Alpine (Alpine's Federal Response BriefI2-13) are not on

point 13

13 In Driggers v. Grafe. 148 Idaho 295, 298 n.2, 221 P .3d 521, 524 n.2 (Ct. App. 20(9), the Court said in a
footnote that "Idaho Courts have yet to address whether equitable tolling is applicable to the rrcA." In short. it did
not address the issue because it made no difference to the outcome of the case. Had it mattered, the Court probably
would have discovered the McQuillen and Madsen cases which are on point and controlling. Alpine also relies on
the case of Doe v. Durtschi. 110 Idaho 466.716 P.2d 1238 (1986). This case held that another statute that ex.pressly
extended filing deadlines for minor children was applicable to the ITCA. We note, fll'st, that this decision predated
McQuillen and Madsen. Even if it remains valid precedent however. it dealt with a different situatjon: the
reconciliation of two conflicting statutes. Alpine can point to no other statute that might grant it relief from the 180day requirement Thus. no Idaho case stands for the proposition that general equitable principles or constitutional
arguments provide a basis for tolling the ITCA' s deadlines.
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(3)

Even if section 5f)..219 is not jurisdictionaL, Alpine's equitable
and constitutional arguments for circumventing section S()"219
lack merit.

The reason that Alpine seeks to describe section 50-219 as something less than a
mandatory condition precedent is that it seeks to make a constitutional argument to ex.cuse its
failure to provide notice prior to November 2010. Alpine's Federal Response Brief 13-16.
However, that argument, even if it were proper to consider it, bas no merit.
Alpine's argument is that the City discriminated among developers by enacting a
resolution to refund fees paid under Ordinance 820 while providing no refunds under Ordinance
819. This, says Alpine, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. There are
many problems with this argument. The simplest, however, is that the City did not enact a
statute refunding money or returning property obtained under Ordinance 819 because none was
collected. At the time of Mountain Central, only two developers were obligated to provide

community housing under Ordinance 819 (Alpine and one other). Affidavit ofMichelle

Groenevelt (submitted herewith). The City promptly released both developers from those
restrictions. (See discussion in section IV at page 30 with respect to Alpine's release.) So there
was no reason to enact a resolution for Ordinance 819 similar to the one adopted for Ordinance
820. In other words, Alpine got the equivalent of a full "refund." It is hardly in a position to
complain ofunequaJ treatment.
Even if equitable estoppel could be applied, Alpine has not alleged any facts to support
the use of estoppel against the City to excuse the failure to file a notice of claim. As the final
nail, even if equitable estoppel were applied here, it would only restart the clock and extend the
deadline to 180 days from the date that the City stopped accepting refund requests. Since that
date was December 31, 2009 (Alpine 's Federal Response Brief 14), the new deadline for filing
CITY'S OPENING BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
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the notice of claim would be June 29, 2010. Thus, even under Alpine's estoppel theory, its
action is still barred because Alpine did not submit its claim to the City until November 15,
2010.

In sum, Alpine's failure to file its state claim within 180 days renders it invalid. Alpine's
claim that the rule does not apply to it is without legal or factual foundation.

B.

Alpine's state claim is barred by the four-year statute of Umltations.

Alpine acknowledges that its state takings claim is subject to Idaho's residual four-year
statute oflimitations, Idaho Code § 5-224.

14

Alpine's Federal Response Brief17. The Verified

Complaint was filed on December 10, 20 10. Accordingly, to be within the four-year statute of
limitations, its cause of action must have accrued no earlier than December 10,2006. However,
it is apparent on the face of its Complaint that Alpine's cause of action accrued on or before June
20, 2006, the day the development applications were filed. Alpine knew that it wouLd be

required to contribute the equivalent of 20 percent of its units to community housing. At that
point, it knew how many units it wanted to build, so it was a simple matter to understand its
obligation under the fixed, non-d.iscretionary formula in Ordinance 819. Thus, as of June 20,

2006, at the latest, Alpine had a cause of action.
Indeed, it had a cause of action well before that. Its cause of action arose whenever it had

a concrete expectation that it would build something or otherwise be affected by the community
housing ordinances. After all, the plaintiffs in Mountain Central had not filed any applications,

14 The City calls to the Court's attention that the IrCA contains its own two-year statute oflimitations,
Idaho Code § 6-911. On its face, Idaho Code 50-219 makes all of the ITCA's requirements applicable to those
filing damage actions against cities: "AII claims for damages against a city must be filed as prescribed by chapter 9.
title 6, Idaho Code." This appears to embrace not only the 180-day notice requirement, but the statute oflimitations,
as well. The City ca.ndidly admits that it has been unable to find any support for this argument. Indeed, the City has
found no case in which this argument has ever been made or addressed. Since this issue is not critical to the City's
case, the City can understand that the Court may not wish to venture into this untested area. Accordingly, the City
presents the argument for the Court's consideration and in order to preserve it in the event of an appeal.

*
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but they had a cause of action because it had become apparent that they would be affected by the
ordinances. Alpine's contention that its cause of action did not arise until it signed the

Development Agreement or obtained final plat approval cannot be reconciled with Mountain
Central.
Alpine's position also runs counter to a mountain of appellate precedent. It is settled law
in Idaho that claims of inverse condemnation run from the time the plaintiff first becomes fully
aware of the interference with his or her property. In McCuskey v. Canyon County

Commissioners ("McCuskey 11"). 128 Idaho 213.912 P.2d 100 «(996), the plaintiff claimed a
temporary taking from the time Canyon County issued a stop work order to the time the Idaho
Supreme Court voided the controlling ordinance in McCuskey v. Canyon County ("McCuskey
f'), 123 Idaho 657,851 P.2d 953 (1993). [n McCuskey lI, the Court explained, ""The time of
taking occurs, and hence the cause of action accrues, as of the time that the full extent of the

plaintiff's Loss of use and enjoyment ofthe property becomes apparent." McCuskey IL 128

Idaho at 216-17,912 P.2d at 103-04. McCuskey had contended that the statute did not begin to
run until the Court had ruled the county's zoning action illegal, because only then did he know
the full extent of damages for the temporary taking. The Court rejected this argument,
explaining that the lack of quantification of the loss is not an excuse for delay in filing the
lawsuit:
Moreover, it is well settled that uncertainty as to the amount of
damages cannot bar recovery so long as the underlying cause of
action is determined. Besides, although McCuskey may not have
known the full extent of his damages at the time the stop-work
order was issued, he would have known with certainty what they
were once a taking had been finally adjudicated.

McCuskey II, 128 Idaho at 218, 912 P.2d at lO5 (citation omitted). Thus, the Court's earlier
quoted reference to knowing "the full extent ofthe plaintiff's loss" should be understood to mean
CITY'S OPENING BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
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chat the clock begins to run when interference with the plaintiff's property is sufficiently
apparent that a cause of action has arisen (as in Mountain Centra!), regardless of whether
damages are then quantifiable. The key point here is that Ordinance No. 819 was facially
invalid. Because the 20-percent rule was in effect when the development applications were filed,
Alpine had a cause of action at that time-or earlier.
The law on this is consistent and settled. In another case decided the same year as
McCuskey II, the Idaho Supreme Court explained that the statute begins to run "when the

impairment was of such a degree and kind that substantial interference with Wadsworth's
property interest became apparent." Wadsworth v.Idaho Department o/Transportation, 128
Idaho 439,443,915 P.2d 1,5 (1996). [n Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 79, 644 P.2d l333, 1338
(1982), the Idaho Supreme Court held that the statute ran on the date of a meeting between
parties at which time there was "recognition of the severity of the problem." In another case, the

Court has explained, "The actual date of taking, although not readily susceptible to exact
determination., is to be fixed at the point in time at which the impainnent, of such a degree and
kind as to constitute a substantial interference with plaintiffs' property interest, became
apparent." Tibbs v. City o/Sandpoint, 100 [daho 667, 671, 603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979) (inverse
condemnation based on airport expansion). In yet another case, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled
that the statute of limitations on inverse condemnation ran from the day the plaintiffs were
compelled to enter into a mineral lease with the state, not the time they made payments to the
state under the lease.
We affinn the district court's detennination that the fun extent of
the Harrises' loss of use and enjoyment of the property became
apparent when they entered into the Mineral Lease. At that point
in time, the impainnent constituted a substantial interference with
their property interest because they signed an agreement promising
CITY'S OPENING BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
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to pay royalties and rents on the sand and gravel. Therefore, the
Harrises are barred from recovering under their inverse
condemnation daim by I.e. § 5-224.
Harris v. State, ex rei. Kempthorne, 147 Idaho 401, 405, 210 P.3d 86, 90 (2009).

In sum, there can be no doubt that Alpine had an actionable lawsuit the day it filed its

development applications. Indeed, it could have sued even before it filed the applications, as did
the pLaintiffs in Mountain Central. IS Accordingly, Alpine's state claim is barred under the fouryear statute oflimitations.
Despite this clear authority, Alpine asserts that its claim did not accrue until December
13,2007 (the date of the Development Agreement) or "at the earliest" August 23, 2007 (when the

City Council approved the final plat for Phase I and the Development Agreement). Alpine's
Federal Response Brie/I 7. In support ofthis contention., Alpine relies on City o/Coeur d'Alene
v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 136 P.3d 310 (2006). But Simpson does not support Alpine's

conclusion.
Simpson involved landowners who built fences on lakefront property at Sanders Beach.

The City of Coeur d' Alene demanded that the landowners remove the fences based on alleged
violations of city ordinances and ultimately sought an injunction to that effect. The landowners
counterclaimed for inverse condemnation alleging a taking under the Fifth Amendment, among
other state and federal claims.

IS In this regard. this case is different than Buckskin and Hellr v. City o/McCall. Case No. CV-2010-276·C
(Idaho, Fourth Judicial Dist, June 6, 20 11) (motion for reconsideration pending). Both Buckskin and Hehr were asapplied challenges. In Buckskin, the ordinance was not challenged, but its application was. In Hehr, Ordinance 819
was enacted later and did not apply to the development. Accordingly. in both cases the cause of action did not arise
until application-specific events materialized giving rise to an allegation of an unlawful exaction. In the instant
facial challenge the cause 0 f action arises at some point after enactment of the ordinance when the plaintiff
detennines to construct a project that is subject to the ordinance.
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'The district court said that that the cause of action accrued as soon as the allegedly
unconstitutional ordinance was enacted. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed, explaining:
In Palazzolo, the United States Supreme Court held that a
regulatory takings claim does not become ripe upon enactment of
the regulation; indeed, it remains unripe until the landowner takes
the reasonable and necessary steps to allow the regulating agency
to consider development plans and issue a decision, thereby
determining the extent to which the regulation actually burdens the
property.

Simpson, 142 Idaho at 846, 136 PJd at 317 (citing Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 553 U.S. 606,
620-21 (200 1)). The Palazzolo Court, however, was talking about Williamson County ripeness,
specifically the "prong one" requirement to obtain a final determination by the agency. Thus, in
Simpson, the Court held that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the date that City

of Coeur d' Alene brought an enforcement action against the landowners. Doing so involved an
exercise of discretion regarding the requirements of the regulation at issue.
The situation in the instant case is fundamentally different. Alpine has brought a facial
challenge to Ordinance 819. thereby making prong one of Williamson County inapplicable. 16
Moreover, Ordinance 819 is non.discretionary and sets out a fixed formula for community
housing. Accordingly, there is nothing to exhaust or finalize and no need for any governmental
action to determine "the full extent of the impairment of the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment"
(using the Court's words in Simpson, 142 Idaho at 846, 136 PJd at 317).
The U.S. Supreme Court made this distinction clear in Palazzolo. The Court recognized
and contrasted cases in which the regulatory action involved no discretion. "While a landowner
must give a land-use authority an opportunity to exercise its discretion, once it becomes clear
16 In fee v. City ofEscondido. 503 U.S. 519. 534 (1992) and again in Sui/urn v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 520 U.S. 725. 730 (1997), the Supreme Court noted that the first prong of the Williamson County ripeness
test does not apply to facial challenges to ordinances.
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that the agency lacks the discretion to permit any development, or the permissible uses of the
property are known to a reasonable degree of certainty, a takings claim is likely to have ripened."
Palazzolo, 53 U.S. at 620.

Here, the requirement to contribute property or money toward community housing was
simple, non-discretionary, and apparent on the face of the ordinance. Complaint 1 7. Alpine
admits this much in its Complaint and in its prior brief:
As the Statement of Facts unquestionably establishes,
Alpine's Applications were subject to Ordinance 819 and Alpine's
compliance with Ordinance 819 was mandatory. The Ordinance
was in place when Alpine filed its Applications. By its terms, the
Ordinance was not discretionary and Alpine Village, as presented,
clearly fell within its purview because the project consists
predominately of ' 'residential units".
Alpine 's Federal Response Brief 18. [n short, Simpson and Palazzolo would delay the start of
the statute of limitations only when the claim is unripe and further admjnistrative action is

required to infonn the plaintiff of the claim. They offer no protection to Alpine.
Thus, Alpine knew of the substantial interference with its property interest when it
applied, ifnot before. Since Alpine submitted its application more than four years before it filed
suit, its state takings claim is barred by the statute of limitations. 17

C.

Alpine's decision to purcbase the Timbers was voluntary, thus
defeating the state claim.

The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that voluntary actions do not give rise to takings
claims. In KMST. LLCv. County ofAda, 138 Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56 (2003), the developer
agreed to dedicate a road to the Ada County Highway District in order to facilitate consideration

11 The ordinance set out the formula for fees with particularity. Even ifit did not, that would not mat1er.
Alpine's case is not premised on a regulatory taking that "went too far." Rather. it is based on a per se violation of
Idaho' s constitutional provision dealing with illegal taxes. Thus, one penny is enough for the action to accrue.
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of its application. This proved fatal to its taking claim. "KMST's property was not taken. It
voluntarily decided to dedicate the road to the public in order to speed approvaJ of its
development. Having done so, it cannot now claim that its property was 'taken.'" KMST,138
Idaho at 582, 67 P.3d at 61.
Here, Alpine took it upon itself to acquire the Timbers. As set out in its Complaint' 9,
the ordinance al10wed Alpine to choose whether to provide off-site community housing or do
something else. It could have satisfied the entire requirement with an in lieu fee, which (like the
in lieu fee it had planned to pay for 0.5 unit) would not have been paid once the ordinance was
invalidated. Yet, knowing full well that it would be stuck holding the Timbers if the community
housing ordinance was overturned, Alpine decided that investing in the Timbers was a good bet.
When Ordinance No. 819 was overturned, it got to keep its investment. But the market turned,
and Alpine does not like its investment any more. Alpine gambled and lost.

In short, this is not the City's problem. The requirement in Ordinance 819 to do
something may have been mandatory, but Alpine's decision to buy the Timbers was its own
voluntary undertaking. Accordingly, under KMST and common sense, the decline in value of the
Timbers is not a taking.
111.

ALPINE'S FEDERAL CLAIM IS TIME-BARRED.

A.

Alpine's federal claim is unripe in federal court but ripe in state
court.

Under Williamson County Regional Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank ofJohnson City,
473 U.S. 172 (1985). Alpine's federal claim is not ripe in federal court. Williamson County

requires that a plaintiff ripen the federal taking claim by first bringing an inverse condemnation
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action under state law. IS For some time after Williamson County, it was thought that this
required a two-step process by which the plaintiff litigates the state claim in state court, loses,
and then litigates the federal claim (in either state or federal court). This, in tum created res
judicata problems for the plaintiff.
In 2005, however, the Supreme Court resolved this conundrum by declaring that a
plaintiffmay bring the federal claim simultaneously (as an alternative claim) with the state claim
in state court, and that doing so poses no problem under Williamson County's second prong
ripeness test. San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County o/San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
Prior to San Remo, courts struggled with whether the statute oflimitations ran at all
against unripe federal claims. The Ninth Circuit held that the statute does not begin to run on the
unripe federal claims. 19 In contrast, the Seventh Circuit ruled that the statute begins to run as
soon as the wrong occurs. Bieneman v. City ofChicago, 864 F.2d 463,470 (7th CiT. 1988). But

none of this matters after San Remo. San Remo says definitively that the federal claim is ripe
(under prong two) from the outset in state court. Indeed, unripe federal claims must be brought

in state court simultaneously with the state claims in order to avoid res judicata.
Here is the key point: If the claim is ripe in state court, it follows necessarily that the
cause of action has accrued. Accordingly, the statute of limitations must be running and has

been running all along. Since both the state and federal takings claims are ripe in state court, the
18 This is the so-called second prong of Williamson County's ripeness test. The first prong requires the
plaintiff to have obtained a final administrative decision. As noted above in footnote [6 at page 22, the first prong is
not applicable here.

19 "We further held in Levaldthat the dale of accrual is either (1) the date compensation is denied in state
courts, or (2) the date the ordinance is passed if resort to state courts is futile .... Thus•.. , Hacienda's claim, , .
will either fail because it is not ripe, or. ifit is ripe, it will be barred by the statute oflimitations," Hacienda Valley
Mobile Estates v. City a/Morgan Hill, 353 F.3d 651,655 (9th Cir. 2003). cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1041 (2004) (citing
Levald.lnc. v. City a/Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 688 (9th Cif. 1993». See also Norco CQnstnlction, Inc. v, King
County, 801 F.2d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 1986),
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statute of limitations began to run against them at the same time. (Different statutes of limitation
may apply, but the start date is the same.) After all, they both arose out oftbe same facts.
Alpine insists that this is not so. In Alpine's Federal Response BrieflO, it contends that
"Alpine's federal takings claim has not even accrued for statute oflimitations purposes until a
final decision on Alpine's state constitutional claim has been rendered by the courts of Idaho."
For this point, it cites Levald. Inc. v. City ofPalm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 687 (9th Cir. 1993).
Alpine misses the fact that Levald (like Hacienda) dealt with federal takings claims
brought in federal court where they are not ripe.20 Where the cause of action is not ripe,
obviously, the statute does not begin to run. But these pre-San Remo decisions have no
applicability to a plaintiff who, in compliance with San Remo. brings its federal claim in state
court. lfthe federal claim can be brought in state court, then obviously the cause of action has
accrued and the case must be brought in a timely fashion. Alpine cannot have its cake and eat it,

too. If the claim is ripe, it is subject to the statute of limitations. San Remo was intended to
avoid piecemeal litigation, not to give plaintiffs a free pass on the statute oflimitations.
It may seem a tittle odd, by the way, that a cause of action is unripe in federal court, yet
the very same cause of action is ripe in state court. Peculiar as this may seem, this was the
precise holding of San Remo. Neither San Remo nor any other post-San Remo court, so far as we
know, has been called on to deal with the question ofwhen the statute of limitations runs against

20 Nor does the case of Norco Construction. Inc. v. King County. SOl F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1(86) help
Alpine. Norco involved a state action that was brought in state court and removed. The Ninth Circuit held that the
cause of action does not accrue Wltil the case has been ripened under prong one of Williamson County. As noted,
prong one ripeness ill not an issue here because this is a facial challenge to Ordinance 819. Under San Remo, a case
that is ripe under prong one (like the instant case) can be brought simultaneously in state court with the state claims.
If it can be brought. then obviously the cause of action has accrued and statute of limitations is running. Neither
Norco nor any other post-San Remo case is to the contrary.
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a federal claim in state court, Perhaps that is because it is so obvious that the statute runs from
the time the claim arises,

Thus, the only questions are how long is the statute of limitations and when did it start
running? We address these below.
B.

Alpine's federal claim is subject tD a two-year statute of limitations.

Federal law dictates which statute oflimitations is applicable to federal claims and when
that statute will begin to run. Wallace v, Kalo, 549 U.S. 384, 387-88 (2007); McCabe v. Craven.

145 Idaho 954. 957, 188 P,3d 896, 899 (2008).
(1)

The federal claim is subject to a two-year statute of limitations.

In Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (19BS). the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that all
§ 1983 actions are subject to the state's statute of limitations for personal injury (aka torts)
regardless of the nature of the constitutional claim. Accordingly. Alpine's federal law claim is
subject to Idaho's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury action, Idaho Code

§ 5-219(4). This bright-line rule was reaffirmed in Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249·50

(1989) and Wallace v, Kala, 549 U.s. 384,387 (2007).21
Alpine concedes that "a section 1983 claim [in federal court] would be subject to Idaho's

two-year statute ofLimitations for personal injury actions, Idaho Code § 5·219(4) (2010)."
Alpine's Federal Response Brie/9. Yet it insists that the same federal precedent does not apply

in Idaho, citing City of Coeur d 'Alene v, Simpson, 142 Idabo 839, 136 P .3d 310 (2006) and C&G

*

it Alpine has now amended its complaint to plead
1983. Even if it had not done so, its federal taking
claim would be subject to the same two-year statute oflimitations. This is because the two-year statute applies

equaUy to actions of this sort brought directly under the U.S. Constitution. Bieneman v. CiJy of Chicago, 864 F.2d
463 (7th Cir. 1988) is directly on point. This Seventh Circuit decision assumed that First Eng/ish Evangelical
Lutheran Church ofGlendale v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 314-15 (1987) allowed takings challenges
directly under the Constitution and, nevertheless, found them subject to the same state statute of limitations as
dictated for § 1983 cases in Wilson. Bieneman was expressly adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Vall Strum v. Lawn,
940 F.2d 406,410 (9th Cir. 1991).
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Inc. v. Canyon Highway District No.4, 139 Idaho 140, 75 PJd 194 (2003». Alpine's Federal
Response Brie/at 10 n.27. This cannot be so. As noted above, federal law determines which
statute of limitations applies. In any event, the cases Alpine cited do not provide the authority
claimed. 22

(2)

The federal statute of limitations begins to run when the cause
of action becomes apparent.

As noted above, whHe state law supplies the statute oflimitations for a § 1983 case,
federal Law detennines when that state statute begins to run. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. at
387-88. Under federal law, the statute oflirnitations begins to run when the constitutional wrong
becomes or should have become apparent. '"A federal claim is generally considered to accrue
when the plaintiff 'knows or has reasoo to know of the injury which is the basis of the action. '"

Norco Comtnletion, Inc. v. King County, 801 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting Trotter v.
International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen '3 Union, 704 F.2d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 1983».
th

See also Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1128 (9 Cir. 1996); Lukovsky Y. City and County of San

21 In C&G, the Court addressed a pure state law inverse condemnation claim. Accordingly, C&G is not on
point as to which statute of limitations governs federal claims.
In Simpson, the Court noted that the district court applied the four-year statute of limitations to this § 1983
case. The Idaho Supreme Court never addressed which statute to apply, however, because it did not matter. (The
Court found that the cause of action accrued in the same year the action arose, so any statute of limitations was

satisfied. )

The case of Gibson v. Ada County, 142 [clabo 746,754, 133 P.3d 1211 (2006), cer1. denied, 549 U.S. 994
(2006), rehearing denied, 549 U.S. 1159 (2007) reflects similar non-attention to the statute oflimitations issue. In
one place, the Idaho Supreme Court said.. "In Idaho there is a two-year statute of limitations on all § 1983 claims
similar to personsl injury actiorl8. LC. § 5-219(4) (2004)." This statement fails to recognize the many Idaho cases
holding that the two-year statute of limitations applies to all 1983 actions not just those "similar to personal injury
actions." Elsewhere in the case, however, the Court says: "Idaho has a two-year statute of limitations on all 42
U.S.C. ~ 1983 claims." Gibson, 142 Idaho at 756,133 P.3d at 1221 (emphasis supplied).
On numerous occasions. [daho courts have applied Wilson and held that Idaho's two-year statute of

*

limitations applies, regardless of the nature of the ~ 1983 action. McCabe v. Craven. 145 Idaho 954, 957, 188 P.3d
896,899 (2008); Osborn v. Salinas, 131 Idaho 456.458.958 P.ld 1142, 1144 (1998); Idaho Stale Bar v. 1\vay, 128
Idaho 794. 198, 919 P.2d 323, 321 (1996); Mason v. Tucker and Assoc.. 125 Idaho 429, 436, 871 P.2d 846, 853 (Ct.
App. 1994); Herrera l·. Conner. III Idaho 1012, 1016,729 P.ld 1075, 1079 (Ct. App. 1987); Henderson v. Slale,
110 Idaho 308, 310-11, 715 P.2d 978, 980-81 (1986).
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Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, the federal rule as to when the statute begins to
run tracks perfectly with the Idaho case law discussed in section I1.B at page 18.
Alpine filed its Verified Complaint on December 10,2010. Consequently, if the cause of
action accrued earlier than December 10, 2008, Alpine has not satisfied the two-year statute of
limitations. Even Alpine admits that, if the statute is running, it began to run on December 13,
2007 (or August 23, 2007 "at the earliest"). Alpine '5 Federal Response Brief I 7. Thus, there is
no doubt that Alpine missed the two-year statute of limitations.

(3)

Alpine's federal claim is late even under a four-year statute of
limitations.

Deciding which statute of Urn it at ions applies is not critical to this case. For the same
reasons that Alpine's state takings claim comes too late under the four-year statute oflimitations,
Alpine's federal claim would violate that statute, too?) Applying the two-year statute simply
makes it that much more obvious that the claim is late.

C.

In any event, Alpine's claim is forfeited because it failed to timely file
its state claJm.

Even if Alpine's federal claim was not time-barred, it is too late for Alpine to ripen it in
state court by pursuing its inverse condemnation claim based on state law. For reasons discussed
above, Alpine's state claim is untimely and otherwise barred under state law. Because it is
impossible for Alpine to bring the state claim, it cannot ripen its federal claim either.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals considered an identical situation in Pascoag Resen'oir
& Dam v. Rhode Island, 337 F 3d 87 (t SI Cir. 2003). "The Williamson County 'ripeness'

requirements will never be met in this case, because the state's statute of limitations has run on

2J As noted above with respect to Alpine's state law claim, the allegations in the Complaint show that
Alpine was aware of its alleged injury by lune 20, 2006, at the latest (the date that Alpine submitted its applications
that included mitigation of community housing as required by the City'S ordinance). Complaint, ~ 6-10.
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Pascoag's inverse condemnation claim. By failing to bring its state claim, Pascoag forfeited its
federal claim." 337 F.3d at 95 (emphasis original) (citing Gamble v. Eau Claire County,S F.3d

285,286 (7 th Cir. 1993) and Vandor, Inc. v. Militello, 301 F.3d 37,39 (2nd Cir. 2002)). As these
cases from three federal circuits point out, a takings piaintiffHke Alpine who fails to timely
bring a state claim can never satisfy the second prong of Williamson County, and its federal
claim is therefore barred entirely and must be dismissed with prejudice.
IV.

ALPINES CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE RELEASE IN THE DEVELOPME,''ff
AGREEMENT.
4

As part of its Development Agreemenr with the City, Alpine waived and released the
City from claims relating to the Mountain Centra/litigation. Article VII of the Development
Agreement reads in full:

Alpine Village's approved Community Housing Plan is
attached hereto as Exhibit "B". Alpine Village waives and releases

the City from any claims whatsoever regarding or stemming from
the pending litigation between the Mountain Central Board of
Realtors and the City (ie. Mountain Central Board of Realtors, et al
v. City of McCall, et al, Valley County Case Number CV-2006490-C) as to Community Housing Units which are sold pursuant to
this Plan prior to the final disposition of such litigation. The Plan
will be reviewed and modified, as necessary, to comply with the
final disposition of the litigation as to any Community Housing
Units which have not been sold prior to the final disposition of the
24 The first Development Agreement (entitled Development Agreement - Alpine Village Planned Unit
Development) was executed by both parties on December 13, 2007 and recorded as Instrument No. 328801 on
January 28.2008 (Complaint 1 20; Complaint, Ex. B).
It was superseded by an identically titled document executed by the parties on March 6 and 25, 2008 and
recorded as Instrument No. 330524 on April 7. 2008 (Millemann Affidavit. Ex. 9; Pittenger Affidavit, Ex. 13). This
agreement appears to be the same as the earlier Development Agreement, except for Exhibit A (legal description).
On July 24. 2008 (the effective date), the parties executed the First Amendment (0 Development Agreement
- A/pine Village Planned UnU Development, which was recorded as [nstrument No. 334281 on August 20,2008
(Complainl ~ 23; Complaint, Ex. E, Millemann Affidavit, Ex. 13). This released Alpine Village from any
community housing requirements and deleted Article VII of the prior Development Agreement.
A number of further amendments followed. In addition, there was a separate Development AgreementThe Timbers executed on May 8 and 21, 2009 and recorded as Instrument No. 343026 on July 7, 2009 (Pittenger
Affidavit, Ex. 10). Article IV of this agreement contained language identical to the release language found in Article
VII of the Development Agreement for Alpine Village. It, too, was later amended along the same lines.
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litigation.
This provision shows that Alpine and the City were aware of the Mountain Central
litigation and took steps to allocate the risk that Mountain Central would overturn Ordinance
819.
A strict reading of Article VII would limit its application to housing units of the Timbers
that were sold at a discount as affordable housing-and, of course, none were. But such a
limited reading would be at odds with the obvious intent of the parties. The only fair reading of
Article VII is that the parties agreed to proceed on an interim basis with the housing plan
pending resolution of Mountain Central, and that the City would be released from claims if
Ordinance 819 were invalidated. [n other words, the plain intent was to leave the parties where
they stood if the district court overturned the ordinance. If. prior to that time, units were sold at a
discount. the City would be held hannless.

Article VII does not say what would happen to units that remained unsold. It is fair to
assume that it never crossed anyone's mind that Alpine would sue the City for units that Alpine
was allowed to retain and sell or rent at full market value. Ifthe City is protected in the event of
the sale of units below market value, is it reasonable that the parties would intended that the City
would be held liable to Alpine for units sold at full market value? No, it is inconceivable that the
City intended to give the developer such an insurance policy against market failure. The only
fair and reasonable interpretation of this provision is to treat it as a complete release in the event
of the invalidation of Ordinance 819. Thus, Alpine has given away any reHef it might have had
against the City.
This conclusion is reinforced by the first amendment to the Development Agreement
referenced in footnote 24 at page 30. The original Article VII of the Development Agreement
CITY'S OPENING BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS
\26JI61_2/44n-o

Page 31 of 44

330

promised that the parties would revisit the situation after Mountain Central was decided. In
faithful compliance therewith, this amendment released Alpine from any community housing
obligation and "deleted" Article VII in its entirety. Again, it is only fair and reasonable to
presume that the parties believed that they were each being left where they stood. Alpine may
contend that the deletion of Article VII deprived the City ofits release protection. It is
implausible that the parties intended such an inequitable result.
In any event, even if the Court were to detennine that the City has no continuing contract
protection under Article VII, the parties' plain intent should be taken into account in considering
the City's equitable defenses. Likewise, this underscores the need for strict application ofthe
procedural requirements in the rTCA which, had they been followed, would have put the City on
notice of Alpine's "gotcha" claim for damages once it was relieved of its community housing
obligation.
V.

ALPINE'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY LACHES.

Ifthe reasons above are not enough, equity, too, demands that Alpine's claims be denied.
Alpine knew even before it acquired the Timbers that Ordinances 819 and 820 were under
challenge. In entering into the Development Agreement, Alpine expressly bargained away its
right to recovery in the event that housing units were sold at a discount prior to resolution of

Mountain Central. That decision proved favorable to Alpine, and it was allowed to keep
everything.

[t

conveyed not a penny to the City. [ts insistence today that the taxpayers should

make it whole for the market slide that affected its purchase of the Timbers reaches too far for
equity.

Had ALpine provided a timely notice that it believed merely purchasing the Timbers
constituted a taking, the City could have protected itself. Instead, Alpine waited for years, as the
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market continued to rise and then crashed. Only then did it infonn the City of its legal theory

that the City has, in effect, been ensuring Alpine's investment all along.
Had the economy taken a different turn. Alpine might have made a killing. We can

presume that Alpine would not have complained about being "forced" to buy the Timbers in that
event. Thus, Alpine wants to have it both ways, with the taxpayers unwittingly on the hook.
The equitable principle oflacbes prohibits this tactic. The law provides that a plaintiff is
estopped from asserting the alleged invasion of his rights when: (i) the plaintiff delayed in
asserting these rights; (ii) the plaintiff had notice and an opportunity to institute a suit; (iii) the
defendant did not know that the plaintiff would assert such rights; and (iv) the delayed suit would

injure or prejudice the defendant. Finucane v. Village ofHayden, 86 Idaho 199,205,384 P.2d
236, 240 (1963). All those tests are met here.
Alpine, of course, will contend that equity favors it because the City's community
housing ordinances were declared invalid. That is true, but the City's ordinances (like others
around the state) were challenged by persons who brought their suits in a timely fashion. In any
event, the City enacted these ordinances in a good faith belief that it was acting within the law.
The City's hands are clean. Alpine's are not.
CONCLUSION

Alpine failed to give timely notice and waited too long to bring its state law claims. The
particular action taken here-Alpine's purchase of the Timbers-was not compelled by
Ordinance No. 819. Instead it chose to purchase the Timbers at the height of the housing market.
This voluntary action does not give rise to a taking.

In any event. the City never took anything

from Alpine; hence there is no taking. Alpine's federal taking claim is ripe in state court.

Precisely because it is ripe, it follows that the statute oflimitations is running. Accordingly, the
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federal claim is late, too. Both claims are barred as well by the release provision Alpine agreed
to in the Development Agreement. Finally, the equities favor the City. For these and all of the
other reasons discussed above, the City urges the Court to dismiss this action with prejudice.

Respectfully submitted tills 16th day of September, 20 II.
GIVENS PURSLEY

By

LLP

~1f.e.PAChristopher H. Meyer

By

~~~rA'Martin C. Hendrickson
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 16th day of September, 2011, the foregoing was filed,
served, and copied as follows:
DOCUMENT FILED;

~o

Fourth Judicial District Court
Attn: Archie N. Banbury, Clerk
Valley County Courthouse
219 Main Street
Cascade, ID 836 LI
Facsimile: 208-382-7107

o

U. S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

SERVICE COPIES TO:
Steven J. Millemann, Esq.
Gregory C. Pittenger, Esq.
Millemann, Pittenger, McMahan & Pemberton,
LLP
706 North First Street
Post Office Box 1066
McCall, ID 83638
Facsimile: 208-634-45\6

U. S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

sjm@mpmplaw.com

gcp@mpmplaw.com

COURTESY COPIES TO:
U. S. Mail

Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin
District Judge
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St.
Boise, ID 83702

Hand Delivered

Overnight Mail

Jason Gray
Law Clerk to Judge Michael McLaughlin
Fourth judicial District Court
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise. 10 83702
Email: jmgray@adaweb.net

o[8JB

U. S. Mail
Hand Delivered

Overnight Mail
E-mail

~Jf-~

Christopher . Meyer
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Exhibit A

TIMELINE

The following timeline is included solely for the convenience of the Court and the parties. It is
not offered as substantive evidence.
Date

9/22/2005

212312006

Author or
Actor
City Council
City Council

Document or Event

Notes re Date

Resolution 05--19 adopted.
Ordinance 819

Where in
Record
Complaint mT 6-

9;
Complaint Ex. A:
MiJlemann, Ex.

1;
Pittenger Ex. 1
I Millemann Ex. 2;
Pittenger Ex. 2

212312006

City Council

Ordinance 820

6120/2006

Alpine

9/2212006

Mountain
Central Bd. of
Realtors
("MCBR")

Applications for preliminary
plat, PUD preliminary plan
approval, CUP, Scenic Route
Approval, & Amendment of
zoning map ("Preliminary
Appllcations").
lawsuit filed challenging
Ordinance 819.

10/3/2006

P&Z

Recommended approval of all
Preliminary Applications.

Complaint 11 12;
Pittenger Ex. 5

City Council
DEADLINE

1211312006

City Council

Ordinance 828
Cut-off date for four-year
statute of limitations
Findings and Conclusions
approving all Preliminary
Applications,

Pittenger Ex. 6

12110/2006

10/1212006

Compiaint 11 10

Complaint 11 11

Complaint 11 13;
Millemann Ex. 5;
Pittenger Ex. 7

1/512001

Alpine

Purchase and Sale Agreement
to acquire Timbers.

Complaint 11 14;
Millemann Ex. 1;
Pittenger Ex. 8

311212007

Alpine

Revised Community Housing
Plan

Millemann Ex. 4;
Pittenger Ex. 4

312212007

City Council

Complaint 115;
Pittenger Ex. 9

411212007

AmeriTitie
(for Alpine)

Findings and Conclusions
approving use of Timbers as
communftv housing for Alpine.
Buyer's Closing Statement

411612001

Alpine

Closed on purchase
Timbers,

5125/2007

Alpine

Application for final plat & final
PUD plan approval for Phase

of

Millemann Ex. 6;
Pittenger Ex. 11
Complaint says
closed "on or
abOut~ April 16,

Complaint 11 16

2007.
Complaint,. 18
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1.

8/2312007

City Council

Approved final plat and final
PUD for Phase 1.

12/1312007

Alpine & City
Council

Development Agreement·
Alpine Village PUD

District Court

2119/2008

Complaint 11" 19;
Millemann Ex. 8;
Pittenger Ex. 12
No effective date.
Executed by all 1213-07. Recorded
1-28-2008 as
Instrument #
328801.

Decision issued in MCBR \I.
I McCall invalidating Ordinance

819.

I

I
I

Alpine & City
Council

Development Agreement·
Alpine Village PUD

City Council

Ordinance 856 (which
repealed Ordinance 819).

4/2412008

City Council

Resolution 08-11

6/2612008
7/24/2008

City Council
Alpine & City
Council

Resolution 08-17
First Amendment to
Development Agreement Alpine Village PUD.

3125/2008

4/2412008

I
I

1211012008

DEADLINE

5121/2009

Alpine & City
Council

Cut-off date for two-year
statute of limitations.
Development Agreement The Timbers

No effective date.
Signed by City 325-08.
Signed by Alpine 3·
6-08.
Recorded 4·7-08
as Instrument #
330524.

Effective date 7-242008.
Signed by Alpine 66-2008.
Signed by Mayor 724-2008.
Signed by Clerk 730-2008.
Recorded 8·20·
2008 as Instrument
#334281.
No effective date.
Signed by City 5-82009.
Signed by Alpine 521·2009.
Recorded 7-7-2009

Complaint 11"
20;Complaint

Ex.S

Complaint 11" 21;
Complaint Ex.
C;
Millemann Ex.
10;
Pittenger Ex. 14
Millemann Ex. 9;
Pittenger Ex. 13

Complaint 1f 22;
Complaint Ex.
D;
Miltemann Ex.
11
Millemann Ex.
12;
Pittenger Ex. 15
Pittenger Ex. 16
Complaint 1r 23;
Complaint Ex. E;
Millemann Ex.
13

Pittenger Ex. 10
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as Instrument #

343026.

11/4/2009

Clty Council

Resolution 09-10

Effective 12-31-

Pittenger Ex. 17

2009.
11/15/2010 ; Alpine

12110/2010

Alpine

Demand letter. sent by Steven
J. Millemann. seeking
payment of damages.
Verified Complaint

Complaint 1m

28.33
Signed & filed on

I
!
I
I

Pleading

12-10-2010.
5123/2011

Alpine

Verified Amended Complaint

Signed & filed on 5-

Pleading

23-2010.
(pending)

Alpine

Second Amended Complaint

Order approving
signed 9-12-2011

i

Pleading
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Exhibit B

LETTER TO ALPINE VILLAGE COMPANY (APRIL 1S t 2011) (WITHOUT
ATTACHMENTS)

~OI'I'ICU
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Via email and u.s. Mail

April 15, 20 It
Steven J. Millemann, Esq.
Gregory C. Pittenger, Esq.
Millemann, Pittenger, McMahan & Pemberton, LlP
706 N. 1st Street
P.O. Box 1066

McCall, ID 83638
Re: Alpine Vii/age Co. v. CUyo{ McCaU, Case No. CV 2010-S19C
Dear Steve and Greg:

I have been retained as special counsel by the City of'McCall in connection with the
aoove-captioned litigalion. I thank you and your clients for IICcommodating the City by delaying
service of the complaint until we have had an opportunity to evaluate the situation. This
cooperation is reflective of a long history of cooperation and good faith.
I have completed my review ofthe complaint and the administrative file in this maner,
and 1 have concluded that the City has very strong defenses. Accordingly, I urge your clients to
consider ending the litigation before further fees are incurred by both sides.
As you may be aware, I have been involved in several cases involving similar issues. I
litigated Schaefe,. Y. CUy o/Sun Valley, Case No. CV ·06·882 (Idaho, fifth Judicial Dist. Jul)' 3,
2007} and Co~'e Springs Development, Il1c. v. Blaine COllnty. Case No. CV2008·22 (ldah», Fifth
Judicial Dis!. June 3, 2008), which. along with Mountain Cenrral Bd. (J/ Rea/tors, Inc. v. City 0/
McCall (Idaho, Fourth Judicial Dist. Feb. 19. 2008), created the modem precedents in this area
of the taw.
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Steven J. Millerr.anl\, Esq.
Gregory C. Pittenger, Esq,
April 15, 2011
Page 2
I am now representing Valley County and the City of McCall in the defense of this case
and three other recent challenges to road and affordable housing payments (Greystone v. City q(
McCall, Buckski")I. Valley Cowuy. and While Cloud v. V(l{/ey County). There is a key
difference between the current cases and the earlier ones. The SChaefer. CO\ltO' Springs, and
Mountain Cenlrai actions were brought contemporaneously with or even in advance of the
imposition ofimpsct fees. Alpine Village and the otherCUITcnt cases were tiled years after the
claims arose. And that is their problem. In my view, this delay and other technical detects
present a number of dispositive defenses.

You are aware thai state law damage claims are subject to a t 80-day notice requirer.1enl
under tdaho Tort Claims Act as broadened hy Idaho Code § 50·219. Sweitzer I). Dean, 118
Idaho 568, 571-n. 798 P.2d 27,30·32 (1990); BHA Investments. fMC. v. City of Boise ('"BHA
fr). 141 Idaho 168, 174·76, 108 P.3d J 15,321·23 (2004). Presumably, this is why theA/pine
Village comp~aint includes only a federal claim. I
HOwever, I do nOI believe thai the federal claim can survive independent of the slate

claim. The Alpine Village case is framod under the 5th and 14th Amendments as if this were an
ordinary f'ederal regulatory taking of the NollonlDcfall ~'ariety (No/l11l1 \I. California Coastal
Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Do/an v. CIIY a/Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994». To win under
NollaniDolan claim, Alpine Village would ha"'e to show a lack of nexu! and proportionality.
But that was no! the basis of the District Court's decision in Moull/ain Central Bd. of Real/ors.
Inc. v. City of McCall (Idaho, Fourth judicial Dist. Feb. ! 9, 200S), and it is not llpparent to me
how such a claim could prevail given the tilcts surrounding the community housing ordinances.
Plaintiffs' only reference to an Idaho const:tutional fheory is in your letter to Lindley Kirkpatrick
of November 15,2010. ft only references the BHA case (discussed below), which was based on
II. liquor license transfer tax statute. Thai is related to, but quite different from, the line of eases
dealing. with municipal regulatory eltllctions that ultimately resulted in the invalidation of
Ordinances 819 and 820 (notably, Idaho Building CO/llraclors Ass 'n v. City ~fCoeur d'Alene,
126 Idaho 740, 742-43, 890 P.2d 326,328·29 (1995). and Drewster v. City olPoca/cilo, 115
Idaho 502. 504,768 P.2d 765, 767 (\988)). It may be that you have avoided addressing the
"illegal tax" case law because doing so would make this case look like a state law claim ban-ed
by the IIlO·day rule (discussed below). But, unless you premise your claim on Nollan/Dolan,
which does not work, you cannot separate the federal takitl!JS claim from the slate law taxation
issue. If you cannot demonstrate a violation of state constiturionallaw. BHA does not apply and
the piZr se federaL taking disappears. 1t\ short, sino;e the state law claim is barred, tne federal
II

! Even iftbc plaintiffs could escape tile I So.day rule. any mte law claims would be barred by KMST. LLC
COl/nty of Ad<l, 138 Idaho )77. 58J, 67 P.3d 56, 61 (2003). This is because "lpine Village's housing contribution
.... as ' .... oluntary" in tbe sen~ onbat case. This does not rCjjuire lite Cily to show that the plllintitT~ were IIIlxiot.S 10
make thls contribution. It only requim U~ to show that the plaintiffs went alOllg without objection because the),
were more htteresled in g¢lling their projeel buill t'nan an)'lhing else. In the vcrna"lIlar, It is a "8i~ins" mlt a
"taking." The facts in Iflpin. Vtllage ,n<1ke this argulI1ent even strongc:r than the fueu in B"ckskin and While C/o"d,

V
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Steven 1. Mil!emann, Esq.
Gregory C. Pittenger, Esq.
April 15,2011
Pase 3

claim loses its basis. Thus. 1 am not persuaded that you can unlink your federal claim and escape
tlte l80·day nOlice requirement.
Yet, even if the federal claim is no! subject 10 the ISO·day notice requirement, it is
defective for other reasons. Notably, federal takings claims must be brought under § 1983 of the
Civil Rights Act. While it is generally true that people can bring actions alleging violations of
the federal Constitution without any implementing statute, COUI1S have ruled that where Congress
provides II specific remedy (such as § (983), it is the exclusive remedy. Indeed, this is black
letter law in the Ninth Circuit {lizu('Pacijlco, Inc. v. City of 1.,0$ Ange{es, 973 F.2d 704. 70S (9'h
Cir. 1992), cerr. denied. 506 U.S. 1081 (1993), and its progeny). We have prevailed on this
point so far in White Cloud (litigation in federal court, which is now subject to objections to the
Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation) and the Buckskin case. 2 Copies of these
decisiofl& are attached.

However, even if plaintiffs were abJe 10 avoid Azul-Pacifico and bring the action directly
Wlder the Constit(!tion, the federal claim is still fatally flawed.
This is because in Williamson County Regional Planning Comm 'n \I. Hamilton Bank of
Johnson City. 473 U.S. 172 (1985). the t.:.S. Supreme Court established two so-called ripeness
tests for federal takings actions:) (a) pal'ties must secure a "final determination" and (b) parties
must lirst pursue (and lose) a state court inverse condemnation action.' In Ollr case, only the
sc<:ond of these two ripeness teslS would apply. This is because the first test does not apply to

1 Admittedly, somo confusion On this point has been introduced by First English Ev,lIlgelkl1/ L.th.ron
Ch,m:" afGlent/l1le v. Los Angelru COI/luy. 482 U.S. 304, 314-15 (1987). Tile case contains some remarkably broad
language rt!1Jlrdlng takings claims: "We have recotloizod lila! a landowner is entitled to brill~ an aclion in invent
condemnation as a resultof'the selr-<!xecuting chlll'acteT or the constitutional provision with rcspcci to
compensation.'" First Engl,sh. 482 at J 15 (lolt01.1 quotation rnlllkS omined). However. this swccl'lng stalClMIlt

appears 10 have :,e-en ol'krt:d as a premise for tile substantIve Issue in the case (temporary lakings) and nOI as a
repudiation ofth~ limitations on Biv~'" recognized by the Ninth Circuit and oilier coutU. {ndeed, First £nglish does
not addres.1 the question of wnemer takiDgs claims may be brougllt dir~ly under die Constitution independent or
§ 1983. This case. and the reMO"a 1 believe il i.s mapplicable. af' discu$Sod in gre.:cr detail in the Idaho Land U."
flQrldlroa4 (20 II).
1 I c.all them "so-called" ripeness tests because they sound mort liko txltaustioll requirements. Bul the U.S.
Supreme Court did nOi want to call il cxhaustlon be<:ausc it had ruled mill c"hall$lion ;1 not requil'..d in § 1<.183 cases.
So tho Coott took paios t<.l e~plain wb) this was ripenes•• nOI exhausllon.

• There is another twist Inat also works in the Cit~'$ fayor. In Palomar Mobll.home Park l/J,st>Ciatio" Y.
Cfty qfSOl1 ManXIJ. 989 f.2d 362. 365-66 (9th CiT. : 993), the t>inth Circuit held that the doclllne of.es judkata
acted to pre_Iud<: the rederal courts ftom hearing plaintirl'$ rede .... 1rakings claim becalJ$C there had been prior
liliiation of the claim in slate co~rt. Thi, CatCh-22 is the subject of some criticism. Nevertheless, it is somethin3
you will need III eval\lille.
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facial challenges. S But that second test is fatal and it applies regardless of whether the case is
framed under § 1983 or as a Bivens action.

In the event that plainli ffs could somehow evade Williamson County, then they would
face another obstacle as teast as daunting as WlfllaMSol! Cormly. This is because the federal
courts dictate that Idaho's two-year statute oflimitalions tor personal injury ([daho Code
§ 5-219(4)} controls both § 1983 claims and Bivens claims. 6 Va" Sirum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406
(9"' Cir. 1991). ff Alpine Village's cause of action has accrued. it accrued more than two years
ago. As the Ninth Circuit said in a recent case, plaintiffs will stumble either on one fool or the
other: "Thus, ... J·lacienda's claim, .. wi!! either fail be<:ause it is not ripe, or, ifit is dpe, it will
be barred by the statute of limitations." Hacienda Valley Mobile &Ialel v. City ofMorgan Hm,
353 F.3d 6S I, 655 (9 1h Cir. 2003).
There arc, in addition, a host of equitable defenses, most notably laches, waiver, and
estoppel. rt is one thins to tell a city, "r won't pay that. It is illegal." That was Schaefer. Cove
Springs. and MOllntain Central. It is quile another to wait until years later, after people have
relied on actions taken and cotn!uilment$ made, and only then bring a lawsuit to undo something
\hat now has grown into S2,OO{},OOO in claimed damages. Simply put, the issue should have been
flaS1!cd in a. timely fashion, and it was not.
In addition to these "standard" equitable defenses, I think the City has olller very good
ar&uments that are unique to this facl setting. Notably, the plaintiffs entered into this agreement
with eyes wide open, knowing thaI the housing requirement might be illegal. This is reflected in
the vr:ry first Development Agreement, which expressly refel-enced the pending Moun/ain
Cenrral litigation. First, the waiver provision in that agreement arguably protects the City from
clnhns arising from all of the plaintiffs' ~tions during the pendency of the litigation, not just the
3ale oflots. In other words, the WB:ver can be read to hold the City harmless with respect to
• Tlte Nin\ll Ci~uit has c)lplained: "Facial challenges are exempt from (he rust prong Qf the Williamsan
Carmly ripeness analysis because a facial challen~ by ils nature does not involve I decision applying Ihc statute or
regulation. Yen CII)'ajEs:ondid(1, 503 U.S. 519. 534, 112 S.C\. 1522. 118 L.EtI.ld \ S3 (IW2). The state
remedies prong, however, does apply to f:lcial cIlalLenges." Hacirmd<t VC/if~yMoblle £SIDles Y, Cily ofMorgClJ'f Hill,
353 FJd 651, 655 (9"Cir. 2(03),
.; '!here is llO federal slatute of hn.itatiolls appliclbl: 10 § 1983; instead (he applicable slate SlaMt of
fw~1 la.... controls whith !>\ale sta!\ll~ oflimitf.llons applies. III 1985. the U.S.
Sup:-eme Court determined that. no matter what the jsauo or claim invol~cd. the Slate Slal~te of limitations fOl'
pCl'sorla1 injury would apply to all § ! 983 claim,. Wilson v, Oarcla. 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985). In Idaho. thai i!.
two-~ar statute. Idaho Code § $-219(4). Although. there is some IIlconsistency (apparently due to poor briefing).
ltie Idaho Supreme C(lun has generally followed this approach. £.g, McCabl v. CI'(!IIM, 145 ldllho 954, 957, I
P3d '96, SW (2001). In 1Il10IMr COInplieation, federal law d~lermintS when the st11le Stll1utc oflil1\it~lions begins to
run for purposes of § 1983. -:1\is is of linIe pmcli~af cooseql.lCl1ce, howevOf', beeause both f!ldcrlll and stale law
recognize thaI the acrion 1'Uf\$ from the time plaintlff is aware of the circumstances. rrO/le, v. Ill/ernalional
Lorrgsho'~mtfn's & WarehQusetnett'" Unilm. 704 f.2d 114/, 1143 (9" e:r. 1983).

limitations aplllles.. Howevel',

sa
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plaintiffs' acquisition of The Timber$, 100. The agreement may not SIIy this in so many words,
but, taking the circumstances into account, this is the evident intent of the parties. Second, even
if the waiver argument does not slick, there is II very strong argument that the City never required
the plaintiffs to buy this building or any other building. Given lhat Alpine Village knew there
was a chance that the housing requirement would be invalidated, its decision to lock itself in by
buying the building was ils decision 10 gamble on Teal estat~. Alpine Village flgured that
whichever way it came out, it would have II decent investment. The gamble did not pan OUI, of
course, due to the crash in the market. But tMl was plaintiffs' gamble and not something forced
on them by the City. They could have secured an option on The Timbers, or they could have just
put up some in lieu money (which the Cily would have returned). Instead, they gambled and
lost. lrthe Alpine Village wanted to protect against this gamble, i~ should have built that into
their Development Agreement. It did not.
Ever. iftne City lost on every aile of the above defenses-an outcome that strikes me as
implausible-there is still the question of causation. I assume that much of the 52,000,000 loss
that plaintiffs claim they suftered is due to the declining real estate market. I doubt that the City
is responsible for that decline.

In aU, the City has ample defenses to this lawsuit. The 180-<lay requirement as to state
claims and the two-year statute of limitations as 10 tederat claims coupled ....'ith the Williamson
County defenses appear to be impenetrable. The others are quite strong, too.

The City wants to get this matter behind us. Accordingly, if your clients will agree (0
dismiss this ease and provide a release to the City, the City will not seek attorney fees. lfthis
offer is not accepled. however, the City will seek recovery of all attorney fees incurred. This
offer is not subjeello Idaho Rule of Evidence 408 and may be shared with the Court in dle event
selliement is not reached.
The Ci!y appreciates Ihe time YOII have made available to us to review the case, and we
want to reasonably accommodate your needs as well. Accordingly, this offer will remain in
effect untiJ the City Council's meeting on May 26, 2011. ! trus: that provides ample lime for you
and your clients to review and evaluate the points made in this tetter and the enclosed materials.
r look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.
In any eVellt and notwithstanding the filing of the complaint, rhe City Councila.nd the
City staff have asked me to assure your clients that the City looks forward to working with them
on future p/ulses of this development. Alpine Village is making a major contribution to the .
City's vitality. The City apPl'CCiates the Hormeacheas' civic spirit and cooperation in working
with tho City over the years.
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Sincerely,

~~

Christopher H. Meyer

Encl.: Report and Recommendation in While Clovdcase (Feb. 14, 20t t)
First Memorandum Decision in Buckskin case OIllL 7,2011)
Second Memorandum Decision in BuckskJn case (Apr. 11, 2011)
Bricfin Support Or Motion for Summary Judgment in Greystone cue (Apr. 5, 20(1)
cc:

Mayor: and City COWlCii
William F. Nichols, Counsel
Lindley S. Kirkpatrick. City Manaacr

CHM:eh
1I4IOM_1I44Jl"
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Christopher H. Meyer [ISB No. 4461]
Martin C. Hendrickson [ISB No. 5876]
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP
601 West Bannock Street
P.O. Box 2720

-t~:~2011
InSl~o

Galle No.

Filed _____A.M ",:1

Boise, Idaho 83701-2720

t

P.M.

Office: (208) 388-] 200
Fax: (208) 388-1300
chrismeyer@givenspursley.com
mch@givenspursley.com
www.givenspursley.com

Attorneys for Defendant City of McCall

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNT V OF VALLEV

ALPINE VILLAGE COMPANY, an Idaho
corporation,

Case No. CV-2010-519C

Plaintiff,
ANSWER TO SECOND AMENDED

v.

COMPLAINT

CITY OF McCALL, a municipal corporation,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the City of McCaH {"City"}, by and through its attorneys of record,
Givens Pursley LLP, and submits this Answer to Second Amended Complaint ("Answer") in the

above action.
GENERAL
1.

Any and all allegations contained in Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint are

hereby denied unless specifically admitted herein.
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2.

Citations to authority provided in this Answer are provided to assist P1aintiff and

the Court. They are merely illustrative and are not offered as an exhaustive identification of
authority supporting the City's position.

PARTIES
3.

The City admits the truth ofthe allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 and 2 of

Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
4.

As to the allegations contained in Paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs Second Amended

Complaint, the City admits that this Court has personal jurisdiction over the City, and that, to

extent that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims, venue is appropriate.
The City denies the remainder of the allegations contained in said paragraph.
NATURE OF ACTION

5.

The City admits that the allegations contained in Paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs Second

Amended Complaint are an accurate description of the claims brought by Plaintiff in this action.

The City denies that Plaintiffs claims have merit.
FACTS
6.

The City admits the truth of the allegations contained in Paragraph 5 of Plaintiff's

Second Amended Complaint.

7.

As to the allegations contained in Paragraphs 6, 7,8, and 9 of Plaintiffs Second

Amended Complaint, the City admits that Ordinance No. 819 was adopted by the City on

February 23, 2006 and that Exhibit A to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint is a true and
accurate copy of Ordinance No. 819 and the Summary of Ordinance No. 819. As to the
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remainder ofthe allegations contained in said paragraphs, which are Plaintiff's descriptions of

the requirements of Ordinance No. 819, the City believes that the ordinance speaks for itself.
8.

The City admits the truth of the allegations contained in Paragraphs 10 and 11 of

Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint.

9.

As to the allegations contained in Paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs Second Amended

Complaint, the City admits that on October 3, 2006, the McCaH Area Planning and Zoning
Commission issued its Findings and Conclusions Regarding Preliminary Plat Approval SUB 06-

7: Alpine Village, in which it recommended approval of Plaintiff s preliminary plat subject to the
stated conditions, including No. 12, which stated, "The applicant shall obtain approval of the
community housing plan when the final plat application is presented to the Commission for each
respective phase," and No. 14, which required a development agreement with the City.
Therefore, the City denies the allegation contained in said paragraph that the Commission's

recommended approval was conditioned on "Plaintiff reaching agreement with the City Council
on the Plaintiff's method of compliance with Ordinance 819 and reducing such agreement to a
recorded 'Development Agreement. ", Said allegation appears to be only a minor error in

describing the conditions for approval ofthe applications and the community housing plan and is
not believed to be material to any of the issues in this action.
10.

As to the allegations contained in Paragraph 13 of Plaintiff's Second Amended

Complaint, the City admits that on December 13, 2006, the McCan City Council issued its
Findings and Conclusions Regarding Preliminary Plat Approval SUB 06-7: Alpine Village, in
which it approved Plaintiffs preliminary plat subject to the stated conditions, including No. 12,
which stated, "The app1icant shall obtain approval of the community housing plan when the final
pJat application is presented to the Commission for each respective phase," and No. 14, which
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required a development agreement with the City. Therefore, the City denies tbe allegation
contained in said paragraph that the City's approval was conditioned on "Plaintiffs submittal of
a Community Housing Plan, as part of a Development Agreement, demonstrating compliance
with Ordinance 819, prior to final plat approval." Said allegation appears to be only a minor
error in describing the conditions for approval of the applications and the community housing
plan and is not believed to be material to any of the issues in this action.

11.

As to the allegations contained in Paragraph 14 of Plaintiff's Second Amended

Complaint, the City admits that on January 5, 2007, P1aintiff executed a Purchase and Sale
Agreement for the property commonly known as the Timbers Apartments, subject to the terms

and contingencies set forth therein, one of which made the sale contingent upon the City's
approval of the use of the Timbers to satisfy community housing requirements for Alpine
Village. The Clty is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth

of the allegation concerning Plaintiff's motivation for entering into the agreement and therefore
denies the same pursuant to l.R.C.P. Rule 8(b). The City denies the allegation that Plaintiff was
required by Ordinance No. 819 to purchase the Timbers or to supply seventeen (17) off-site
community housing units because there were other methods that Plaintiff could have chosen to
satisfy the community housing requirements.
12.

As to the allegations contained in Paragraph 15 of Plaintiff s Second Amended

Complaint, the City admits tbat on March 22, 2007, the McCall City Council issued its Findings
and Conclusions Final Pial Approval SUB 06-8: The Timbers Condominiums, in which it

approved the final plat for the Timbers, including the Community Housing Plan for Alpine
Village, subject to the stated conditions. The City further admits that the approved Community
Housing Plan, which was submitted by Plaintiff to comply with Ordinance No. 819, required the
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Timbers units to be deed restricted and offered at restricted prices to income eligible buyers as
community housing. The City denies the allegation that Ordinance No. 819 required that the
Timbers units be deed restricted and offered at restricted prices to income eligible buyers as
community housing because there were other methods that Plaintiff could have chosen to satisfY
the community housing requirements.

13.

The City is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the

truth of the allegations contained in Paragraphs 16 and 17 of Plaintiff s Second Amended

Complaint and therefore denies the same pursuant to LR.C.P. Rule 8{b).
14.

The City admits the truth of the allegations contained in Paragraph 18 of

Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint.

15.

The City admits the truth ofthe allegations contained in Paragraph 19 of

Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, with the clarification that on August 23, 2007, the
McCall City Council issued its Findings and Conclusions Regarding Final Plat and Final Plan

SUB 06-7 and PUD-06-3: Alpine Village, in which it approved the final plat and final plan for
Alpine Village phase 1, subject to the stated conditions.
16.

As to the allegations contained in Paragraph 20 of Plaintiffs Second Amended

Complaint, the City admits that on December 13,2007, Plaintiff and the City executed a
Development Agreement Alpine Village Planned Unit Development, which included the Alpine

Village Community Housing Plan as Exhibit B. The City further admits that said Development
Agreement was recorded in the real property records of Valley County on January 28,2008 as
Instrument # 328801, and that Exhibit B to Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint is a true and
accurate copy of that Development Agreement. The City affirmatively alleges that Plaintiff and
the City executed a superseding Development Agreement in March 2008, which was recorded in

ANSWER TO SECOSD AMEN OED COMPLAINT
1275627_1/4432-6

Page 5 of5

348

the real property records of Valley County on April 7, 2008 as Instrument # 330524. The
superseding Development Agreement appears to have only modified the legal description of the
development.

17.

The City admits the truth of the allegations contained in Paragraphs 21, 22, and 23

of Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
18.

As to the allegations contained in Paragrapb 24 of Plaintiff's Second Amended

Complaint, the City incorporates by reference its responses to all previous paragraphs as if set
forth in fulL
19.

As to the allegations contained in Paragraph 25 of Plaintiffs Second Amended

Complaint, the City is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of the allegations concerning Plaintiffs motivation for purchasing, remodeling. and
improving the Timbers and therefore denies the same pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 8(b). The City
denies the allegation that Plaintiff was required by Ordinance No. 819 to purchase the Timbers or
to provide deed restricted and income restricted community housing units as a condition of
proceeding with the development of Plaintiff's property because there were other methods that
Plaintiff could have chosen to satisfy the community housing requirements.
20.

The City denies the allegations contained in Paragraphs 26 and 27 of Plaintiff's

Second Amended Complaint.
21.

As to the allegations contained in Paragrapb 28 ofPlaintii'rs Second Amended

Complaint, the City admits that on November 15, 2010, Plaintiff delivered to the City a ",'Titten
demand for payment of damages, and that the City denied the demand by operation of Idaho
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Code § 6-909. The City denies that any taking occurred and denies responsibility for any of the
damages described in Plaintiff's written demand fOT payment.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
22.

As to the allegations contained in Paragraph 29 of Plaintiff's Second Amended

Complaint, the City incorporates by reference its responses to all previous paragraphs as if set
forth in full.
23.

As to the allegations contained in Paragraph 30 of Plaintiffs Second Amended

Complaint, the City is without knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the

truth of the allegations concerning Plaintiffs motivation for purchasing, remodeling, and
improving the Timbers and therefore denies the same pursuant to I.R.C.P. Rule 8(b). The City
denies the allegation that Plaintiff was required by Ordinance No. 819 to purchase the Timbers or
to provide deed restricted and income restricted community housing units as a condition of

proceeding with the development of Plaintiff's property because there were other methods that
Plaintiff could have chosen to satisfy the community housing requirements.

24.

The City denies the allegations contained in Paragraphs 31 and 32 of Plaintiffs

Second Amended Complaint.
25.

As to the allegations contained in Paragraph 33 of Plaintiff s Second Amended

Complaint, the City admits that on November 15, 2010, Plaintiff delivered to the City a written
demand for payment of damages, and that the City denied the demand by operation of [daho
Code § 6-909. The City denies that any taking occurred and denies responsibility for any of the
damages described in Plaintiffs written demand for payment.
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TIDRD CAUSE OF ACTION
26.

As to the allegations contained in Paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs Second Amended

Complaint, the City incorporates by reference its responses to all previous paragraphs as if set
forth in fulL
27.

The City denies the allegations contained in Paragraphs 35 and 36 of Plaintiffs

Second Amended Complaint.

ATTOR~EY FEES
28.

The City denies the al1egations contained in Paragraph 37 of Plaintiffs Second

Amended Complaint.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:
LACK OF ANY TAKING BY THE CITY
29.

The City did not, at any time, obtain or acquire any interest in Plaintiff's real or

personal property for the purpose of community housing.

30.

Any restrictions on the use of Plaintiff's real property imposed by the City for the

purpose of community housing were removed by the executed and recorded fust amendment to
the Alpine Village Development Agreement.

SECOND AFFIR\{ATIVE DEFENSE:
VOLUNT ARY NATURE OF ACTION

31.

Plaintiff chose to comply with the City's community housing requirements by

providing off-site deed restricted housing units, rather than on-site units, or in lieu fees.
32.

Because Plaintiff chose to purchase the Timbers and to include the Timbers in its

Community Housing Plan rather than any of the other availabJe options, Plaintiff cannot
establish that the City forced Plaintiff to purchase the Timbers, and Plaintiff's decision to
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purchase the Timbers was voluntary. KJv/ST, LLC v. County ofAda, 138 Idaho 577,67 P.3d 56

(2003).

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:

LACHES
33.

Plaintiff did not object to purchasing the Timbers at any time prior to serving its

claim for damages on the City in November 2010.
34.

As of the date that Plaintiff entered into the Purchase and Sale Agreement for the

Timbers, Plaintiff was aware of the lawsuit filed by the Mountain Central Board of Realtors
against the City challenging the validity of Ordinance No. 819.
35.

As of the date that Plaintiff submitted its revised Community Housing Plan to the

City for approval, Plaintiffwas aware of the lawsuit filed by the Mountain Central Board of
Realtors against the City challenging the validity of Ordinance No. 819.
36.

As of the date that Plaintiff closed on the purchase of the Timbers, Plaintiff was

aware of the lawsuit filed by the Mountain Central Board of Realtors against the City
challenging the validity of Ordinance No. 819.
37.

As of the date that Plaintiff executed the Development Agreement for Alpine

Village, Plaintiff was aware of the lawsuit filed by the Mountain Central Board of Realtors
against the City challenging the validity of Ordinance No. 819.
38.

At no time prior to serving its claim for damages on the City in November 2010

did Plaintiff assert that it believed that the City had forced Plaintiff to purchase the Timbers and
was liable for any damages resulting from said purchase.
39.

The City was unaware that Plaintiff had any objection to purchasing the Timbers

or otherwise would assert a claim against the City based upon the purchase of the Timbers until

it received the c1aim for damages from Plaintiff in November 2010.
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40.

The City has been prejudiced by Plaintiffs delay in asserting its claim based upon

its purchase of the Timbers.
FORTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:
STATUTES OF LIMIT ATIONS

41.

All or a portion of Plaintiffs claims are barred by the failure to bring an action

against the City within the time limits established by the Idaho Legislature in the applicable
statutes of limitations including, without limitation, Idaho Code §§ 5-219(4}, 5·224, and 6-911.
42.

Plaintiffs claims brought pursuant to federal law are barred by the two year

statute oflimitations contained in Idaho Code § 5-219(4).
43.

Plaintiff s claims brought pursuant to Idaho law are barred by the four year statute

of limitations contained in Idaho Code § 5-224.
44.

Alternatively, Plaintiffs claims brought pursuant to Idaho law are barred by the

two year statute of limitations contained in Idaho Code § 6-911, made applicable to Plaintiffs
claim for damages against the City by Idaho Code § 50-219.
45.

Plaintiff filed its Verified Complaint in this action on December 10, 2010.

46.

Plaintiff s claims brought pursuant to federal law accrued prior to December 10,

47.

Plaintiffs claims brought pursuant to state law accrued prior to December 10,

2008.

2006.
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:
FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE CLAIM
48.

An or a portion of Plaintiff's claims are barred by the failure to present to and file

with the City a claim for damages within the time limits established by the [dabo Legislature in
Idaho Code § 6-906 as required by Idaho Code § 50-219.
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49.

The timely presentation and filing of a claim for damages under Idaho Code § 6-

906 as required by Idaho Code § 50-219 is a mandatory condition precedent to an action upon

such claim.

50.

The failure to timely present and file a claim for damages is jurisdictional and

absolutely bars an action based upon any such claim that is subject to the notice requirement per
Idaho Code § 6·908.

51.

Plaintiff did not present and/or file any claim for damages arising from the

purchase of the Timbers until November ]5,2010.

52.

On November [5, 20 to, Plaintiff delivered to the City Manager a written demand

for payment of damages based upon its purchase and improvement of the Timbers.

53.

The City did not take any action on the written demand, which means it was

deemed denied on January 13,2011, pursuant to Idaho Code § 6-909.

54.

All of Plaintiff s claims as described in the written demand arose or reasonably

should have been discovered prior to May 19,201 0 (one hundred and eighty days prior to the
presentation and filing of PLaintiffs claim for damages).
55.

In addition to failing to present and file its claim for damages within 180 days

from the date the claim arose Of reasonably should have been discovered, Plaintiff filed this
action on December 10,2010, which was prior to any denial of Plaintiffs claim by the City,
contrary to Idaho Code § 6·910.

SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:
RELEASE
56.

Al1 or a portion of Plaintiffs claims are barred by Plaintiffs express release of

claims contained in Article VII of the Alpine Village Development Agreement.
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SEVENTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MITIGATE DAMAGES
57.

All or a portion of Ptaintiffs claims are barred by Plaintiffs failure to mitigate its

damages.
EIGHTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE:
INTERVENING SUPERSEDING CAUSE

58.

While the City denies that its actions caused any of Plaintiff s alleged damages, to

the extent that the City'S actions are determined to have been wrongful, all or a portion of
Plaintiff's alleged damages were the result of an intervening superseding cause for which the
City is not responsible.
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS
As a result of the filing of this action, the City has been forced to retain counsel in

defense of Plaintiff's claims and therefore requests that it be granted its reasonable attorneys'
fees and costs incurred in this action pursuant to the Development Agreement, Idaho Code §§
10-1210, 12-120, 12-121, 12-117; 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil

Procedure, and other state and federal law.
PRAVER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Defendant City of McCall, requests that the Court enter judgment as
follows:

59.

Dismissing Plainti ffs' Second Amended Complaint for lack of jurisdiction;

60.

Dismissing Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint on the merits;

61.

Awarding Defendant its costs and attorneys' fees incurred herein; and

62.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate under the
circumstances of the case.
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DATED this 29th day of September, 2011.

iendant and Counterclaimant

ANSWER TO SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

1275627_1 14432-6

Page 13 of13

356

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 29 th day of September. 2011, the foregoing was filed,
served, and copied as follows:
DOCUMENT FILED:
Fourth Judicial District Court
Attn: Archie N. Banbury, Clerk
Valley County Courthouse
219 Main Street
Cascade, ID 836 t 1
Facsimile: 208-382-7107

[gI

U.S. Mail

o
o

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

o
o

SERVICE COPIES TO:
Steven J. Millemann, Esq.
Gregory C. Pittenger, Esq.
Millemann, Pittenger, McMahan & Pemberton, LLP
706 North First Street
Post Office Box I 066
McCall. ill 83638
Facsimile: 208-634-45 t 6
sjm@mpmpJaw.com
gcp@mpmplaw.com

~

o

o
o

IZI

U.S.Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
E-mail

COURTESY COPlES TO:
Honorable Michael R. McLaughlin
District Judge
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front St.
Boise, ID 83702
Jason Gray
Law Clerk to Judge Michael McLaughlin
Fourth Judicial District Court
Ada County Courthouse
200 W. Front Street
Boise, ID 83702
Email: jmgray@adaweb.net
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U. S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
E-mail
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ARCHI~BUR~CLERK
Depu~

By

OCT 0 7 2011
Case No. -

_ _ lns1. Nc>.~_ _

F"ecI -_---..JA.M .

STEVEN J. MILLEMANN, ISB KO. 2601
GREGORY C. PITTENGER, ISB NO. 1828

A:10 ;.M

MILLEMANN, PITTENGER. McMAHAN & PEMBERTON, LLP
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
706 NORTH FIRST STREET
POST OFFICE BOX 1066
McCALL, IDAHO 83638
TELEPHONE: (208) 634-7641
FACSIMILE: (208) 634-4516
EMAIL: sjm(@.mpmplaw.com

gcp@.mvmplaw.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
'I HE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COCNTY OF V ALLEY

ALPINE VILLAGE COMPANY,
an Idaho Corporation,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CV-2010-S19C
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

v.

CITY OF MCCALL,
a municipal corporation,
Defendant.
COMES NOW, the Plaintiff, Alpine Village Company, by and through its

attorneys of record, and pursuant to LR.C.P. 56 respectfully moves this Court for
Summary Judgment against Defendant on Plaintiff's claims that the City's actions in this
case effectuated an inverse condemnation and taking ofPlaintifi"s constitutionally
protected property rights under Article I, Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution and the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. This motion is supported by
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support Q{Plaintiff's Motionfor Summary Judgment and in

Opposition to Defendant's Motionfor Summary Judgment. Affidavit ofSteven J.
Millemann and Affidavit ofDeanna Schnider.

Oral argument is requested.
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RESPECTFCLLY SUBMITTED this i h day of October, 2011.
MILLEMANN, PITTENGER, McMAHAN
& PEMBERTON, LLP

BY:~~~~_~
_ _- _- _ - _
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ARCHl N. BANBURY. CU!RK
By

Oeputy

OCT 0 7 2011
Case No. ----'lns1)Io
_.AM 4- ~ f":7--'~-P.M-.

Filed

STEVEN J. M1LLEMANN, ISB NO. 2601
GREGORY C. PITTENGER, ISB NO. 1828
MILLEMANN, PITIENOER, McMAHAN & PEMBERTON, LLP
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
706 NORTH FIRST STREET
POST OFFICE BOX 1066
McCALL, IDAHO 83638
TELEPHONE: (208) 634-7641
FACSIMILE: (208) 634-4516
EMAIL: sim@.mpmplaw.com
gcp(lV,mpmplaw.com
Attorneysfor Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY
ALPINE VILLAGE COMPANY,

an Idaho Corporation,

CASE NO. CV-20I0-519C

Plaintiff,

v.
CITY OF MCCALL,
a municipal corporation,
Defendant.

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
ALPINE VILLAGE'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDG MENT
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INTRODUCTION

I.

Statement of Case
Plaintiff, Alpine Village Company (hereinafter "Alpine") filed its complaint on

December 10, 2010. Before service on Defendant, City of McCall (hereinafter "City"),
Alpine amended its complaint to add a Count Two, which alleges a cause of action
against the City for a taking and for inverse condemnation under Article I. Section 14 of
the Idaho Constitution. The Summons and Amended Complaint were served on the City
on May 23,2011. Soon thereafter, the City removed the case to federal district court.
The Notice of Removal was followed closely by a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint.
Alpine filed a Motion to Remand the action from federal court to state court. That
Motion was granted by U.S. Chief District Judge B. Lynn Winmill, who also denied the
City's Motion to Dismiss as moot and ordered the federal case closed. Alpine filed its
Second Amended Complaint on September 19,2011, adding a Third Claim for Relief
under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The City filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on September
19,2011. The City's Motion requests that judgment be summarily entered against

Alpine, not on the merits of Alpine's claims, but based on the assertion that Alpine's
claims are time barred. The City filed its Answer on September 30, 2011.
II.

Alpine's Motion for Summary Judgment

Alpine's claims in this case stem from the mandatory imposition by the City on
Alpine oftbe City's Ordinance 819, which has since been declared to be unconstitutional
and void in a decision of the Fourth Judicial District Court in the case of Mountain
Cenlral Board of Reallars v. City ofMcCall (Valley County Case No. CV2006-490-C).

The City applied the Ordinance to Alpine by making compliance with the Ordinance an
express and mandatory condition of approval of Alpine's development applications.
Prior to the entry of the Mountain Central decision, Alpine expended in excess of $2
million in order to comply with the Ordinance. I

I

Alpine's case presents distinctly different facts and legal i!;sues than were presented in the recently

decided case of Richard Hehr and Greystone Village, LLC v. City a/McCall (Valley Case No. CV-2010276C). Among other notable distinctions, un like the Greys/one facts, in this case, Ordinance 819 was in
effect when Alpine submitted its development applications and was applied to Alpine as a mandatory
condition of approval of Alpine's Applications.
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In its Second Amended Complaint, Alpine asserts three claims for relief, namely,
that the City's imposition of Ordinance 820 on Alpine constituted an inverse

condemnation/taking under (i) Article 1, Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution; (ii) directly

under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and, (iii) through 42 U.S.C.
§1983.
In its accompanying Motion, Alpine seeks Judgment against the City on its state
constitutional inverse condemnation/taking claim (i.e. pursuant to Article I, Section 14 of
the Idaho Constitution); and, in the event that this Court finds that Alpine is not entitled
to compensation under the state constitutional claim, then Alpine seeks Judgment against

the City on its federal takings claims (i.e. asserting a taking directly under the Fifth

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and through 42 U.S.C. §1983)?
This Memorandum is submitted in Support of Alpine's Motion for Summary
Judgment and as Alpine's Memorandum in Response to the City's Motion for Summary
Judgment. Concurrently with the filing of its Motion and this Memorandum, Alpine is
submitting the Affidavit of Steven J. Millemann and the Affidavit of Deanna Schnider.
In addition, Alpine is submitting for the Court's reference (as Exhibits to the Affidavit of
Steven J. Millemann) the following pleadings which were filed by the parties in the
United States District Court in and for the District of Idaho, prior to the remand of this
case:

1. City's Motion to Dismiss (Exhibit 23);
2. City's Opening Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss (Exhibit 24);

3. Alpine's Motion to Remand (Exhibit 25);
4. Alpine's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Remand (Exhibit 26);
5. City's Response Brief in Opposition to Motion to Remand (Exhibit 27);
6. Alpines Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
(Exhibit 28); and,
7. U.S. District Judge's Memorandum Decision and Order remanding this

case (Exhibit 29).

2 The issue of the amount of compensation to which Alpine is entitled is not before the Court on either the
City's nor Alpine's Motions for Summary Judgment.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Alpine Village Planned Unit Development ("Alpine Village") is a mixed use

residential and commercial project located in downtown McCall. Alpine is the developer
and owner of most ofthe units in Alpine Village.
The applications required by the McCall City Code for the development of Alpine

Village were filed with the City of McCall on June 20, 2006 (the "Applications"). Prior
to Alpine's filing of the Applications, the City had adopted Ordinances 819 and 820,
which were companion community housing ordinances. 3 These Ordinances were
adopted by the City on February 23, 2006. Ordinance 819 was an "lnclusionary
Housing" ordinance. It required developers of residential subdivisions to provide
"community housing units" equal in number to a specified percentage of the total units in
the subdivision. These community housing units were required to be deed restricted units
eligible for purchase or rent by income qualified persons. Ordinance 820 required a
"Community Housing Fee" to be paid at the time of application for a building permit for
a residential unit. Ordinance 820 is not directly involved in this litigation.
Ordinance 819 was codified as Section 9.7.10 of the McCall City Code. 4 It
allowed an applicant who was subject to the Ordinance to comply in anyone or a
combination of the following four ways: (i) to build community housing units on the site
of the development; (0) to build or provide the community housing units off-site; (iii) to
provide land for the construction of community housing units; andlor (iv) to pay an "in
lieu fee".
The Applications were subject to the mandatory requirements of Ordinance 819,
as codified in McCall City Code § 9.7. I O. Alpine proposed to satisfy the requirements of
Ordinance 819 by providing six community housing units on site and by converting ] 6
mobile home spaces which were owned by Alpine to Community Housing Rental Units. s
In a Staff Report to the McCall Planning and Zoning Commission, dated July 26,
2006, the City's Community Development Staff recommended to the Commission that

J See Ordinance 819 and Ordinance 820 (Exhibit I and 2 to Aff. Steven J. Millemann, filed concurrently

herewith).
See McCall City Code §9.7.l0 (Exhibit 3 to Millemann AfT.)
5 See Community Housing Plan dated June 4, 2006 (Exhibit 4 to Millemann Aff.)

4
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"The applicant should confer with VAHRA and the City and resubmit a Community
Housing Plan to better match the intent of the Community Housing Policy of the City of
McCall.',6
On September 22, 2006, the Mountain Central Board of Realtors filed a lawsuit
against the City, seeking a declaration that Ordinances 819 and 820 were unlawful and in
violation of the United States and Idaho Constitutions. 7 The City elected to not suspend
the enforcement of Ordinances 819 or 820 on pending applications, or to suspend the
processing of pending applications. Rather, the City declared a moratorium only on new
applications. The Alpine Village applications thus continued to be processed by the City
and continued to be subjected to the mandatory provisions of Ordinance 819.
On October 3, 2006, the McCall Planning and Zoning Commission resumed its
public hearing on the Applications. The components of Alpine's community housing
plan continued to be the subject of discussion and continued to be unresolved, with the
City's Community Development Staff pushing for specifically identified and dedicated
off-site community housing units, instead of the converted mobile home spaces already
owned by Alpine. s The Commission recommended approval of the Applications and
deferred the resolution of the specific ingredients of Alpine Village community housing
pLan until Alpine's submittal of its final plat for Phase 1 of the project. In its Findings
and Conclusions regarding the Application for Subdivision Preliminary Plat Approval,
the Commission found that the " ... proposed project is subject to the requirements of the
IneLusionary Housing Ordinance (No. 819)" and concluded that "The applicant shall
obtain approval of the community housing plan when the final plat application is
presented to the Commission .....9
On December 13,2006, the McCall City Council conducted its public hearing on
the Applications. When asked by the Council about the specifics of the community
housing plan, the City's Community Development staff advised the Council that ..... the
community housing plans were tied with the final plat and that the information might
See Staff Report dated July 26, 2006 (Exhibit 5 to Millemann Afr.)
Central Board of Realtors v. City of McCaf{, Valley County Case No. CV -2006-490C.
8 See Planning and Zoning Minutes dated October 3, 2006 (Exhibit 6 to Millemann Aff.)
9 See Planning and Zoning Findings and Conclusions for Alpine Village Preliminary Plat Approval dated
October 3,2006 (Exhibit 7 to Millemann Afr., specifically Finding No. 18 and Conclusion No.12.)
6

7 Mountain
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change. Mr. Millar said the specifics would be provided with the final plat."lo The City
Council granted preliminary approval of the Alpine Village Applications. In its Findings
and Conclusions regarding the Applications, the Council found that the " ... proposed
project is subject to the requirements of the Inclusionary Housing Ordinance (No. 819)"
and concluded that "The applicant shall obtain approval of the community housing plan
when the final plat application is presented to the Commission. " "II
On January 5, 2007, Alpine entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement by which
Alpine agreed to purchase a seventeen unit apartment complex in McCall known as "The
Timbers" (the "Timbers"). The purchase was contingent on Alpine receiving the City's
approval of the conversion of the apartments to condominimns and for the use of the
condominiums as off-site community housing units for Alpine Village. The purchase
price for the Timbers was $2.1 million. 12
On March 12,2007, Alpine submitted a revised Community Housing Plan, which
proposed to satisfy the requirements of Ordinance 819 for Alpine Village by providing
six units on site, alJ seventeen of the Timbers units as off-site units, and the remaining
required .5 units by paying an "in lieu" fee to the City. I)
On March 22, 2007, the McCall City Council granted Preliminary and Final Plat
approval for the Timbers conversion (i.e. from apartments to condominiums) and for the
use of the units as community housing units for Alpine Village. 14 The accompanying
proposed Development Agreement contained language dedicating all seventeen of the
Timbers Units as community housing units pursuant to McCall City Code 9.7.10. 15
On or about April i 6, 2007, Alpine closed on its purchase of the Timbers project.
The purchase price paid by Alpine for the property was $2, I 00,462, which was paid in
cash at closing. 16 Alpine's sole reason for acquiring the Timbers project was to provide

See City Council Minutes dated December 13, 2006 (Exhibit 8 to Millemann Aff.)
See City Council Findings and Conclusions for Alpine Village Preliminary Plat Approval dated
December 13,2006 (Exhibit 9 to Millemann Aff. specifically Finding No. 18 and Conclusion No.l2.)
12 See Purchase and Sale Agreement for the Timbers (Exhibit 10 to Millemann Aff.)
Il See Revised Community Housing Plan for Alpine Village dated March 12,2007 (Exhibit J lto
Millemann Aff.)
14 See City Council Findings and Conclusions for Timbers Final Plat Approval dated Mareh 22. 2007
(Exhibit 12 to Millemann Aff.)
See Draft Development Agreement for the Timbers (Exhibit J3 to Millemann AfI)
16 See Timbers Closing Statement (Exhibit) 4 to Millemann Aff.)
10

II

I'
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the Community Housing Units for Alpine Village whicb were required by Ordinance
819.

On August 23,2007, the City Council approved the Final Plat for Phase I of
Alpine ViJlage, which contruned the aforesaid revised Community Housing Plan. 17
On December 13, 2007, the Development Agreement for Alpine Village was
signed. The final Community Housing Plan, dedicating all seventeen of the Timbers

units as community housing units for Alpine Village, was attached as Exhibit B to the
Development Agreement. 18 The Agreement was first recorded on January 28, 2008. 19
The City required and the Development Agreement contained a release of aU claims

against the City stemming from the outcome of the Mountain Central Board of Realtors
litigation" ... as to Community Housing Units which are sold pursuant to this
[Community Housing] Plan prior to the final disposition of such )itigation." (emphasis
added). No release was sought by the City, nor granted by Alpine, regarding any other

claims. None of the Timbers units soid prior to the final disposition of the Mountain
Central Board of Realtors litigation.
On February 19,2008, District Court Judge Thomas Neville issued a
Memorandum Decision and Order in Mountain Central Board of Realtors v. City of

McCall, Valley County Case No. CV2006-490-C. finding Ordinances 819 and 820 to be
unconstitutional, void and without force and effect,2o No appeal of that Decision was
filed.
On April 24, 2008, the McCall City Council adopted Resolution 08-11> which
authorized refunds of fees paid pursuant to Ordinance 820. 21 On the same date, the City
Council adopted Ordinance 856, which repealed Ordinances 8] 9 and 820. 22

17 See City Council Findings and Conclusions for Alpine Village Phase 1 Final Plat and Final Plan
Approval dated August 23, 2007 (Exhibit 15 to Millemann Aff.)
18 See Development Agreement for Alpine Village recorded April 7, 2008 (Exhibit 16 to Millemann Aff.)
19 The Development Agreement was re-recorded on February II, 2008 because the attachments were
omitted from the version which was recorded on January 28, and it was recorded again on April 7, 2008 to
correct an error in the legal description.
20 See Mem. Decision Order Granting Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J. dated February 19,2008 (Exhibit 17 to
MiHemann Aff.)
21 See Resolution 08-11 (Exhibit 18 to Millemann Aff.)
22 See Ordinance 856 (Exhibit 19 to Millemann AfT.)
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On June 26, 2008, the City Council adopted Resolution 08-17, pursuant to the
terms of which refunds were also authorized for those persons who "voluntarily" paid
Community Housing Fees under Ordinances 828 and 833,23
On August 20, 2008, the First Amendment to Development Agreement, Alpine
Village Planned Unit Development was recorded. The Amendment released Alpine from
any further obligation to provide Community Housing for Alpine Village,24
On November 4, 2009, the McCall City Council adopted Resolution 09-10 which
established December 31, 2009 as the last date on which requests for refunds of
Community Housing Fees paid pursuant to Ordinances 820, 828, or 833 could be
submitted. 25 Fifty-eight refund requests, totaling $92,820, have been received, approved
and paid by the City for Community Housing Fees paid pursuant to Ordinances 820, 828
or 833. 26 Everyone of the refund requests which was paid by the City was filed long
after the expiration ofthe 180-day period within which such requests arguably would

have been required to be filed under Idaho Code §50-219. In fact, the City accepted and
paid refund requests which were submitted as iong as forty-three months after the fees
had been paid. The City did not assert Idaho Code §50-219 as a bar or defense to any of
these refund requests.
No procedure or authorization whatsoever was provided by the City for the filing
of refund requests or claims for the recovery of fees paid or monies expended pursuant to
Ordinance 819.

27

ARGUMENT
I.

Introduction
The City introduces its arguments in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment

with a number of assertions which are, at best, misleading. The City states that "Alpine's
problem is that the bottom fell out of the housing market and Alpine wishes it did not

23

See ReS<llution 08·17 (Exhibit 20 to Millemann Aff.)

24

See First Amendment to Development Agreement for Alpine Village recorded August 20, 2008 (Exhibit

21 to Millemann Afr.)

See Resolution 09-10 (Exhibit 22 to Millemann Aff.)
See Affidavit of Deanna Schnider, filed concurrently herewith.
21 The chronology of events which is contained in the Statement of Facts is illustrated in a condensed
Timeline, which is attached to this Memorandum as Attachment A.
25

26
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own the Timbers.,,28 There is no question that the rapid decline in the housing market is a
factor in the calculation of Alpine's damages. However, "Alpine's problem", as the City
wouJd phrase it, is that:

0) Alpine was forced to comply with an unconstitutional

Ordinance as a mandatory condition of obtaining approval for its development; (i i) after
Alpine's attempt to use property (i.e. the mobile home spaces) which it already owned to
satisfy the community housing requirement was rebuffed by the City, Alpine acquired the
Timbers complex solely to satisfy the requirements of the Ordinance; (iii) the City
provided every other person who was subjected to either of the companion community
housing ordinances (i.e., Ordinance 819 and Ordinance 820) except Alpine the
opportunity to request and receive their money back; and, (iv) the City waived the
requirements of the Notice of Claim Statute (Idaho Code §50-219) for each and every
said claimant, except Alpine.
The City also suggests that " ... as part of its Development Agreement with the
City, Alpine waived and released the City from 'any claims whatsoever regarding or
stemming from the pending litigation between Mountain Central Board of Realtors and
the City .......29 It is disconcerting that the City did not complete its quote of the
Development Agreement, which continues with the words ..... as to Community Housing
Units which are sold pursuant to this Plan prior to the final disposition of such
litigation.',3o The Chy admits that no such sales occurred.

The City also mischaracterizes its "side trip" to federal court, suggesting that it
urged the federal court to waive the "prudential" requirements of Williamson County

Regional Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank ofJohnson City. 473 U.s. 172 (1985). In
fact, after removing this case to federal court, the City argued in its Motion to Dismiss
that the requirements of Williamson County were mandatory and that Alpine's alleged
non-compliance with Williamson County requlred dismissal with prejudice ofthe case. 3 )
It was only after Alpine moved to remand on the basis that the removal deprived Alpine
of its ability to comply with Williamson County that the City changed its position by
arguing that the requirements of Williamson County were prudential and should be

City's Opening Sr. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 8.
City's Opening Br. Sup)). Mot. Summ. J. 9.
30 See §7.1 of Deve)opment Agreement for Alpine Village (Exhibit 16 to Millemann Aff.)
:18
29
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waived by the federal court. This flip flop was noted by Judge Winmill in his
Memorandum Decision remanding this case:
In its brief supporting its Motion to Dismiss, the City initiaJly argued that
this Court should apply Williamson County ripeness requirements to
Alpine City's claim (citation omitted). Recognizing that application of
Williamson County would require this Court to remand to state court, the
City now reverses course and urges the Court to waive the ripeness
requirements in order to reach the other arguments in its Motion to
Dismiss. 32
The City concludes its Statement of Facts with a series of statements which either
mischaracterize the undisputed facts of record; or, are completely without support in the
factual record which is before this Court. The City argues that:
If Alpine was concerned about being left holding the property, it could
have acquired an option in the property and awaited the outcome in
Mountain Central. Alternatively, it could have agreed to restrict more onsite units or paid a larger in lieu fee and gotten its money back after
Mountain Central. In any event, it could have sold the Timbers at any
time, rather than wait for the market to crash. 33
In fact, Alpine had no basis to project how long the Mountain Centra/litigation
migbt last or what the outcome of that litigation might be. Alpine desired to proceed with
its development. The City left it with only one way to do so, namely to comply with
Ordinance 819. Apparently the City's level of confidence about the pending Mountain
Central litigation was such that it was comfortable continuing to impose Ordinance 819

during the pendency of the litigation and it was further comfortable requiring only a
partial release of claims related to community housing units which were sold to third
parties during the pendency of the Mountain Central case. Not only did the City agree to
Alpine's use, in part, of the acquisition of off-site units to satisfy the Ordinance, it
insisted that those units be designated and dedicated and was aware that Alpine was
acquiring the Timbers solely to comply with the Ordinance. The City'S suggestion that
Alpine somehow could have readily sold the Timbers units or that Alpine waited for the
"market to crash" to assert its claim is disingenuous. First, this argument has nothing to

31

See City's Opening Br, Supp. Mot. Dismiss 15 (Exhibit 24 to Millemann Aff.)

n See Mem. Decision and Order 4 (Exhibil 29 to Millemann Aft:)
3] See City's Opening Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 11.
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do with the issue before the Court; namely, whether a taking has occulTed. Moreover, the
City can cite no evidence of record which remotely supports these assertions. Alpine Vvill
be prepared to introduce expert testimony at the damage phase of this case that will
establish that, on the day the City released the restrictions on the Timbers units, Alpine
had already suffered damages well in excess of one million doHars. Lastly, the City's
suggestion that Alpine could have just agreed to pay an in lieu fee and get its money back
is completely contradicted by the record. No refund requests or claims for monies
expended under Ordinance 819 were allowed by the City. What is even more telling
about this assertion is the implicit concession by the City that, if Alpine had complied

with the Ordinance by paying money, it would be entitled to a refund; but, having
complied by acquiring and dedicating off site units, its claims are barred.

II.

The City's imposition on Alpine of Ordinance 819 constituted a taking or
inverse condemnation under Article I, Section 14 of the Idaho Constitution
and, if relief is denied under the state constitutional claim, then a
compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment to .he United States
Constitution has occurred.
A.

The issue of whether a taking bas occurred is an issue oflaw.

The issue of whether a taking has occurred is a legal issue to be resolved by the
Court. Tibbs v. City o/Sandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 670, 603 P.2d 1001, 1004 (1979)
(citing Rueth v. State, 100 Idaho 203, 596 P .2d 75 (1979». In Rueth, the Idaho Supreme
Court held that a11 issues regarding inverse condemnation are to be resolved by the trial
court, except the issue of what is just compensation. See a]so, Covington v. Jefferson
County, 137 Idaho 777,780,53 P.3d 828,831 (2002).

This case presents a unique set of facts, not often found in inverse condemnation
or takings actions. McCall City Ordinance 819, which is the basis of Alpine's takings
c1aims, has previously been he1d to be void, as having impermissibly exceeded the City's
police powers. Mountain Central Board a/Realtors v. City o/McCall. Valley County
Case No. CV2006-490-C. J4 Additionally, the Mountain Central court found that
Ordinance 819 attempted to regulate a landowner's ownership rather than use of property

34
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and as such, was an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of the police powers and was
unconstitutional. The City did not appeal the decision in Mountain Central. Thus. unlike
most of the takings cases which will be cited to the Court, the issue of whether the City's
underJying ordinance was constitutional or whether the City had any authority at all to
require Alpine to expend funds or divest itself of property rights has already been fully,
finally and adversely resolved against the City.

B.

The application of Ordinance 819 to Alpine effectuated a per se taking
of Alpine's protected property interests.

At the time Alpine filed its development applications. the community housing
ordinance was in effect and Alpine's compliance with that ordinance was mandatory.

What did not become clear until months later is how Alpine would comp]y and what the
ramifications of that compliance would ultimately be. The Ordinance allowed Alpine
four ways, or a combination of those ways, in which to provide low income, community
housing. To comply with the Ordinance. and with the City's full knowledge, Alpine
expended well over two million dollars to acquire and renovate the Timbers apartment
complex, which was then converted to a condominium and deed restricted as community
housing. It is indisputable that the City required Alpine to expend funds and imposed
significant restrictions on Alpine's property rights pursuant to an unconstitutional
Ordinance which the City was without authority to adopt or impose on AJpine.
Both the Idaho and United States Constitutions prohibit the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation.

3S

"The Fifth Amendment's guarantee

that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation was
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v.
United Stales, 364 U.S. 40, 49,80 S.Ct. ]563,4 L.Ed.2d 1554, 1569 (1960).

In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2076, 161

L. Ed. 2d 876 (2005), the U.S. Supreme Court identified the two types of

H

"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." Fifth Amendment to

U.S. Const. "Private property may be taken for public use, but not until aju!>t compensation, to be
ascertained in the manner prescribed by law, shall be paid therefor." Idaho Const. Art. I, § 14.
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regulatory actions which will be deemed to be per se takings under the Fifth
Amendment:
Regulatory actions generally will be deemed per se takings for Fifth
Amendment purposes (l) where government requires an owner to suffer a
permanent physical invasion of its property, see Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp. 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868, or
(2) where regulations completely deprive ao owner of "all economically
beneficial us[e]" of her property, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 112 S.Ct. 2886,120 L.Ed.2d 798.

Lingle. 544 U.S. at 528, 125 S. Ct. at 2016. 36
Ordinance 819 effectuated a Loretto type of per se physical taking of Alpine
Village's constitutionally protected property interests, in at least two respects. Alpine
was required to expend in excess of two million dollars and Alpine was required to suffer
an invasion and taking of fundamental and protected property rights. Either way, the
application of the Ordinance to Alpine was a per se violation of the aforesaid Idaho and
United States Constitutional provisions for which compensation must be paid.

1.

The City took a fundamental and constitutionally protected

property right from Alpine, namely the right to freely exclude
people from and dispose of its property.
One ofthe bundle offundamental and constitutionally protected property rights

which has been recognized by the courts is the right of an owner to freely dispose of
property. The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that "Property in a thing consists not
merely in its ownership and possession, but in the unrestricted right of use, enjoyment
and disposal. Anything which destroys any of these elements of property, to that extent
destroys the property itself." O'Connor v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37, 42, 202 P.2d
401,404 (1949).

This view is not unique to Idaho. The United States Supreme Court

has long held that property consists of a "(G]roup of rights inhering in the citizen's
relation 10 the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it." U.S. v. Gen.

Motors Corp.. 323 U.S. 373,378,65 S. Ct. 357, 359, 89 L. Ed. 311 (1945). See also
Kaiser Aetna v. U 8., 444 U.S. 164, 179, 100 S. Ct. 383, 393,62 L. Ed. 2d 332 (1979),

36

In LorellO v. Teleprompter M(1l!haltan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419. 102 S.O. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868
(J 982) the Supreme Court held thal a compensable taking resulted from the government's appropriation of
part of a rooftop in order to provide cable TV access for apartment tenants.
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"[W]e hold that the 'right to exclude.' so universally held to be a fundamental element of
the property right. falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take
without compensation."

The City required Alpine to permanently deed restrict its community housing
units as to both purchase price and eligible purchasers. Alpine was required to sel1 or
lease its property at restricted prices only to those individuals who met certain age,
income and residency requirements, as established and administered by the City of

McCall. Ordinance 819,7, p. 9. In short, the City took from Alpine its fundamental
right to dispose of its property to whomever it chose and for whatever price it could
obtain. The City also took from Alpine Village its right to freely exclude others from the
property and to determine who will occupy the property.
The City may well argue that a per se Loretto taking requires an actua1 physical
invasion of one's property by the governmental entity. It would be an overly simple
reading of Loretto to conclude that it applies only to an actual physical occupation of land
by the governmental entity and to do so would be contrary to the analogous caselaw

which has developed regarding per se takings.
The United States Supreme Court has made it clear that where the character of the
governmental action implicates fundamental property rights, a per se taking

will be

found, even absent a literal physical invasion of the property by the governmental entity
itself. In Hodel v. Jrving, 48J U.S. 704, 107 S. Ct. 2076,95 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1987). the
Supreme Court examined and invalidated a federal statute which prohibited Indian tribal
members from passing property to their heirs and descendants. In finding that the statute
effectuated a taking the Court held as foHows:
In Kaiser Aetna v. United Stales, 444 U.S., at 176, 100 S.Ct., at 391, we
emphasized that the regulation destroyed "one of the most essential sticks
in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property-the
right to exclude others." SimiJarJy, the reguJation here amounts to virtually
the abrogation of the right to pass on a certain type of property-the smalJ
undivided interest-to one's heirs. 1n one form or another, the right to pass
on property-to one's family in particular-has been part of the AngloAmerican legal system since feudal times.
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Hodel v. Irving. 481 U.S. at 716, 107 S. Ct. at 2083.
This same per se takings analysis has been applied by various state courts in cases
in which the court found that an essential property right had been infringed. In Gregory

v. City ofSan Juan Capistrano, 142 Cal. App. 3d 72, 191 Cal. Rptr. 47, (Ct. App. 1983)
the California Court of Appeals found that a city ordinance which required an owner who
desired to sell his mobile home park first to offer it to "the residents," violated the park
ov.rner's right to control the disposition of his or her property.

The ability to sell and transfer property is a fundamental aspect of property
ownership. Property consists mainly of three powers: possession, use, and
disposition. (U.s. v. General Motors Corp., supra., 323 U.S. at pp. 377378 [89 L.Ed. at p. 318].) California courts have long recognized the
fundamental importance of an o\\;ner's right, absent an illegal purpose, to
sell property to whomever the o\vner chooses. "The constitutional
guaranty securing to every person the right of 'acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property,' ... includes the right to dispose of such property in
such innocent manner as he please." (El; Parte Quarg (1906) 149 Cal. 79.
80 [84 P. 766]; see Tennant v. John Tennant Memorial Home (1914) 167
Cal. 570, 575 [140 P. 242J; Laguna Royale Owners Assn. v. Darger
(1981) 119 Ca1.App.3d 670, 681 1174 CaJ.Rptr. 136].) This part of the
ordinance simply appropriates an owner's right to sell his property to
persons of his choice. City has thus "extinguish[ed] a fundamental
attribute of ownership," in violation of federal and state Constitutions.
(See Agins v. Tiburon, supra., 447 U.S. at p, 262 [65 L.Ed.2d at p. 113].)
Gregory v. San Juan, 142 Cal. App. 3d at 88, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 58.
The Washington Supreme Court has held that the forced transfer of a right of first
refusal constituted a taking. "The instant case falls within the rule that would generally
find a taking where a regulation deprives the owner of a fundamental attribute of
property ownership. See Guimont, 121 Wash.2d at 605 n. 7, 854 P.2d 1; Settle, supra, at

387" Manufactured Housing Communities of Washington v. Stale, 142 Wash. 2d 347,

369, 13 PJd 183, 194 (2000).
In holding that a taking resulted from the application of a rent control ordinance
which granted perpetual leases to a limited class of individuals, the New York Court of
Appeals ruled that:
Property attributes to any physical object include the rights "to possess,
use and dispose" of the asset (United States v General Motors Corp., 323
US 373, 378). It is well established that even if only a single element of an
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT Of ALPINE VILLAGE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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owner's" 'bundle of (property] rights' ,. is extinguished, there has been a
regulatory taking (see, Hodel v Irving, 481 US 704, 716, supra; see also,
Seawall Assocs. v City o/New York. 74 NY2d 92, supra).

Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hasp., 84 N.Y.2d 385, 398, 643 N.E.2d 479 (1994).
Ordinance 819, as applied to Alpine by the City, was an outright invasion of
Alpine's right to freely dispose of its property, through sale or rent, to a buyer or lessee of
its choosing, at

a price of its choosing.

The determination of price and person was

controlled by the City, not Alpine. The Ordinance resulted in the forced occupation of
Alpine's property by renters or buyers approved by the City, not Alpine. As such, under
the authority cited above, Alpine's fundamental constitutionally protected property rights
were taken and extinguished by the City. This conclusion follows directly from the
findings of Judge Neville in Mounrain Cenrral.
The restrictions for community housing dictate the price for which the
property may be sold and to whom the property may be sold. Even if the
landowner builds rental units, the restrictions that twenty percent of the
units be community housing also limit how much rent a landowner may
charge and to whom the units may be rented. These restrictions go much
further than merely regulating the usc of property; instead, they essentially
regulate ownership of the property by dictating to whom a unit may be
37
sold or rented.

2.

The requirement that Alpine expend money to comply with a void
and unconstitutional ordinance effectuated a taking.

Under the perceived authority of Ordinance 819, the City required Alpine to
spend in excess of two million dollars to provide low income housing for a public use.
With the holding in Mountain Central, it is undisputed that the City had no statutory
authority to require Alpine to spend any money whatsoever for this purpose.
Money is property in the constitutional sense. "Money is clearly property that

may not be taken for pub1ic use without the payment of just compensation. Brown v.

Legal Found. o/Wash., 538 U.S. 216,123 S.Ct. 1406, 155 L.Ed.2d 376 (2003)." BHA
Investments, inc. v. City ofBOise, 141 Idaho 168, 172, 108 P.3d 315, 319 (2004). In BHA
the Idaho Supreme Court found that the payment of money to the City of Boise pursuant

'7 Mem. Decision Order Granting PI. 's Mot. Summ. J. 29 (Exhibit 17 to Millemann Aff.)
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to a city ordinance that the Court had earlier ruled void 38 was an unconstitutional taking.
"Since the City had no authority to charge the liquor license transfer fee, its exaction of
the fee constituted a taking of property under the United States and Idaho Constitutions."
BHA Investments, Inc, 141 Idaho 168, 172, 108 P.3d 315, 3 t 9 (2004). The clear and

unambiguous holding of BHA is that the exaction of money pursuant to a void ordinance
is a per se unconstitutional taking of property.
There is no constitutionally relevant distinction between BHA's payment of
money directly to the City of Boise and Alpine's payment of money to a third party to
purchase property as required by the Ordinance. It is the taking of property for a public
use, without compensation that constitutes the taking. In both instances, the exactions
were mandated by an ordinance later declared to be invalid.
In Brown v. Legal Found o/Washington, 538 U.S. 216, S. Ct. 1406, 155 L. Ed.
2d 376 (2003) the Supreme Court was asked to decide if a Washington State law
requiring interest earned on la\\'Yer c1ient 10LTA accounts be transferred to the Legal
Foundation of Washington to help pay for legal services for the needy was a taking. The
Court in Brown recognized that, prior to addressing the issue of "just compensation" it
must first address the type of takings analysis which should be applied to the case.
Brown, 538 U.S. at 233. In its analysis of the transfer of money from the lawyer client

IOLTA account to the Washington Law Foundation, the Brown court concluded the facts
best suited a "per se" takings analysis as provided for in Loretto.
It is undisputed that, but for the requirements of the Community Housing

Ordinance, Alpine would not have expended two million dollars to acquire the Timbers.
It is likewise beyond dispute that providing community housing was for a public use.

The Ordinance itself stated H[TJhe health, safety and welfare of the citizens of the City of
McCall is dependent upon a reasonable supply of affordable, deed restricted workforce
housing (community housing) being made available ... " Ordinance 819, p. l. Thus
under BHA. Loretto and Brown, the requirement that Alpine expend money to provide
38 In the earlier case, the Supreme Court held that "The state legislature has not granted cities the authority
to impose a transfer fee. The City exceeded its power in collecting the transfer fee ... BHA Investments, Inc.
v. City of Boise, 138 Tdaho 356, 358, 63 P.3d 482, 484 (2003)
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community housing was a compensable per se physical taking under both Article I,
Section 14 ofthe Idaho Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution,
C.

The fact that Alpine is left with the ownership of the Timbers is
irreJevant to Alpine's takings and inverse condemnation claims.

The City commences its argument with two assertions that are completely

unsupported by prevailing case law. First, the city asserts that since Alpine Village stiB
owns the Timbers in fee, no taking can have occurred. Second, the City asserts that all
the City was required to do to compensate Alpine for the taking was to remove the
community housing restrictions from the Timbers. 39 The City cites no authority for either
argument, because none exists.
State and Federal case law leave no doubt that a temporary taking, such as the one
before this court, is nonetheless a compensable taking. "If a regulation of private property
that amounts to a taking is later inval idated. this action converts the taking to a
"temporary" one for which the government must pay the landowner for the value of the
use of the land during that period." McCuskey v. Canyon County Com'rs, 128 Idaho 213,
216,912 P.2d 100,103 (1996) citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los
Angeles County.. 482 U.S. 304,319, 107 S.Ct. 2378. 2388,96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987). The

fact that Alpine owns the Timbers will certainly be relevant to the issue of the amount of

compensation to which Alpine is entitled. It has no bearing on the issue which is before
this Court, namely whether a taking has occurred.
III.

Alpine's Inverse CondemnationfI'akings Claim under Article I, Section 14 of
tbe Idaho Constitution is timely.
A.

Alpine's state constitutional claim was filed well within the four years
prescribed by Idaho Code. §5-224.

There is no dispute that Alpine's state inverse condemnation claim is subject to
Idaho's residual four-year statute of limitations. Idaho Code §5-224, The disagreement
lies in when the four-year statute of Iimitations began to run. Idaho law has recognized
that an inverse condemnation cause of action accrues "after the full extent of the
impairment of the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of [the property] becomes apparent."
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Tibbs v. City ofSandpoint, 100 Idaho 667, 67l, 603 P.2d 1001, 1005 (1979) (quoting
Aaron v. United States, 311 F.2d 798,802,160 Ct.Cl. 295, (1963). The Tibbs Court
reasoned that "The actual date of taking, although not readily susceptible to exact
detennination, is to be fixed at the point in time at which the impainnent, of such a
degree and kind as to constitute a substantial interference with plaintiffs' property
interest, became apparent." Tibbs, 100 Idaho at 671.
The Tibbs standard was reiterated by the Supreme Court in McCuskey v. Canyon

County Com'rs, 128 Idaho 213, 217, 912 P.2d 100, 104 (1996) and more recently in City

o/Coeur dlAlene v. Simpson, 142 Idaho 839, 846, 136 P.3d 310, 317 (2006). In Simpson,
the Supreme Court held that the landowner's inverse condemnation and takings cause of
action accrued not when the subject Shoreline Regulations were adopted, but when those
Regulations were actually applied to Simpson's property. The Court reiterated the
standard articulated in Tibbs, holding that "A claim for inverse condemnation 'accrues
after the full extent of the impairment of the plaintiffs' use and enjoyment of [the
property] becomes apparent.' (cites omitted)". In support of its holding that the
landowner's cause of action did not accrue until the Shoreline Regulations were actually
applied adversely to his property, the Simpson Court quoted Palazzolo v. Rhode Is/and,
533 U.S. 606,121 S.Ct. 2448,150 L.Ed.2d 592 (2001):
In Palazzolo, the United States Supreme Court held that a regulatory
takings claim does not become ripe upon enactment of the regulation;
indeed. it remains unripe until the landowner takes the reasonable and
necessary steps to allow the regulating agency to consider development
plans and issue a decision, thereby determining the extent to which the
regulation actually burdens the property.

Simpson, 142 Idaho at 846, 136 PJd at 317.
The City has cited McCuskey for the proposition that Alpine's claim accrued on
the date on which Alpine first filed its applications with the City, because Ordinance 819
was then in effect. 40 However, McCuskey simply does not support this argument. A
review of the facts of McCuskey helps explain why. McCuskey acquired the subject

39

City's Opening Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 13.
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property in 1978. A year later, Canyon County adopted an ordinance which had the effect
of "down zoning" McCuskey's property. Seven years later, in 1986, McCuskey obtained
a building pennit for a use which does not appear to have been allowed by the County's
zoning ordinance. The County promptly issued a stop work order. McCuskey sued (but
did not allege a taking or inverse condemnation), and in 1993 the Supreme Court held
that the subject zoning ordinance was void (the McCuskey 1 decision). Then, in 1994,
McCuskey filed an inverse condemnation action against the County. The Supreme Court

held that the inverse condemnation action accrued not when the "down zone" ordinance
was adopted (in 1979) and not when McCuskey I was decided (in 1993), but, rather, when

the stop work order was issued, reasoning that

[llhis Court has decided that damages for inverse condemnation should be
assessed at the time the taking occurs. Tibbs v. City of Sandpoint, 100
Idaho 667, 670, 603 P.2d 1001, 1004 (1979) (citation omitted). The time

of taking occurs, and hence the cause of action accrues, as of the time that
the full extent of the plaintiffs loss of use and enjoyment of the property
becomes apparent. Intermountain West, ] 11 Idaho at 880, 728 P.2d at 769
(citing Tibbs, 100 Idaho at 671, 603 P.2d at 1005).

McCuskey, 128 Idaho at 217, 912 P.2d at 104.
If Alpine was arguing that its inverse condemnation action did not accrue until
the Mountain Central decision was issued, the City's citation of McCuskey would be
appropriate. However, that is not Alpine's position. Consistent with McCuskey, Alpine is
arguing that its inverse condemnation action accrued not on the date that Ordinance 819
was adopted and not on the date on which the Mountain Central decision was issued, but,
rather, when the full extent of Alpine's loss of use and enjoyment ofits constitutionally
protected property rights became apparent. As the above Statement of Facts confirms,
this occurred on December 13,2007, when Alpine executed the Development Agreement
for Alpine Village, committing to dedicate the Timbers units as community housing
units. Under the undisputed facts of record, the earliest that this could be said to have
occurred was on March 22, 2007 when,for theflrst time, Alpine's proposed acquisition
and dedication of the Timbers units as community housing units for Alpine Village was

4~

In its continued mischaracterization of Alpine's constitutional claim as a "facial challenge", the City
actually implies that Alpine's cause of action accrued on the date that Ordinance 819 was adopted (City's
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approved by the City Counei1. In either case, Alpine' s filing of its Complaint on
December 10,2010 was well within the allowable four-year statute of limitations.
The City's suggestion that Alpine's inverse condemnation claim accrued when it
filed its applications because it knew it would be subject to Ordinance 819 also ignores
the facts as to how Alpine's community housing plan for Alpine Village evolved. When
it filed its applications, Alpine was proposing to satisfy the requirements of the Ordinance
by constructing some community housing units on site and by dedicating sixteen off-site
mobile home spaces~ which Alpine already owned, as community housing rental spaces.
However, this proposal was rebuffed by both the City's Community Development Staff
and by the Planning and Zoning Commission, who instructed Alpine to submit a revised
plan and to specifically designate and dedicate the off-site units which would be provided
as part of the plan. Both the Planning and Zoning's and the City Council's preliminary
approvals of the Alpine Village Applications acknowledge that the community housing
plan was not final, would be subject to further change and would need to be finalized

when Alpine submitted its final plat applications. 41 This prompted Alpine to pursue the
acquisition of the Timbers apartment complex and to propose that it be converted to
condominiums and dedicated as community housing units to satisfy the off-site
component of the Alpine Village community housing plan. This was first proposed by
Alpine to the City on March 12,2007 andfirsl approved by the City on March 22,2007.
Thus, the earliest that it can be said that the "impairment" of Alpine's constitutionally
protected property rights became apparent was on March 22, 2007. This impairment was
not officially confirmed and memorialized until Alpine executed the Development
Agreement on December 13, 2007.
The other cases cited by the City in support of its argument that Alpine's inverse
condemnation cause of action accrued when it filed its applications are either
distinguishable on their facts or support Alpine's position. In Harris v. Slate, ex reI.

Kempthorne, 147 Idaho 401, 210 P.3d 86 (2009), Harris acquired property and began
Opening Sr. SUpp. Mot Summ. J., 22). The City does not offer any authority to support this assertion.
41 The City Council's preliminary approval of the Applications was granted on December 13,2006. At
that time, Alpine wa3 still proposing to use its mobile home spaces as off-site community housing units.
Alpine's final plat application, which included the proposed dedication of the Timbers units, was approved
by the City Council on August 23, 2007 (see Statement of Facts).
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extracting gravel from it in 1980. In 1986, the State asserted a reserved statutorily created
mineral right to the property and demanded that Harris pay retroactive royalties and enter
into a minera1lease for future extractions. Harris did both in 1986. Thirteen years later

the Supreme Court decided that the subject statute did not create reserved mineral rights
in the state. The state subsequently disclaimed any mineral rights in Harris' property.
Harris then filed an inverse condemnation claim against the state. claiming that the cause
of action accrued on the date of the state's disclaimer. The Supreme Court disagreed,
holding that Harris' cause of action accrued when Harris entered into the mineral lease.
This holding is wholly consistent with Alpine's position in this case, which is that
Alpine's. cause of action accrued not when the Mountain Central decision was issued.,
but, when it became clear that the Timbers would be dedicated as community housing.
The equivalent to the mineral lease in Harris is the Development Agreement in this case.
In Wadsworth v. Dep 'f of Transp , 128 Idaho 439, 915 P.2d 1 (1996), the landowner
waited for 28 years after the single event which caused damage to his property to initiate
an inverse condemnation claim. The Supreme Court ruled that the cause of action arose
seven years earlier, when the landowner filed a tort claim seeking damages allegedly
caused by the same incident.

B.

Alpine's state constitutional claim is not barred by Idaho Code §50-

219
Alpine is entitled to assert equitable and constitutional defenses to
the City's claim that Idaho Code §50-219 is a jurisdictional bar to
Alpine's state constitutional claim.

1.

a.

The legal consequence of Alpine's failure to provide notice in
accordance with Idaho Code §50-219 is not governed by Idaho
Code §6-908.

The City argues that Alpine's failure to timely file a notice of claim under Idaho
Code §50-219 is a jurisdictional defect and that, therefore, Alpine is precluded from
presenting equitable or constitutional defenses to the City's assertion of Idaho Code §5042

219 as an absolute bar to Alpine's state constitutional c1aim

•

Alpine acknowledges that

the Idaho Supreme Court has ruled that Idaho Code §50-219 applies the Notice of Claim

42

The parties concur that Idaho Code §50·219 is not applicable to Alpine's federal constitutional claims.
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Statute (i.e., Idaho Code §6-906) to non-tort claims for damages asserted against
municipalities. However, it is equally clear that neither Idaho Code.§50-219, nor any
other statute, incorporates or applies the balance of the Idaho Tort Claims Act (IlCA) to
such claims. This is no small distinction. The City's entire argument depends on the
Court concluding that the entirety of the ITCA, and in particular Idaho Code §6-908, as
well as the case law applying it, should be applied to Alpine's state constitutional claim
through Idaho Code.§50-219. The plain Janguage ofIdaho Code §50-219 does not

suggest any intent by the Legislature to apply the entirety of the lTCA to non-tort claims.
The applicable case law in fact suggests to the contrary.
In support of its argument that the failure to file a claim under Idaho Code.§50219 is a jurisdictional defect, the City cites McQuillen v. City ofAmmon, 113 Idaho 719.
747 P.2d 741,744 (1987) and Madsen v. Idaho Dept. of Health & Welfare, 116 Idaho
758, 779 P.2d 433 (Ct. App. 1989). However both McQuillen and Madsen turned on the
Court's interpretation of Idaho Code §6-908 of the ITCA. Idaho Code §6-908 provides
that "No claim or action shall be allowed against a governmental entity or its employee
unless the claim has been presented and filed within the time limits prescribed by this

act." (daho Code Ann. §6-908 (West). The word "claim" is a defined term in the ITCA.
As set forth at Idaho Code §6»902(7):
"Claim" means any 'A-Titten demand to recover money damages from a
governmental entity or its employee which any person is legally entitled to
recover under this act as compensation for the negligent or otherwise
wrongful act or omission of a governmental entity or its employee when
acting within the course or scope of his employment. (emphasis added).
Thus, the '"claim or action", as used in Idaho Code §6-908 applies only to tort
claims.
Both McQuillen and Madsen were tort cases which were unquestionably subject
to the entirety of the ITCA. The City has not cited any statutory or judicial authority for
the proposition that Idaho Code § 6-908 determines the consequences of non-compliance
with Idaho Code §50-219 in the case of an inverse condemnation claim or, for that
matter, any other claim which is not subject to the ITCA. The Idaho Supreme Court has
consistently held that Idaho Code §5-224 and not Idaho Code §6-911 (the two year
statute of limitations applicable to tort claims which are subject to the lTCA) is the
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applicable Statute of Limitations for inverse condemnation claims. This confirms the
proposition being argued by Alpine herein, namely that, while inverse condemnation
claims are subject to the notice filing requirements of Idaho Code §6-906, the balance of
the ITCA applies only to "claims" as defined in the Act.

b.

Alpine's failure to provide notice in accordance with Idaho
Code §50-219 is a non-jurisdictional defect

Idaho Code §6-908 expressly disallows any tort claim which is not compliant with
the notice requirements of the Idaho Tort Claim Act. As is explained above, however,
Idaho Code §50.219 applies only Jdaho Code §6-906 and Idaho Code §6-907 to non-tort
damage claims against municipalities. Unlike Idaho Code §6~908, it does not appear that
the Idaho Supreme Court or Court of Appeals have ever held Idaho Code §50-219 to be
jurisdictional and Idaho Code §50-219 itself has no language which would lead to the
conclusion that non-c.ompliance with the statute is jurisdictional.

In Cox v. City o/Sandpoint, J 40 Idaho 127, 131,90 P.3d 352, 356 (Ct. App.
2003), the Court addressed the issue ofwhetber or not the language in a lease agreement
was sufficient to constitute a waiver of the requirements ofIdaho Code §50-219. While
the court concluded the lease language was not sufficient to constitute a waiver, the
significance of the case is that waiver in the context ofldaho Code §50-219 was
discussed at all. If the Court had considered Idaho Code §50·219 to be jurisdictional, no
quality or quantity of waiver language in a lease could have effectuated a waiver of
jurisdiction.
On at least two occasions, the Idaho Supreme Court has in fact ruled that ldaho
Code §50-219 is not a statute oflimitations. 43 Consistent with this characterization, the
Idaho Supreme Court has held that, absent express language in the subject statute
evidencing a legislative intent to bar equitable defenses, such defenses to the application
of even a statute of limitations may be asserted.

44

The Supreme Court's decision in City

See McQui[{en v. City ofAmmon, 113 Idaho 719, 722, 747 P.2d 741,744 (1987); Harkness v. City of
Burley, 110 Idaho 353, 360, 715 P.2d 1283,1290 (1986).
44 See Williams v. Blakley, 114 Idaho 323, 756 P.2d 186 (1988); Twin Falls Building& Hospital Corp. v.
Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 644 P.2d 341 (1982); J. R. Simplot Co. ... Chemelics, Inc., J26 Idaho 532, 887 P 2d
1039 (1994); Ferro v. Soc'y of Saint Pius X, 143 Idaho 538, 540, 149 P.3d 813, 815 (2006).
43
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of Eagle v. Idaho Department of Water Resources, 150 Idaho 449, 247 P.3d 1037 (2011)
is not inconsistent with this line of cases. Therein, the Court held that the doctrine of
quasi-estoppel could not be applied to extend the 28 day period for appeal of an
administrative decision, because the 28 day appeal period was a jurisdictional
requirement under IRCP 84(n). The decision was appropriate, inasmuch as IRCP 84(n)
provides that "The failure to provide a petition for judicial review or cross petition for
judicial review with the district court within the time limits prescribed by statute and
these rules shall be jurisdictional and shall cause automatic dismissal ofthe petitionfor

judicial review ... "(emphasis added). No such language exists either in Idaho Code §50219 or Idaho Code §6-906.
Courts in other jurisdictions that have evaluated comparable notice of claim
statutes have concluded that the notice requirements are procedural, not jurisdictional in
nature and are thus subject to equitable and constitutional defenses. In Pritchard v.

Slale, 163 Ariz. 427, 788 P.2d 1178, (1990), the Arizona Supreme Court dealt explicitly
with the issue of whether or not that state's mandatory notice of claim statute was
procedural or jurisdictional. In holding the Arizona statute to be procedural, the court
cited similar holdings by other jurisdictions.
The requirement of filing a claim with the state is mandatory and an
essential requisite to plaintiffs cause of action. Nonetheless, the time
element with respect to filing is essentially procedural in nature. See Ames
v. State. 143 Ariz. 548, 694 P.2d 836 (App.1985) (faiJure of plaintiff to
allege compliance with statutory notice requirements is not a jurisdictional
defect that could be raised by the state for the ftrst time on appeal). See
also Farrell v. Placer County, 23 Ca1.2d 624, 145 P.2d 570 (1944);
Redlands High School Dist. v. Superior Court. 20 CaUd 348, 125 P.2d
490 (1942). Like a statute of limitations, this procedural requirement is
subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling. Rand v. Andreatta, 60
Cal.2d 846, 36 Cal.Rptr. 846,389 P.2d 382 (1964) (estoppel); Dettamanti
v. Lompoc Union School District, 143 Cal.App.2d 715, 300 P.2d 78
(1956) (estoppel); Florida Medical Center v. Dept. of Health and
Rehabilitative Services, 511 So.2d 677 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App.1987) (waiver);
see Gordon v. National Youth Work Alliance, 675 F.2d 356, 360
(D.C.Cir.1982).45
4S The Pritchard court continued at fu4: "Severa) other jurisdictions have concluded that their claim
statutes are not jurisdictional and, like a statute of limitations, are subject to waiver or estoppel. See
Fredrichsen .... City a/Lakewood, 6 Cal.3d 353, 99 CaLRptr. 13, 49l P.2d 80S (l971); RahinowUzv. Town
of Bay Harbor Islands, 178 So.2d 9 (fJa.1965); Bryant v. Duval Hosp. Authority. 502 So.2d 459
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Pritchard, 163 Ariz. at 432, 788 P.2d at 1183 (1990)
Alpine would submit that the correct legal conclusions to be drawn from the
statutory and judicial authority cited above is that: (i) Idaho Code §50-219 is not a statute
of limitations; (ii) Idaho Code §50-219 has the effect of applying Idaho Code §§6-906
and 6-907 to non-tort damage claims against municipalities; (iii) the balance of the ITCA,
and in particular Idaho Code §6-908, has not been applied to such claims; (iv) unlike
Idaho Code §6-908, there is no evidence in Idaho Code §50-219 of any legislative intent
to prohibit the assertion of equitable and constitutional defenses to the claim that noncompliance with Idaho Code §50-219 should bar a non-tort claim; and, (v) absent such
legislative intent, Alpine is entitled to assert equitable and constitutional defenses to the
claim that non-compliance with Idaho Code §50-219 should bar Alpine's state inverse
condemnation claim.

2.

Application of the 180 Day Notice of Claim Statute to Alpine's
state inverse condemnation claim would violate Alpine's
constitutional right to Equal Protection.

After Ordinances 8 t 9 and 820 were declared unconstitutional, void and invalid in
the Mountain Central Board of Realtors decision, the McCall City Council on April 24,
2008 adopted Resolution 08-11, which authorized refunds of fees paid pursuant to
Ordinance 820. Shortly thereafter, the City Council adopted Resolution 08-17, pursuant
to the terms of which, refunds were aLso authorized for those persons who "voluntarily"
paid Community Housing Fees under Ordinances 828 and 833. The City accepted such
refund requests through December 3 I, 2009.
A total of $92,820 in refunds was paid to 58 claimants. Every one of the refund
requests which waS paid by the City was filed long after the expiration of the 180 day
period within which such requests arguably would have been required to be filed under
Idaho Code §50-219. In fact, the City accepted and paid refund requests which were

(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1986); Gordy Construction Co. v. KIIM Development Co., 128 Ga.App. 648,197 S.E.2d
426 (1973); Dunbar v. Reiser, 26 I1I.App.3d 708, 325 N.E.2d 440 (1975) aJ}'d. 64111.2d 230, J III. Dec. 89,
356 N.E.2d 89 (1976); LaBriola v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Authority, 227 Pa.Super. 305, 323
A.2d 9 (1974); HilJv. Board ofEd. o/Middletown, 183 N.1.Super. 36,443 A.2d 225 (1982)."
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submitted as long as 43 months after the fees had been paid. 46 The City did not assert
Idaho Code §50-2] 9 as a bar or defense to any of these refund requests. Under the very
arguments made by the City in this case, the Notice of Claim Statute would have barred
the refund claims asserted by each and every one of those persons who requested refunds.
Yet, the City elected to waive compliance with the statue for all of the refund claimants.
Ordinance 819 and 820 were treated in all respects by the City as companion
ordinances and both required the expenditure of money to support community
housing, as did the voluntary provisions of Ordinances 828 and 833. Those
complying with Ordinance 820 paid monies directly to the City. Those voluntarily
proposing community housing plans pursuant to Ordinances 828 and 833 could have
expended monies either in direct payment to the City or to third parties. Similarly,
those subject to the mandatory requirements of Ordinance 819, like Alpine, could
have expended monies either to construct community housing units, to purchase
community housing units, to purchase land for community housing units andlor by
direct payment to the City of "in lieu fees". In his Memorandum Decision and Order
in Mountain Central Board of Realtors v. City qf McCall, Judge Neville treated
Ordinances 819 and 820 jointly and as legally indistinguishable.
It follows from these undisputed facts that those who were required to expend
monies pursuant to Ordinance 819 were in the same class, for equal protection
purposes, as those who paid fees pursuant to Ordinances 820, 828 and 833. By
excusing those who paid mandatory fees pursuant to Ordinance 820 or who
voluntarily expended monies pursuant to Ordinances 828 or 833 from compliance
with the Notice of Claim Statute, while now asserting the Statute as a bar to Alpine's
claim for compensation, the City has violated Alpine's right to equal protection of
the law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article J, Sections 1 and 2 of the Idaho Constitution.
There is very little distinction between the treatment of Alpine's equal
protection claim under the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions. In Rudeen v. Cenarrusa,
136 Idaho 560, 569,38 P.3d 598,607 (2001), the Idaho Supreme Court explained

46

Alpine's lawsuit was filed less than 35 months after it signed the Development Agreement.
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that an equal protection analysis under both the federal and Idaho Constitutions
generally involves a three-step process. "The first step is to identify the
classification that is being chaUenged. The second step is to detennine the standard
under which the classification will be judicially reviewed. The final step is to
detennine whether the appropriate standard has been satisfied." (Citations omitted).
The first step, then, is to identify the classification at issue, which is
discussed above. The second step is to identify tbe standard by which the
classification will be tested. While the standard differs somewhat for a state versus a
federal equal protection claim, both a state and federal analysis suggest that the
"rational basis" test is the appropriate level of scrutiny of the City's actions in this
case. 47 The third and final step is to determine whether the rational basis standard
has been satisfied. The rational basis test requires that a statutory classification be
rationalJy related to a legitimate government objective. 48 In Bon Appelil Gormet

Foods, Inc. v. State Dept. ofEmployment, 117 Idaho 1002,793 P.2d675 (1990), the
Court utilized a two-step analysis in app1ying the rational basis test. That analysis
first requires a determination of whether the statute reflects any reasonably
conceivable public purpose, and, second, a determination of whether the
classification is reasonably related to that purpose.
The singular justification which has been offered by the City for the
differential treatment afforded to every other member of the class of persons who
were subjected to community housing extractions is that Alpine did not pay fees or
contribute property to the City and that "Alpine got the equivalent of a full 'refund'
by the City's release of the community housing restrictions on the Timbers
property.49 As is argued above, it is not only disingenuous but legaUy indefensible to
suggest that, having required Alpine to expend over two million dollars to acquire
the Timbers and having then imposed significant restrictions on Alpine's o'A'11ership
rights in the Timbers, merely releasing the restrictions a year later made Alpine
See Meisner v. Potlatch Corp., 131 Idaho 258,954 P.2d 676 (1998), regarding economic and social
welfare legislation, and Bon Appetit Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Slate, Dept. of Employment, 117 Idaho 1002,
793 P.2d 675 (1990), regarding taxation legislation.

47

41

Rlldeen, 136 at 569,38 P.2d at 607.

49

City's Opening Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 17.
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whole. In any event, the City's response to Alpine's equal protection argument
misses the essential point of the argument. The issue is not how the City would or
would not have responded to Alpine's claim, the issue is on what rational basis the
City waived the requirements of the Notice of Claim statute as to every other
member of the class except Alpine. The City has offered no public purpose which
was served by its differential treatment, nor any explanation of how the differential
treatment was related to such purpose. The City should be barred from asserting the
Notice of Claim statute against Alpine.

3.

The City should be estopped from asserting the 180 day Notice
of Claim Statute as a bar to Alpine's state claim.

"The doctrine of quasi estoppel applies when it would be unconscionable to allow
a party to assert a right which is inconsistent with a prior position". Willig v. State Dept.
a/Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259, 261,899 P.2d 969, 971 (1995). The identical set of

facts which fonn the basis for the equal protection analysis discussed above support the
claim that the City should be estopped from asserting that Alpine is required to comply
with the Notice of Claim Statute. After excusing some 58 other similarly situated
claimants from having to comply with the Notice of Claims Statute, the City now argues
that the Notice of Claim Statute bars Alpine's state takings claim. This is fundamentally
inconsistent with the position which was, without exception, taken by the City over a
nearly two year period between April, 2008 and December 31, 2009. The advantage
being gained by the City and disadvantage resulting to Alpine from this fundamental
change of position is that Alpine's claim is potentially barred despite being filed within
the same period of time after its accrual as was allowed for aU other similarly situated
claimants,50 The City should be estopped from asserting this dramatic change of position.

so Alpine is aware of the Court's citation of the Supreme Court's decisions in Harrell v. City of Lewiston.
95 Idaho 243,506 P.2d 470 (1973) and Sprenger, Grubb & Associates. Inc. v. City a/Hailey. 127 Idaho
576,903 P.2d 741 (1995) in the Court's Memomndum Decision on Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment, filed on June 16, 2011 in Henr and Greys/one Village, LtC v. City o/McCall Alpine
respectfully submits that these decisions are specific to the assertion of estoppel in cases involving the
enforcement of municipal zoning decisions. As noted in both opinions "[T]he enactment of zoning
regulations is a governmental function which is not usually subject to estoppel." (quoting Harrell).
Sprenger, 127 Idaho at 583. In addition. Alpine submits that the exigent circumstances found Jacking in
those cases exist in this case, with the City making the discretionary decision to waive a statutory claim as
to 58 out of 59 claimants with nO basis other than to avoid liability to Alpine.
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IV.

Alpine's Federal Takings Claims are Timely
A.

The applicable Statutes of Limitation.

Alpine has pled two takings claims which are based on the Fifth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Alpine's First Cause of Action, Alpine pleads the takings claim "directly" under the Fifth
AmendmentS!. Alpine is entitled to assert the takings claim directly under the Supreme
Court' s decision in BHA Investments, Inc. v. City of Boise, 141 Idaho 168, 108 P.3d 315

(2004), in which the Court held that:
The Takings Clause is self-executing, and a takings claim may be based
solely upon it, First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S.
304, 107 S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed,2d 250 (1987) • or it may be brought as an
action under 42 u.s.c. § /983, City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, LId, 526 U.S. 687,119 S.Ct. 1624, 143 L.Ed.2d 882 (1999).
BHA Investments, Inc, 141 [dabo 175 n.2, 108 P.3d 322 n.2

In Alpine's Third Cause of Action, Alpine also pled the federal takings claim
through 42 U.S.c. §1983.
The two causes of action mayor may not be subject to the same statute of
limitations. Under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Garcia, 47] U.S. 261
(1985), the § 1983 claim is subject to Idaho Code §5-219( 4), which is Idaho's statute of
limitations for personal

i~iury

actions. Neither the U.S. Supreme Coun nOT the Idaho

Supreme Court have ruled on the issue of whether the same statute of limitations would
apply to Alpine's First Cause of Action (i.e. the direct assertion of the takings claim
under the Fifth Amendment). The City cites federal circuit court decisions for the
proposition that the same two-year statute would apply. Alpine contends that the direct
claim would be subject to fdabo Code §5-224, Jdaho's four year statute of limitations. 52

B.

Alpine's federal takings claims are timely, regardless of which statute
of limitation is applied to them.

It does not matter which statute of limitations is applied to Alpine's Fifth

Amendment takings claim. Under controlling Ninth Circuit precedent, Alpine's federal

51

See Second Amended Complaint, filed September 19,2011.

52

See City o/Coeur d' Alene v. Simpson. 142 Idaho 839,136 PJd 310 (2006); C & G. Inc. v. Canyon

Highway Disl. No.4. \39 Idaho 140,75 P.3d 194 (2003).
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takings claim bas not even accrued for statute oflimitations purposes until a final
decision on Alpine's state constitutional claim has been rendered by the courts of Idaho.
The threshold question regarding the issue of when the federal claims accrue for purposes
of commencing the running of the applicable statute of limitations is whether state or
federal law governs. There is no dispute between the parties on this question. The City
concedes that federal law governs the issue of when the statute of limitations begins to
run on Alpine's federal claims. 53
The Ninth Circuit directly addressed the issue of when a takings claim accrues in

Levald, inc. v. Cily of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 687 (9th Cir. 1993), holding that:
To determine when the statute of limitations period begins to run, we first
must determine when the cause of action accrued. Determining when the
cause of action accrues is merely the corollary to the ripeness inquiry ...
"So long as the state provides 'an adequate process for obtaining
compensation,' no constitutional violation can occur" until just
compensation is denied. (cite omitted). Thus, a plaintiff cannot bring a
section 1983 action in federal court until the state denies just
compensation. A claim under section 1983 is not ripe-and a cause of
action under section 1983 does not accrue-until that point.(emphasis
added) .54
Thus, regardless of the applicable statute of limitations, Alpine's Fifth Amendment
takings claim has not accrued and will not accrue until and unless Alpine has been denied
compensation on its state inverse condemnation/takings claim in state court.
The holding in Levald is the logical extension of the fundamental principles of
law regarding Fifth Amendment takings claims, as developed by the U.S. Supreme Court.
In a case of direct significance to this case, the U.S. Supreme Court in Williamson County
Regional Planning Comm 'n v. Hamilton Bank ofJohnson City confirmed that "[T]he

Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without
just compensation".S5 The Court held that a Fifth Amendment taking has not occurred
until the aggrieved party has sought and been denied compensation under the state
constitution. ld.

City's Opening Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 27.
Accord, Hacienda VaJitry Mobile Estates v. City oj."-1organ Hill, 353 F.3d 651 (2003).
" Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank ofJohnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 194,
105 S.Ct. 3108,87 L.Ed. 2d 126 (1985).
53
S4
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This principle was re-affirmed and extended by the Court in San Remo Hotel, L.P.

v. City and County o/San Francisco, et 01.,545 U.S. 323, 125 S. Ct. 2491, 162 L. Ed. 2d
315 (2005). The Court in San Remo held that the aggrieved property owner was required
to also present the Fifth Amendment takings claim to the state court as part of the

Williamson "ripening" process, assuming that both the state and federal claims stem from
the same set of facts. In San Remo, a hotel owner challenged an ordinance which
required the payment of a fee for the conversion of residential rooms to tourist rooms.
The hotel owner sought relief in state court, but purported to "reserve" its federal takings
claims for assertion, ifneeded, in federal court. After the state courts rejected the hotel
owner's state law-based takings claims, the owner filed an action in federal court,
pleading the federal takings claim. The Court found that the hotel owner was precluded
from raising the federal takings claim in federal court, holding that:
With respect to those federal claims that did require ripening, we reject
petitioners' contention that Williamson County prohibits plaintiffs from
advancing their federal claims in state courts. The requirement that
aggrieved property owners must seek "compensation through the
procedures the State has provided for doing so," 473 U.S. at 194, 105
S.Ct. 3108, does not preclude state courts from hearing simultaneously a
plaintiff's request for compensation under state law and the claim that, in
the alternative, the denial of compensation would violate the Fifth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Reading Williamson County to
preclude plaintiffs from raising such claims in the alternative would
erroneously interpret our cases as requiring property owners to "resort to
piecemeal litigation or otherwise unfair procedures." MacDonald, Sommer
& Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 350, n. 7, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 91
L.Ed.2d 285 (1986).56
Thus, it is entirely appropriate for Alpine to bring both the state and federal
constitutional claims in this action; and, under the above decisions, the federal claims do
not accrue until this Court has ruled on Alpine's state claim. As a result, whether the two
year or the four year statute of limitation is applied to Alpine's federal claims, they are
unquestionably timely.
Having argued in the federal court proceedings that Alpine was precluded from
bringing both the state and federal claims in state court, the City now acknowledges that
56

San Remo, 545 U.S. at 346. 125 S.Ct. at 2506.
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it is indeed appropriate for Alpine to do

SO.57

The City, however, now argues: (i) that

Levald should apply only to federal takings claims filed in federal court; (ii) that Alpine
cannot bring an "unripe" claim in state court; (iii) that, as a result, the federal claims must
be considered to be ripe; and (iv) that, therefore, the accrual date for Alpine's federal
claims should be the same as for the state claims. The City cites no authority for this
argument, which is understandable. This argument flies directly in the face of the U.S.
Supreme Court's ruling in San Remo and the Ninth Circuit's decisions in Hacienda and

Levald. Interestingly, this precise argument was also made by the City in the federal court
proceedings in this case and was rejected by Judge Winmill, who found that:
The accrual of a federal takings claim turns on the exhaustion of state
remedies: "'[T]he date of accrual is either (1) the date compensation is
denied in state courts, or (2) the date the ordinance is passed if resort to
state courts is futile." Hacienda Valley Mobile Estates v. City of Morgan
Hill, 353 F.3d 651 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Levald. Inc. v. City of Palm
Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 688 (1993». There is no contention that the
exhaustion requirement is futile here. Therefore, Alpine Village's federal
claim does not accrue until compensation is denied in state court, and it
appears that the statute of limitations has not yet begun to run.
(<!ontinuing at footnote 2):
The City argues that Hacienda Valley Mobile Eslales and Levald apply
only "with respect to a federal claim brought first in federal court:'
(cite omitted). But the Ninth Circuit's rationale is at least as strong
with respect to a state claim removed to federal court.
4<[T]he Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of
property; it proscribes taking without just compensation. "
... Thus, a plaintiff cannot bring a section 1983 action in
federal court until the state denies just compensation. A
claim under section 1983 is not ripe-and a cause of action
under section 1983 does not accrue-until that point.
Levald, 998 F. 2d at 687 (quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S.
at 194).58
There are several inescapable conclusions to be drawn from these decisions. First,
Alpine is required to plead both the state inverse condemnation claim and, in the
alternative. the federal takings claims in this action. Second, although the federal claims
are not ripe and do not accrue until Alpine's state claim has been decided, under the clear

57 City'S Opening Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. 1. 25.
sa See Memorandum Decision and Order, filed August 25,2011, p. 6, (Exhibit 29 to MiJlemann AfT.)
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teaching of San Remo, this court can "simultaneously" hear both the state and federal
claims in this proceeding. Third, the federal takings claims do not accrue for statute of
limitations purposes until compensation has been denied under the state claim. As a
resu1t, Alpine's federal claims are clearly timely.

C.

Alpine's federal takings claims have not been forfeited.

Finally, the City argues that Alpine's federal claims are forfeited because Alpine

failed to timely bring its state claim.59 This argument fails for the simple reason that
Alpine's state claim is timely. Moreover, even if this Court were to find that Alpine is not

entitled to relief on its state claim for some other reason, this stiH would not effectuate a
forfeiture under the cases cited by the City. This is because Alpine's state claim is clearly
timely under the only applicable statute of limitations (Le., Idaho Code §S·224). This fact
alone distinguishes this case from the decisions cited by the City. For example, in

Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 337 F.3d 87 (First Cir. 2003), the
plaintiff was attempting to assert a federal takings claim in federal court some 36 years
after the commencement of the public use of his property which formed the basis for the
claim. The ptaintiffhad challenged the state's assertion of public prescriptive rights in
state court, but had voluntarily dismissed its takings claim in the state case. In federal
court, the plaintiff admitted that its potential state inverse condemnation claim would be
barred by the applicable statute of lim itations and that resort to the state court would not
otherwise have been futile. The resultant ruling was no more than an extension of the

Williamson County decision. Since Alpine's state claim clearly is timely under the only
applicable statute of limitation, Idaho Code §5-224, the "forfeiture" argument has no
merit.

V.

The balance of the City's arguments are witbout merit.
A.

Alpine's expenditure of monies to acquire tbe Timbers and its
acceptance of the restrictions on its ownership rights were not
"voluntary"•

Citing KMST, LLC v, County ofAda, 138 Idaho 577, 67 P.3d 56 (2003), the City
argues that Alpine's expenditure of in excess of two million dollars and acceptance of
severe restrictions on its ownership rights were "voluntary", thereby relieving the City of
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any liability. The Court is familiar with the KMST case and its facts, which bear no
resemblance to the facts of this case. It is indisputable that Alpine's Applications were

subject to Ordinance 819 and Alpine's compliance with Ordinance 819 was mandatory.
The Ordinance was in place when Alpine filed its Applications. By its terms, the
Ordinance was not discretionary and Alpine Vi11age, as presented, clearly fell within its
purview because the project consisted predominantly of "residential units". Both the
McCall Planning and Zoning Commission and the McCall City Council found that the
AppHcations were subject to the requirements of the Ordinance. The City Council
required, as a condition of approval, that Alpine present a final Community Housing Plan
with its Final Plat and that the Plan be incorporated into a recorded Development
Agreement. When the Mountain Central lawsuit was filed, the City elected to continue
to apply the Ordinance to the Alpine Village Applications rather than to suspend it. The
City rejected Alpine's initial plan to utilize property which it already owned to satisfy the
off-site community housing component and required Alpine to identify its' off-site
community housing units. The City was specifically aware that Alpine was acquiring the
Timbers units solely to comply with the requirements of the Ordinance. The City's
assertion that Alpine's compliance with Ordinance 819 was "voluntary" is completely
unsupported by the undisputed facts of record.

B.

A1pine did not release its claims against the City.

The City suggests that this Court should find that Alpine released all of its claims
against the City by means of the language of the Alpine Village Development
Agreement, the pertinent section of which provides:
Alpine Village waives and releases the City from any claims whatsoever
regarding or stemming from the pending litigation between the Mountain
Central Board of Rea1tors and the City (ie. Mountain Central Board of
Realtors, et al v. City of McCa11, et ai, Valley County Case Number CV2006-490-C) as to Community Housing Units which are sold pursuant /0
this Plan prior (0 the final disposition of such litigation. The Plan will be
reviewed and modified, as necessary, to comply with the final disposition
of the litigation as to any Community Housing Units which have not been
soLd prior to the final disposition of the litigation. (emphasis added). 60

59
6()

City's Opening Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 29.
See Article VlI, Alpine Village Development Agreement (Exhibit 16 to Millemann Atf.)
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The City suggests that "The only fair reading of Article VII is ... that the City
would be released from claims if Ordinance 819 were invalidated.,,61 The language of
Article VII is unambiguous. Alpine's release is clearly limited to only claims related to
units which were sold prior to the final disposition of the Mountain Central Board of
Realtors case. No Timbers units were sold during this period. The record is devoid of any

evidence which would support the City's position.
C.

Alpine's claims are not barred by the doctrine of laches.

Of the numerous unsubstantiated and outright false factual assertions made by the
City in support of its argument that Alpine's claims should be found to be barred by the
doctrine of laches, perhaps none are more blatant than the statement that "[A]Ipine waited
for years, as the market continued to rise and then crashed. Only then did it inform the
City of its legal theory that the City has, in effect, been ensuring Alpine's investment all
along.,,62 This is a classic, albeit disappointing, example of the City's willingness to
make up the facts to suit the argument. There is absolutely no evidence of record to
remotely substantiate the City's c1aim that the market "continued to rise and then
crashed" after the City released the Timbers from the community housing restrictions. To
the contrary, the evidence at the damages phase of this case will establish that the market
had crashed before the City rescinded Ordinance 819 and released the Timbers from the
associated restrictions and that, by then, Alpine had suffered damages in excess of one
million dollars. The City's suggestion that its "hands are clean" is bold, if nothing else.
This is the same city which required Alpine to expend in excess of two million dollars
and accept significant restrictions on its property ownership under the authority of an
Ordinance which was unconstitutional and which the City had no legal authority to enact.
It offered every single other person or entity which had expended money in compliance

with the companion community housing ordinances, except Alpine. the opportunity to
request a refund of the monies expended. It waived as to every such person any
compliance with the 180 day notice of claim statute which it now asserts as a bar to
Alpine's claims. It paid refund claims which were presented as long as 43 months after

61

6l

City's Opening Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. 1., 31.
City'S Opening Br. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. 32.
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the claim would have accrued. The City has no standing to seek relief from this Court on
equitable grounds.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons and pursuant to the authority offered above, Alpine respectfully
requests that this Court grant Alpine's Motion for Summary Judgment, deny the City's
Motion for Summary Judgment and enter judgment against the City and in favor of

Alpine on Alpine's claims that the City's actions in imposing Ordinance 819 on Alpine
effectuated an inverse condemnation of Alpine's protected property interests under
Article I, Section 14 of he Idaho Constitution and a taking of Alpine's said property
interests under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
DATED this 7th day of October, 20 II.

MILLEMANN, PITTENGER, McMAHAN
& PEMBERTON, LLP
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